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Mr. Chairman and members of the Civil Rights
Commission, my name is R. Dennis Ickes.

JE have been requested

by the Boards of County Commissioners for Duchesne and Uintah
Counties, Utah, to appear before you today on their behalf.
Each Board of County Commissioners consists of three members
who are elected from among the eligible voters of the County,
whether Indian or non-Indian, and whether tribal member or
non-tribal member.
I have haa extensive personal experience concerning
the subject which is being reviewed by th$ Commission.

I

served as the first Deputy Director of th^ Office of Indian
Rights within the Department of Justice fr|om 1973-74.
Thereafter, I served as the Director of that office from
1974-76.
Interior.

From 1976-77, I was Deputy Undensecretary of the
In each of these positions, I c^ealt directly with

the issues of individual rights as they interacted with the
rights of tribal governments.

After leaving the federal

service in 1977, I have practiced law in the West where I have
either been involvea in or aware of many olf these same issues.
I hope that I can convey to you tne need to make
aajustments in existing law so as to, on the one hano, protect
and enhance tribal sovereignty, and, on th£ other hand, better
protect the rights of individuals whom are subject to that
sovereignty.

Such adjustments in the law $hould be grounded

upon the principle that the consent of the governed is required
before an entity is empowered to impose it^ will upon others.

Aid I.

The county commissioners of Duchesne and Uintah
Counties nave airectea me to appear before you today as their
representative to share with you their perceptions of the
problems arising out of tne Santa Clara pueblo v. Martinez
decision ana a recent decision of the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals1 in State of Utah, et al. v. Utah Indian Tribe, 773
F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985).
It is not the Counties' purpose today to argue their
legal differences with the Ute Tribe in 4ny pending or future
cases.

The Counties are not seeking to Have Congress redraw

the boundaries of the Uintah or the Uncoi^pahgre Reservations.
Instead, it is the Counties1 purpose to make this Commission
aware of what is happening and what is li|kely to happen within
the bounaaries of tne Ute reservation reqognizea by the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Further, it isi the Counties1 purpose

to propose a means for resolving the chaols ana unfairness that
has arisen from the decision.
Unfortunately, it is not legally possible for the
United States, the State, the Counties, ahd the Tribe to
resolve the problems created by the 10th Circuit's decision
among themselves without the assistance of the Congress.
Unless the Congress provides the requested legislative
assistance, the only remaining recourse w}ll be for the
Counties, the Ute Tribe, the Counties' residents, and tribal
members to litigate at great expense and ]Joss of time each and
every consequence of the 10th Circuit's decision.
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The Counties

believe that there is sufficient goodwill between and among the
federal, state, local and tribal governments to work out a
jointly arrived at solution if they have %he legislative and
financial means from Congress to do so.
STATISTICAL BACKGROUNb
Duchesne County is the twelfth largest county and
Uintah County is the sixth largest county of Utah's 29
counties.

Duchesne County consists of 2,086,400 acres ana

3,260 square miles.

Uintah County consists of 2,856,320 acres

and 4,476 square miles.

The 1986 census Showed a population ot

approximately 13,500 resiaents in Duchesne County ana 24,000
residents in Uintah County.

Approximately 17,000 residents of

these two Counties and approximately 70% df all fee land are
encompassed by the 10th Circuit1 s defined CJte Reservation.
Duchesne County's population consists of approximately
13,200 non-Indians and approximately 300 Indians,
Approximately 50% of the total population reside within the
incorporated towns of Duchesne, Altamont, jyiyton, Tabiona, and
Roosevelt.

None of these incorporated tov^ns was consiaerea to

be locatea within the pre-lOth Circuit Ute Reservation
bounaaries.

After the 10th Circuit's aeci|sion, all ot the

major incorporated areas are considered to be located within
the Ute Reservation.
Uintah County's population consists of approximately
22,048 non-Indians and 1,952 Indians.

The principle cities and

towns affected by the 10th Circuit's decision are Tridell,
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Lapoint and Ballard which have a combined population of
approximately 5,000 residents who are predominantly non-Indian.
Both Counties' Indian population almost entirely
reside upon lands hela in trust by the United States for their
individual or tribal benefit.

The Indian population consists

primarily ot members of the Ute Tribef butJ there are some
persons who are members of other Indian tribes or are racially
Ute, but are not enrolled in the Ute Tribe|.

It is impossible

to distinguish tribal members from non-tri|bal member Indians,
except through an examination of the tribal membership books
and records.
Approximately 90% of Duchesne County's population
resides within a 30-mile wide strip that traverses the County
from east to west.

The Duchesne County area north of the strip

consists primarily of the Ashley National Forest, and the area
south of the strip is largely comprised of the Ashley National
Forest ana high mountain country which is sparsely settled.
Duchesne County is semi-arid oesejrt or primitive
forest land.

The County is known for its high mountain lakes

and spectacular scenery and attracts thousands of visitors each
year.
Both Counties' economic base relics upon tourism, oil
and gas production and ranching.

Future economic development

in the Counties may include tar sands, oil shale, water
development through the Central Utah Project and other natural
resource related enterprises.
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Presently, both Counties and the State have a number
of business incentives to attract economic activity, including
a lack of an inventory tax, utilization of industrial revenue
bonds, industrial parks, favorable energy rates, and a
broad-based tax structure.
An extensive wilderness area known as the High Uintas
Primitive Area, consisting of 73,000 acres at 13,528 feet above
sea level, including Kings Peak, the highest point in Utah, and
many accessible recreational areas, is spread over both
Counties.

Uintah County also is home to Dinosaur National

Monument, flaming Gorge National Recreatioiji Area, and numerous
lakes.

The Ute Tribe's Bottle Hollow Resort is within Duchesne

County.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Utes originally dwelled within portions of Utah,
Colorado, and northern New Mexico where th^y relied upon
hunting and gathering for food.

Europeans identified seven

bands of Ute people, of whom three bands npw reside in the
Duchesne and Uintah County areas.

The Ute people had various

contacts with the Spanish, the explorers, adventurers, mountain
men, and trappers.
in the mia-1800s.

These were followea by the Mormon pioneers
Conflicts eventually occurred between the

Utes and the Mormon settlers and by the 18^0s the traditional
solution of Indian removal was again implemented by the United
States government.

The area acceptable to the United States

and to Governor Brigham Young was the Uint4h Basin.
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President

Lincoln designated the Uintah basin as a Reservation by the
Executive Order ot October 3f 1861.

A treaty was thereafter

signed by the Utes and Governor Young upoji the representation
that the Uintah Basin would become the Ut£ reservation.
However, this treaty was rejected by the United States Senate.
For the next four years, as a result of the Senate's
rejection of the treaty that had been accepted by the Utes, the
Black Hawk War was waged between the Mormon settlers and the
Utes.

The territorial militia eventually defeated the Utes.

Under the leadership of Chief Tabby, who favored peace, the
Utes were removed to the Uintah Valley.
In 1875, the federal government purveyed the first
boundary for the Uintah Valley Reservation.

In 1888, Congress

mandated that a 7,040 acre strip of lano hfe declared to be
public lands of the United States and restored to the public
domain.

This act of Congress began a series of actions by the

Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Interior to
affect the Ute's reservation.

The effects of those actions are

the subject of litigation brought by the Tjribe against the
State of Utah, the Counties and the citie^.

The Counties

intend that the courts determine these iss|ues.
LITIGATION BACKGROUND
In October 1975, the Ute Tribe si^ed the State and the
Counties seeking to establish the reservation boundaries in
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approximately their original location.

Approximately twelve

years later, those boundaries were fixed qs described in the
map attached as Exhibit "A".
The 10th Circuit's decision is orie of the most drastic
ana far-reaching decisions ever handed dowjn affecting the State
ot Utah ana its subdivisions in that:

(1) it has quadrupled

the size of an Inaian reservation with a s broke of a pen,
making it the secona largest reservation 1 n the Unitea States;
(2) it has dramatically slashed the State1 b and the Counties1
tax base; (3) it has placed the Tribe, the State, and the
Counties into direct competition for reven iae from most of the
same lands, property and people; (4) it hab subjected
approximately 17,000 people who are not members of the Ute
Tribe and their property to tribal controll for many civil
matter; (5) it has deprived those same 18,|)00 people of federal
court oversight review of tribal government actions; (6) it has
deprivea non-Ute tribal members of the riglfit to vote and
otherwise participate in the government thkt asserts
jurisdiction over them; (7) it has ousted £tate concurrent
jurisoiction in many instances; ana, (b) iji essence, has placed
the fate of the Counties' residents in theihands of
approximately 450 tribal voters who currently vote in tribal
elections.
Prior to the filing of the lawsuit by the Ute Tribe,
there had been a multi-decade and long-standing recognition by
the United States, the State of Utah, the (pounties, and other
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political subdivisions, that the Ute Reservation consisted of
approximately 1,000,000 acres of territory

The Ute lribe, as

late as immediately prior to its enactment of the Comprehensive
Law and Order Code in 1975, had accepted that designated area
as well.

Thus, it was a tremendous shock to Duchesne and

Uintah Counties when the Ute Tribe adopted a Comprehensive Law
and Order Code in September 1975 which assorted the Tribe's
governmental power over approximately 4,00 0,000 acres, instead
of the 1,000,000-acre area that had been previously
acknowledged.

The Tribe currently asserts that it had

governmental power over all residents of tjie entire
4,QUO,000-acre area, including power over ^on-tribal members to
the extent that the subject matter touches in some direct or
indirect wa> upon the Tribe, its officers, agents, employees,
property, enterprises, its members, or Indians generally.

A

portion or tnat code is attached as Exhibit "fa".
Duchesne and Uintah Counties have legally resisted the
Tribe's assertions at great expense through the federal
district court in Salt Lake City, through two 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals1 decisions, and through a Petition for
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Coiart.
Prior to the 10th Circuit's decision, or more
correctly, prior to the time that the Trib^ brought suit
against the State of Utah in 1975, there existed a somewhat
predictable delineation of the authority between and among the
federal, state, local and tribal governments.
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It was

uniformally accepted that the federal govejrnment had exclusive
jurisdiction and responsibility for federa 1 lands, such as the
national forest and Bureau of Land Management administered
lands, plus navigable rivers, lakes and re|servoirs, and to some
extent, concurrent or exclusive jurisdicti on in certain
instances on tribal ana individually allotted trust lands.

It

was equally accepted that the State of Utan had exclusive
jurisdiction and responsibility for the remainder of Duchesne
County, such as state land, school lands, fion-navigable
streams, lakes, and reservoirs, and fee labds, but that it had
no jurisdiction over tribal or individually allotted Indian
trust lands.

Likewise, it was understood that the Ute Tribe

had exclusive jurisdiction over its members (and maybe Indian
non-members), and over trust lands and trust property, but that
its authority over non-Indians was restricted to removal
rights.

There seemed to be no dispute by ^ny government that

the incorporated cities and towns were outride of the
jurisdiction of the Tribe.

In certain instances, the federal

ana state governments shared concurrent jurisdiction over
certain assimilated crimes and over certain civil matters.
The State and the Tribe had striven to work out
cooperative ways of accomplishing mutual gcj>als, such as
cross-deputization and development of the (tentral Utah Project
water pact.

Sometimes these attempts to cooperate worked well,

such as cross-deputization, and sometimes they did not, such as
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when the Ute Tribe refused, and still continues to refuse, to
ratify a mutually negotiated water pact wijth the Utah State
Legislature.
Thus, for the period preceding trie 10th Circuit's
decision there existed a somewhat clear understanding of where
each government stood in its authority ovejr land, people and
property.
Subsequent to the 10th Circuit's Idecision, the
jurisdictional picture is chaotic and, thus, the Counties
predict that the new situation will generate a large number of
lawsuits aesigned by each litigant to aefine the limits of the
particular government's authority with regard to lana,
property, and people within 4,000,000 acres.

As presently

unaerstooa, the 10th Circuit's decision will significantly
affect the authority of the federal government within the
national forest, the Bureau of Land Management aaministereo
tracts, and on the United States Fish and Wildlife administered
lanas and waters, as well as in other areajs formerly understood
to be federal.
As to the State and its subdivisions, the 10th
Circuit's decision appears to have ousted ^hem from all areas
within the reservation where they formerly,possessed concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal government.

In addition, the

decision may have placed them into direct cpompetition with the
Tribe to tax basically the same people for revenue and regulate
activities of non-tribal members residing yithin the
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reservation on non-trust lands.

Further, the decision has cast

a pall over the authority possessed by incorporated cities ana
towns.

The aecision appears likely to severely cut back

revenue ana revenue sources for both the State ana the County.
While the County is required by law to continue to proviae
extensive governmental services for all residents, its tax base
has been greatly erodea.
NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION
Duchesne ana Uintah Counties believe that the
judiciary is not institutionally equipped to render decisions
that will specifically confront the jurisdictional problems
that naturally arise out of the 10th Circuit's decision.
Therefore, these Counties approach this hearing with the
attitude that there must be a better way of solving the
problems createa by the 10th Circuit's decision and the present
state of the law concerning the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Only Congress has the Constitutional flexibility to
stuay the problem ana fashion legislation Ito solve or minimize
tfte problems.

The Civil Rights Commission has the mandate from

Congress to stuay and collect information concerning legal
developments pertaining to the civil rights of residents of the
Unitea States and therefrom to make recommendations to the
President ana to the Congress.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE INDIAN CIVllL RIGHTS ACT
Indian tribal governments are not limited in the
exercise of their powers by the Bill of Rights, the 14th
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Amendment, or the United States Constitution.

The 1968 Indian

Bill of Rights purportedly was enacted to restrict the tribal
governments in many of the same ways as tpe Bill of Rights
restricts the federal government.

However/ the U.S. Supreme

Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, )l36 U.S. 49 (1978)
held that the Indian Civil Rights Act con pained no private
right of action against tribal governments and held that tribal
governments are immune from suit in federal court.
Enforcement of the Indian Civil Kights Act today
resides solely within the absolute discretion of tribal
government, except for habeas corpus actions.

Whether any

person who comes within the jurisdiction of a tribal government
receives the intended benefits of the Act depends more upon the
political discretion of a tribal council than upon the legal
judgments of its tribal courts.

This is so because there is no

circumstance where a federal court can exercise judicial
oversight, except in habeas corpus situations, and perhaps in
limited situtations J.n the 10th Circuit.
A recent headline in The Lakota times, a reservation
newspaper, demonstrates once again the supremacy that tribal
councils have over their inferior tribal courts.

The July 29,

1987 edition of The Lakota Times stated "<t>ST Council System
Overrules Tribal Court".

The news article went on to explain

that the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council votecti to overrule both the
tribal trial court and the appellate court on an issue
pertaining to a wrongful employment termination.

-12-

AAU}

This incident

occurred on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota
where there has been an history of tribal council actions which
have disregaraed tribal courts who have attempted to apply the
law.

For example, in Shortbull v. Looking hlk, 677 F.2d 645

(8th Cir. 1982) the court of appeals noted:
We must, however, express serious concern that
Shortbull1s rights under §1302 of the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) [citation omitted] may never be
vindicated.

Shortbull alleges tlhat the tribal court,

Chief Judge Red Shirt, ruled tha^. he was entitled to
run in the primary election because of the Tribal
Council's January 24 resolution.

It appears that

because of this ruling, Judge Red Shirt was removed
from office ana was replaced by a judge more
sympathetic to the Tribal Executive Committee, who
quashed Juage Rea Shirt's orders.| Such actions raise
serious questions under the Inaian Civil Rights Act,
but because the Supreme Court aeterminea in Martinez
that there is no private right of action under the
ICRA, Shortbull has no remedy [iii federal court]. . .
We are [also] presented witq a situation in which
Shortbull has no remeay within the tribal machinery nor
with the tribal officials in whoq e election he cannot
participate, [citations omitted] unless and until
Congress provides otherwise.

[citing Santa Clara

Pueblo at 72]. We question whether such a result is

-13-

AU.W

justified on the grounds of maintaining tribal autonomy
and self-government:

it frustrates the ICRA's purpose

of "protect [ing] individual Indians from arbitrary and
unjust actions of tribal governments," and in this case
it renders the rights provided by the ICRA
meaningless.

677 F.2d at 650.

Also, in Garreaux v. Andrus, 676 IF.2d 1206 (8th Cir.
1982) H[t]he court recognize[dJ that the plaintiffs are being
treatea unfairly by the tribal council" but nonetheless felt
compelled to dimsiss, as a result of Sant4 Clara, a suit to
require an election to change the tribal constitution, Id. at
1210.
In Committee to Save Our Constitution v. Unitea States,
No. 83-3011 (D.S.D., Feb. 24, 1984) 11 ILI^ 3035, the United
States district court said:
When the tribal council fail ed to implement the
change from 6 districts back to l|3 districts, one or
more of the members of the plaintiff association . . .
brought an action in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Court before Chief Judge LeBeau . . . Judge LeBeau held
. . . that future elections must Utilize 13 election
districts rather than the 6 distr icts then in use.
On June 15, 1982, Judge LeBe ku's term of office
was terminated by tribal council Resolution.

On June

21, 1982, the tribal council resc jinded Judge LeBeau's
injunction barring further use of| the six election
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districts then in place.

On or shortly after June 21,

Melvin Garreau [reputedly the father of the then
current tribal council chairman] was appointed chief
judge of the tribal court by the cpouncil.
In Kickapoo Tribe v. Thomas, No. ^3-4177 (D. Kan.f June
24, 1S83) (10 ILR 3093) that Court held that it had no
jurisdiction after the Santa Clara decisioh to consider a tribal
election dispute adding, at 3096, that it ^is not my place to
determine whether [ ] congressional Indian policy fosters
self-government or a vacuum with potential for chaos."
In Runs After v. United States, 7^6 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.
1985) , the 8th Circuit commented on the Judge LeBeau situation
and a number of other tribal members who w$re barred from
seeking tribal office.

That Court of Appeals noted that:

. . . despite the substantive guarantees of certain
constitutional rights contained im the

ICRA,

'the only

federal relief available under th$ Indian Civil Rights
Act is a writ of habeas corpus,' ^oodface v. Grassrope,
708 F.2d at 338 n.4, and

f

[t]hus, actions seeking other

sorts of relief for tribal deprivations of rights must
be resolved through tribal forumsf•
The Court went on to state that " . . . givpn congressional
concern about deprivations of individuals1 rights by tribal
authorities [it is] improbable that Congress desired enforcement
of rights to be left to the very tribal authorities alleged to
have violated them."
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Where federal courts have retained jurisdiction over
habeas corpus matters, factual situations h kve been brought to
light where victims of unfair tribal acts h ave been determined
to have no non-habeas corpus relief available.

In Good v.

Graves, Civil No. 6-85-508 (D. Minn., May 2D, 1985), the
plaintiffs in tribal court of Inaian offenses were convicted of
several criminal offenses, including the possession of drugs,
ana sentencea up to six months in tribal ja|il.

The federal

district court found as fact:
Ihe evidence brought forth at tne trial indicates that
the Red Lake Tribal Council has a |policy of not
permitting lawyers to practice before the Red Lake
Court of Indian Offenses . . . [an|d such a policy] is
in direct violation of 25 U.S.C. ^1302(6) which
provides that no Indian tribe sha]Jl deny a person in a
criminal proceeding the right to qounsel . . .
[Further] the testimony of the Reel Lake prosecutor and
the former prosecutor indicates that in the past
several years there has been only one jury trial
granted to a criminal defendant.

By telling [the

defendants in tribal court] that they would have to pay
for a jury trial, the Red Lake Coi|irt of Indian Offenses
denied petitioners their right to a trial by jury which
is specifically guaranteed by 25 Ip.S.C. §1302(10) . . .
The evidence in this case leads tljiis court to the
inescapable conclusion that the rfLghts guaranteed
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petitioners by the Indian Civil Rights Act were
tramplea upon by the officials of the Red Lake Court of
Indian Offenses.
The report and recommendation of the magistrate in the
same case goes on to add that the conduct of tribal officials
demonstrates "virtually complete disregard for the rights
afforded to petitioners under the [ICRA], Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate, Civil Noj. 6-85-508, at 7
(April 23, 1985) • . . [and it] is reprehensible that
individuals acting within the tribal court system would directly
misstate and completely ignore the law,"
In a non-habeas corpus matter, th |e court in Vvells v.
Philbrick, 486 F. Supp. 807 (D.S.D. 1980) (allegation of bad
faith on the part of the tribal council in a chila custody case
dismissed in light of Santa Clara, supra), stated that:
If the allegations of the complai bt may be taken as
true plaintiffs available tribal forums seem limited
. . . [and] it certainly may be argued that the effect,
after Santa Clara Pueblo, of the pECRA is to create
rights while withholding any meanl:ingful remedies.
Some federal courts have stretched to accommodate Santa
Clara in certain egregious situations.

InJ Dry Creek Lodge, Inc«

v. Arapaho and Shoshone Tribes, the 10th Circuit found federal
jurisdiction to consider an ICRA complaint for damages against a
tribe.

It did so largely because the mattjer was "outside of
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internal tribal affairs", concerned "an issue with a non-Indian"
and "in the absence of [available tribal] relief or remedy the
reason for the [Santa Clara] limitation disappear".
Although the ICRA was intended to protect individuals
from tribal abuse, enforcement may be unavailable as a practical
matter.

The 10th Circuit reliea heavily oq the facts in Dry

Creek Lodge to conclude that:
Plaintiffs Cook, who are non-Indians, had owned
the 160-acre tract for about ten years and had lived
there.

They decided to build a guest lodge for

hunting, and consulted the superin|ltendent of the
reservation about the matter.

He advised them that

projects of that type were encouralcIged to provide
employment.

He also stated that there would be no

access problem.

A license to plaintiffs Cook was

issued for the business.

The individuals then formed

Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. to build thq facilities.
was done with an SBA loan.

This

The lodge was completed and

opened, but the next day the Tribes closed the road at
the request of a nearby Indian family, the Bonatsies .
. . With the road blocked the persons on the Dry Creek
land could not get out and were fbr all practical
purposes confined there until a fdderal court issued a
temporary restraining order.

Thereafter the plaintiffs

sought a remedy with the tribal court, but were refused
access to it.

The judge indicated he could not incur
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the displeasure of the Council and that consent of the
Council would be neeaed.

25 C.F.If. §11.22.

The

consent was not given.
Without federal jurisdiction, the court reasoned, plaintiffs
would lack access to any forum.
The plaintiffs alleged that their personal and property
rights under the Constitution had been violated by the
defendants.

A jury so found and ^warded damages.

There must exist a remedy for parties in the position
of plaintiffs to have the dispute resolved in an
orderly manner.

To hold that they have access to no

court is to hold that they have constitutional rights
but have no remedy.

The self-help which was suggested

to shut down plaintiffs1 "business" accoraing to the
Council minutes, and which was carried out with the
help of the federal police, does not appear to be a
suitable device to determine constitutional rights.
The decision in Dry Creek Lodge, however, cannot be
relied upon to solve problems encountered py non-tribal
members.

The decision has been criticized|by a number of

commentators, See, e.g., Gover and Laurenc^, Avoiding Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, at 8 (The Dry Creek Lodge
Court's "conclusion is wrong because they ignore tribal immunity
and the rationale of Santa Clara"), narrowed in scope by the
10th Circuit itself, White v. Pueblo of Saji Juan, 728 F.2d 1307
(10 Cir. 1984), and rejected by other circuits, Garreau v.
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Andrus, supra, at 1210 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (Refusing to follow
but mentioning Dry Creek Lodge with approval).

Dry Creek Lodge

is a judicial statement that the ICRA is woefully deficient.

In

his aissent in Dry Creek Lodge, Judge Hollpway said:
"To me this is a most disturbing cpase because of the
result I feel compelled to reach.

The jury found a

violation of the plaintiffs1 civil rights recognized by
§1302 of the Inaian Civil Rights Act, under most
distressing circumstances.

And yet it seems we must

say that the doors are closed against any orderly
redress for the wrongs. State and federal
courts are barred by the immunity doctrine from hearing
the claims and access was denied |:o the tribal court/
as the majority opinion points out. Nevertheless, I
must reluctantly agree with the trial court's
conclusion that the Santa Clara opinion compels
dismissal as to the sole remaining defendants, the
tribes.
The most recent known case to touch on the scope of a
tribal government's powers over an individual within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation is Duro v. Reina,
821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987).

The 9th Circuit held that a

non-member Indian is subject to tribal government authority
where the person had significant contacts With the reservation.
The foregoing discussion of the qurrent status of the
law concerning the ICRA is both relevant and pertinent to the
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day-to-day life within the Duchesne and Uirlitah County areas.
While the County governments are not awarel of any egregious
deprivation of civil rights by the Ute Tripe prior to the 10th
Circuit's decision, the 10th Circuit's dec (ision adds 3,000,000
acres of non-trust land and 18,000 persons to the partial
control by the Ute Tribe.

These 3,000,000 acres and 18,000

persons encompass significant property and political rights. The
inaividuals do not have any political infl bence in the conduct
of tribal governmental affairs.

The future need for revenue and

the lack of federal legislative restraint are likely to either
compel or allow the Ute tribal government to exercise civil
control over persons and their property.

This situation will

surely produce extensive litigation by those who can afford it.
Those who cannot afford litigating to protect their property or
their political interest will be swallowed) by the superior power
of the Ute Tribe.
It is fair to say that the curren t Ute tribal
government has been reasonable in many respects since the 10th
Nonetheless, the Ute Tribe has let both the

Circuit's decision.

State of Utah and the Counties know in no (uncertain terms that
it intends to expand its power into areas where it previously
has not ventured.

In early 1987, the Ute Tribe sued the State

of Utah and Duchesne County to collect cerltain past tax revenues
collected by the State and County within the 10th Circuit
defined reservation.

That case remains pending.
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Much

uncertainty remains as to what additional expansion of powers
this tribal council and future tribal counqils may take with
respect to property and political rights.
There are also at issue the political and property
rights of many persons who are allegedly racially Ute but whom
are politically non-Ute.

These concerns are expressed in

greater detail in a statement of claims described in a "Notice
of Claim", a memorandum from the attorney for these politically
non-Ute Indians to various federal officials, and in a letter
to the governor of Utah by the same attorney, all of which are
attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E".

Irj essence, the

racially Ute persons have been unsuccessfully seeking for an
extended period to be accepted as Ute tribal members.

The Ute

tribal government nas consistently denieo them tribal
membership.

Thus, under the Duro decision supra, these persons

are treated as being within the jurisdiction of the Tribe when
they are within the 10th Circuit's defined (reservation, but
they have no Ute political rights.
There exists both a disparity of political ana
property rights between tribal members and non-tribal members
within an Indian reservation's boundaries,

There is also a

disparity of political and property rights between tribal
members within a reservation and all citizens of the U.S. who
live outside of a reservation's boundaries!

The existence of

an Indian reservation places its residents into a "quasi
foreign territory" where quasi federal constitutional rights
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are applied in theory, but always subject tlo discretionary
enforcement by the tribal government then in power.

Thus,

tribal members are second-class U.S. citizens and non-tribal
members are third-class U.S. citizens.

If this was intended by

the 1968 ICRA, then it should be corrected by new law.
In summary, the ICRA creates "rights" whose
implementation are subject to the absolute discretion of each
tribal council.

The four-told expansion of the Ute reservation

and the concommitant expansion of tribal authority give rise to
justifiable concern by Duchesne and Uintah Counties that their
respective governmental powers and the political rights of
non-tribal members will be diminished.

All residents of the

reservation will be deprived of the full protection of the
Unitea States Constitution.
NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
A Congressional solution for current inequities within
reservations must be premised upon the bed-rock fundamental
theory of American government that government derives its just
powers from the consent of the governed.

iThis means that

Congress should examine the functions of tjie governments
operating within Duchesne and Uintah Counties to ascertain whom
such governments purport to govern, and then to determine if
those persons whom they purport to govern *iave given their
consent to be governed by each of those governments.

The

Counties believe that the Congress would discover to its
surprise that under present law the Ute Indian Tribe could
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assert substantial governmental power and Authority over
persons who resiae within the exterior boundaries of the 10th
Circuit's defined reservation who, by Tribal law, do not have
the right to give or withhold their consent to government by
the Tribe.

The elected representatives of all residents of

Duchesne and Uintah Counties feel this is a deplorable
condition within the United States of America.
The governmental power currently recognized to be
possessed by tribal governments probably includes some degree
of control over hunting and fishing activities of all persons
(except perhaps in the national forests), water rights, control
of ingress and egress to certain non-trust lands, assessment of
taxes, even on non-Indian fee lands, regulation of the sale of
liquor, imposition of a severance tax on oil ana gas production
by non-Indian lessees, imposition of cigarette taxes on sales
to non-Indians, imposition of zoning and land use regulations,
regulation of the conduct of business, determination of certain
domestic relations, tort actions, and collection matters, and
other important powers affecting the healtp, welfare, safety
and revenues of the Counties' residents.
These extensive powers of an Indikn tribe not only
allow an Indian tribe to assert extensive pivil jurisdiction
over non-tribal members who reside within |a reservation, but
such powers also operate in many instances to exclude the State
and the Counties from regulating certain activities of the
Counties' residents and persons passing th rough the Counties.
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Thus, not only will an undisturbed 10th Cirlcuit decision impose
newly discovered governmental jurisdiction over non-tribal
members, but it will also dramatically affejct the Counties'
ability to raise revenue to support government services for all
of their residents, tribal and non-tribal, Presumably, the
revenues raised or income received by the tJ1te Tribe is not
required to be expended for the direct benefit of non-tribal
memoers.

It is believed that Duchesne County's $6 million

budget for 13,500 residents and Uintah County's $10 million
budget for 24,000 residents is dwarfed by the Lite Tribe's
budget for 2,713 members.
Chaos has or will emerge in the cbnduct of government
and in the conduct of individual business Affairs because of
the conflicting understandings of existing laws.

Unfairness

has or will result because there are two inconsistent theories
of government at work in these two Counties.

One theory of

government arises out of the Declaration of Independence
statement that government derives its just powers from the
consent of the governed.

This principle was engrained as the

fundamental source of all government power in the Articles of
Confederation, the United States Constituteon, and every
state's Constitution.
A different and conflicting theory of government
applies to the source of power for tribal government.

That

theory of government arises out of judicial interpretations of
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution at
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Article I, which states that the Congress shall regulate
commerce among the several states and with the Indian tribes.
This judicial interpretation has come to mqan that Indian
tribes are free to exercise absolute authority within their
territory to the extent that such authority has not been
limited by an act of Congress.
Thus, on the one hand, the legitimacy of federal,
state and local governments is based upon t[he consent of all
persons who are proposed to be governed.

On the other

competing hana, the legitimacy and political power of tribal
government is based upon inherent sovereignty which is subject
only to those limitations as have been imposed by Congress.
The result has been that the Ute Inaian Trjbe has established a
constitution ana bylaws which confer power^ of government upon
a tribal business committee whose powers o^ government arise
from the consent of persons whom the Tribe has concluded
possess sufficient specified Ute Indian racial characteristics
to be acceptable as tribal members.

The cdurts have defined

tribal "citizenship" as belonging to those persons whom the
tribe will accept.

I

Historically, "citizenjship" in a tribe has

been limited to those possessing certain specified Indian
racial characteristics, primarily Indian bJLood quantum of a
certain minimum percentage.

In the Counties' opinion the

currently judicially accepted theory of Indian government
cannot fairly and equitably assert government power over
non-tribal member residents within the reservation if it
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contains significant numbers of non-member^ and contains a
significant percentage of non-trust lands.
There are no effective limitations imposed upon a
tribe's governmental authority over non-menjbers, except habeas
corpus review by feaeral courts.

Nonetheless, it is well

established that a tribe has the right to remove non-members
from a reservation.

Presumably, this is so even if the

non-mernber owns property and resides on the reservation.
Therefore, you can imagine that non-members| will have to
appease the tribal administration or be in fear of being
subject to removal.
Without limitations being imposed by Congress, Indian
tribes will continue to be capable of imposing obligations upon
non-members without extending the privileges that would
otherwise be available to the non-member outside of the
reservation context.

The federal government and state

governments have accepted limitations upon their authority
through their respective constitutions. Th|<e Counties are
requesting that this Commission recommend to the President ana
to the Congress that limitations be imposed upon Indian tribes
which both apply general constitutional law principles to
tribal governments and provide for meaningful federal judicial
oversight of tribal acts and omissions.
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CONCLUSION
Obviously, something is dreadfullly wrong when a
federal court acknowledges that a government has extensive
powers over all residents within its territory, but does not
simultaneously require that same government to extena the power
of the vote and other political rights to all residents of
legal age who are subject to the powers oil that government,
This condition would be condemned by every federal and state
court in the United States, except when it involves the powers
of an Indian tribal government.
The existing facts require the civil Rights Commission
to apply its financial and personnel resources to finding a
creative and fair means to permit the county ana tribal
governments to operate within Duchesne and Uintah Counties to
the extent that each government extends political rights to the
residents thereof.
Thank you for this opportunity t<^ present our views.
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Original

1861 and 1882 Reservation Boundaries

Present Boundaries of the Uintah and Oiufay Reservation *x per
1985 Tenth Circuit Court Decision

MA. W

Judae Jwtf/i

PREAMBLE
This Law and Order Code for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is
established for the purposes of strengthening ^ribal self-government, providing for the judicial needs
of the Reservation, and thereby assuring the maintenance of law and order on the Reservation.
TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARY PROVISI0NS
§1-1-1

Constitutional Authority.

This Law and Order Code is adopted piirsuant to the authority vested in the Tribal Business
Committee under Article VI of the Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation.
§1-1-2

Name of Code.

This Law and Order Code shall be known as The Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe of
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and may be referred to as the Ute Law and Order Code, or Law and
Order Code, and may be abbreviated as the U.L.O.C. Sub-codes and rules included herein may be
cited by the name given in the sub-code or rule heading.
§ 1 -1 -3.

Prior Inconsistent Ordinances Repealed.

Any and all ordinances of the Tribal Business Committee which conflict in any way with the
provisions of this Law and Order Code are hereby repealed to the extent that they are inconsistent with
or conflict with, or are contrary to the spirit and/or purpose of this Law and Order Code.
§1-1-4.

C.F.R. No Longer Applicable.

Any and all provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 25, Part II, as presently
constituted or hereafter constituted which deaj with subjects covered in this Law and Order Code or
are otherwise inconsistent with or in conflict ^vith the provisions of this Law and Order Code or the
purpose and/or spirit of this Law and Order Cofie are declared to be no longer applicable to the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation.
§1-1-5

Amendment of Law and Order Code.

This Law and Order Code may be amende^, additions made hereto, or deletions made herefrom in
the manner provided for the adoption of tribal ordinances. Amendments and additions to this Law and
Order Code shall become a part thereof for all purposes and shall be codified and incorporated herein
in a manner consistent with the numbering and organization hereof.
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CHAPTER 2. JURISDICTION
§1-2-1

Jurisdiction • Tribal Policy.

It is hereby declared as a matter of Tnoal policy and legislative determination, that the publi<
interest ar J the interests of the Ute Indian Tribe demand that the Tribe provide itself, its members, anc
other persons living within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe as set forth in Article I of th<
Constitution of the Ute Indian Tnbe with an effective means of redress in both civil and cnm.nal case
against members and non-Tribal members who through either their residence, presence, busmes
dealings, other actions or failures to act, or dther significant mm mum contacts with this Reservatioi
and/or its residents commit cnminal offenses against the Tribe or incur civil obligations to persons o
entities entitled to the Tribe's protection This action is deemed necessary as a result of the confusioi
and conflicts caused by the increased contact and interaction between the Tribe, its members, an(
other residents of the Reservation and othjer persons and entities over which the Tribe has no
previously elected to exercise jurisdiction The jurisdictional provisions of this Law and Order Code
to insure maximum protection for the Tribe, its members and other residents of the Reservation
should be applied equally to all persons, rrjembers and non-members alike
§ 1-2-2

Territorial Jurisdiction.

(1) The Jurisdiction of the Courts of thelUte Indian Tribe shall extend to the territory within th<
onginaJ confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive Orders of October 3
1861, and January 5, 1882, and by the Acts (^Congress approved May 27, l902,June 19 1902,anc
March 11, 1948, and to such other lands without such boundaries as have been or may hereafter fcx
added to the Reservation or held in trust for thp Tnbe under any law of the United States or otherwise
(2) The jurisdiction of the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe shall extend beyond the temtona
limitation set forth next above, to effectuate the jurisdictional provisions set forth below, to th<
greatest extent permissible by law
§ 1-2-3

Personal Jurisdiction.

(1) As used in these jurisdictional provisions, the word "person" shall include any individual
firm, company, association, or corporation
(2) Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions or limitations contained in either federal law
the Tribal Constitution, or as expressly stated elsewhere in this Law and Order Code, the Courts of the
Ute Indian Tribe shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over the following persons
A Any person residing, located or present within the Reservation for
0

Any civil cause of action, or

u)

Any charge of cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the
Tribe when the offense is allegeld to have occurred within the Reservation

B Any person who transacts, conducts, 0r performs any business or activity within the Reserva
don, either in person or by an agent or representative, for any civil cause of action or charge o
criminal offense for any act expressly prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the Tribe arising
from such business or activity
C Any person who owns, uses or possesses any property within the Reservation, for any civi
cause of action or charge of cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the Tribe
arising from such ownership, use or possession
D Any person who commits a tortious acft or engages in tortious conduct within the Reservation
either in person or by an agent or representative, for any civil cause of action arising from such act oi
conduct.
E Any person who commits a cnminal offense prohibited by this Code or other ordinance of the
Tnbe, by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable, if
i)

The conduct occurs either wholly or partly within the Reservation, or

u)

The conduct which occurs outside the Reservation constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit ap offense within the Reservation, and an act in
furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy occurs within the Reservation, or

in) The conduct which occurs withirj die Reservation constitutes an attempt, sohcita-
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tion, or conspiracy to commit in another junsdiction an offense prohibited by this
Code or ordinances of the Tribe] and such other junsdiction
(3) None of the foregoing bases of jurisdiction is exclusive, and junsdiction over a person may be
established upon any one or more of them as applicable
§ 1 2-4

Jurisdiction Over Property.

Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained in either federal laws and
reg jlations the Tribal Constitution, or as express!) stated eK*where in this Law and Order Code, the
Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have junsdiction over am real or personal property located on the
Reservation to determine the ownership thereo or rights therein or to determine the application oi
such property to the satisfaction of a claim for which the owner of the property may be liable
§ 1 -2-5

General Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Limitations.

Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained in either federal law, or
the Tnbal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have junsdiction over all civil causes
of action, and over all offenses prohibited by this Code except the Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall
not assume junsdiction over any civil or cnminal matter which does not involve either the Tnbe its
officers, agents, employees, propert) or enterpnses, or a member of the Tnbe, or a member of a
federalh recognized tnbe, if some other forum exists for the handling of the matter and if the matter is
not one in which the nghts of the Tnbe or its members mav be directly or indirect!) affected
§1-2-6

Concurrent Jurisdiction.

The junsdiction invoked bv this Code over am person, cause of action, or subject shall be
concurrent w ith any valid j unsdiction over the same of the courts of the United S tates, am state, or an)
political subdivision thereof, provided, however, mis Code does not recognize, grant, or cede
junsdiction to any other political or governmental entitv in which jurisdiction does not otherwise exisi
in law
§1-2-7

Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.

(1) The Courts of the Ute Indian Tnbe shall have exclusive original junsdiction in all matters in
which the Ute Indian Tnbe or its officers or employees are parties in their official capacities
(2) Nothing contained in the preceding paragraph or elsewhere m this Law and Order Code shall be
construed as a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Tnbe or its officers or enterprises unlev
specificallv denominated as such
CHAPTER 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS; JUDGES AND OTHER COURT
PERSONNEL.
§1-3-1

Courts Established.

(1) There is herebv established a Ute Indian Appellate Court, which mav be refened to as the
\ppellate Court, to handle all appeals from the Tnbal Juvenile Court and Tnbal Court as providec
elsewhere in this Law and Order Code The Appellate Court shall consist pf three justices
(2) There is hereby established a Ute Indian Tribal Court, which may be referred to as the Tnbu
Court, to handle all matters of a judicial nature not specificall} placed within the junsdiction ot som<
other judicial torum The Ute Indian Tnbal Court shall be a court of general civil and cnmina
jurisdiction and shall hear appeals from all Tribal administrative bodies
(3) There is hereby established a Ute Indian Tnbal Juvenile Court, which may be referred to as th<
Tribal Juvenile Court, to handle all matters set forth in the Juvenile Code contained in this Law anc
Order Code
§1-3-2

Judges.

(1) There shall be appointed
(a) Three Appellate Court Justices for the Appellate Court;
(b) One Chief Judge and as man) associate Judges as tne Business Committee sees fit
for the Tribal Court, and
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NOTICE:
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DATg;

January 9 f 1987

SUBJECT!

CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY

TOi

Martin Seneca
Stewart Pike
Floyd Wopsock
Haxine Natcheee
Lester Chapoose
Frank Arrowchis
Leon Perank
Perry Baker, Superintendent
William Ragsdale, &~ea Director,
William McConkie, Regional Solicitor
John & Jane Does 1 - 100
YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby notified that as attorney for

the following individuals, Haskell

Levi

Chapoose,

Shawn Thomas

Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon Levi Chapoose, Michel 1 Ouetta
Chapoose, Dorthea Unca Sam Garcia, Mureen

Garcia, Murita Garcia,

Johnnie Chris Garcia, Phillipi Theodore Garcia, Lora Lynn Garcia,
E, Maxie Chapoose,
Chapoose Reed,
Lanna

Mary

Sr. ,

Lori Lyn

(Marie)

Maxie

Chapas

Reed, Ina

Wopsock,

Chapoose,

Jr.t Marietta

Charlene Reed, John Wopsock,

Leslie

Karen

Wopsock,

Raymond

Wissiup, Raylene Jamie Wissiup, Raymond Wissiup II, Cynyella Mona
Rae Wissiup,
Myore,

Leanna

Angela Martin,
Beth

Hullingpr, Willis
Brad

Denver,

Chivers

Kent

Lanca

Elmer
Chris

Charles

Thomas Reber, Rickie
Bolena

Thurnhorst,

Troy chivers,

Susan Denver Gilbert,
Stavenson,

Stanley Whitthawk

Christensen

Lynn

McCcok, Judy Ann

Darlene Marie Chivers

Laura Kaye

Chivers f.guilar, J.

Denver, Geraldine Denver Buckalew, F.
Harold
Denver,
Reber,

Aguilar,

Denver,
Johnnie
Brenda

Vance

Tern
Lee

Lois

Lynn Denver

Reber, Freddie
Reber Anderson,

0. Christensen,

Dixie
Page
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Christensen Mai one,
Chandler,

Christina

Christensen,

Gerald

Harris, Winifred
Richard
Griffin,

Dennis

Elmer

K.

Christensen
Christensen,

Harris, Romaine
Daniels,

Larry

Grant

Daryl

Elmer Charles

Elnora Christensen

Hullinger,

Vernon

Keht

Joyce LaRose

Marilyn

Johnson, Karen LaRose,

Iorg, Bruce L. Icrg, Pala lorg Nelson,

Wayne Perank,

Lopez,

Sarah

Jenks,

Troy

Edward Jenks,

Jolene Perank, Misty Ann Perank, Monica J. Perank,

Dallas Wayne Perank, Clint B. Perank, Sony& K.
Gray and

others.

of

clients,

directly or

Lopez, Joyce

Monaco, Eileen Rae Lopez Admundson, Carol Jean Lopez

Martinez, Danny LeRoy

said

Daniels

LaRose, Gary Carnes

Leonard Paul Lopez, Naomi Clara Lopez Adamp, Junior
Marie Lcpez

Oran

Kenna Dee Harris,

Daniels,

Loren

Terry

Christensen, Clarence

"J" Hariris,
Lynn

LaRose,

LaRcse, Robert Fred LaRose,
Alan Icrg,

Christensen,

Burns, Norma Jean

I intend to file a Complaint -for and on behalf
against

each

of

you

for

engaging, either

indirectly, in a Conspiracy t£ deny the Civil Rights

Guaranteed under the Indian Civil Rights A(tt, the Constitution of
the Ute

Indian Tribe

Constitution of
statutes and

the

laws.

of the
Unitea

Uintah and
States,

or

under

and

al1

other applicable

This conspiracy has been directed towards my

aforesaid clients and others,
ne^c&rs

Ouray Reservation, the

the

each

Tribal

of

whom

Constitution

are

either tribal

ought to be tribal

neTiDers of the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.
Your conspiracy to violate

the Civil

Rights of

my clients

consists of the following:

P-3Q3
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1.
devices,

Engaging in
delusions,

schemes, chimera, plots, artifices, plans
stratagem,

rusts,

illusions, apparitions

tricks, fantasies, procedures, and otherwise conniving to deny t
each of my clients, without due

process of

law, one

or more o

the -following property rights: their Membership in the tribe; th<
benefits of their judgment against the Tribal Business Committee
open and

free access to the tribal courts including availabilit1

of tribal judges; the

benefits

and/pr

rights

of

or

to then

office; or, their unpaid tribal divio^nds or salaries, plus courl
costs, attorneys fees, fines, etc.
2.

Obstructing justice.

3.

This conspiracy<s> has involved each of you as

others,

in

varying

continuing course of

well as

combinations,

^nd has been an on-going anc

conduct

has

that

utilizes

a

variety of

schemes, etc., which extends from priojr to 1976 to the present.
4.

The

with you as
ascertained

names

of

conspirators
during

the

all

of the individuals who have joined

ar&

presently

discovery

unknown,

that

will

but

will be

occur

during

1itigation.
5.

Those of you who are tribal Officials, your

forbidden by

Federal Law

under the

well as by the Tribal Constitution

conduct is

Jndian Civil Rights Act, as
anil the

Law and

Order Code.

Those of you who are non-tribal member^ but who are United States
officials, your conduct is forbidden ur^der the laws of the United
States, as the same has been uniformly applied by the courts.
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is hereby made upon each of you to immediately cease, and desist
in any

and every

conduct.

particular from

Whether

your

continuing to

conduct

fpas

been

engage in thi

active,

passive

supervisory or advisory, it has resulted in giving full force anc
effect to

this insidious,

injurious* inauspicious and otherwise

totally unsatisfactory situation.
Your failure to immediately
your attempts

to continue

rectify

to engage

this

situation and/or

in this conspiracy, and/or

unlawful acts, by any means or device, can only serve to increase
the damages

suffered by my clients and the punitive damages that

will be awarded against each of you who
or abetted
affairs

in any

that

form or

arB found

manner this

presently

exists

on

to assure

hereafter th0

to have aided

unconscionable state of
the

Uintah

and

Ouray

Reservation,
In order

Indian Civil Rights Act, the
States and
well as
requested

full compliance with the

Constitutions

of

both

the United

the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as

all other
to

applicable Federal

assure

that

a

and Tribal

competent,

Laws, you are

independent

restricted Tribal Judiciary, which will include at least
trained

judge,

is

appointed

without

doing, to cease and desist from

any ahd

and nonone law

further delay, and in so
all attempts

to "pack"

the court with individuals who will strictly comply with only the
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Demands and d i r e c t i o n s ai

EACH

OF

YOU

the T r i b a l

SHOULD

Easiness Committee.

GOVERN

\\

ACCORDINGLY

'. \

George E# Mangan
\
Attorney:for Claimants J
47 North 200 East
Roosevelt, UT 84066
6014722-2428

CERTIFICATE OF NAILING
I hereby certify that on the _^ ^Jay of January, 1986, I
personally caused a copy of the foregoing Notice of Claim to be
nailed to each of the above named individuals, by depositing the
same
ssmp in
in the United States Mail at Roosevelt, Ut, postage prepaid.

George E. i Mangan

NOTICE OF CLAIM/CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY

PaQe

/IPC
GEORGE
EMAN \G AN ,
t.
L
a
w
A t t o r n e y
a
47 k r t n Secern £ait
tose.pit, Utah B 4 ^
farce E. foqan

DATE:

UtaE

December 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO;

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
SUPERINTENDENT, UINTAH Sc OURAY AGENCY,
AREA DIRECTOR, PHOENIX^
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
SENATOR JAKE GARN
SENATOR ORIN HATCH
CONGRESSMAN HOWARD NIEUSEN

SUBJECT:

12.
3.
4.

ABILITY OF UTE BUSINESS COMMITTEE TO GOVERN:
EFFECTIVENESS OF UTE TRIBAL COURTS;
AVAILABILITY OF DUE PROCESS ON THE UINTAH AND
OURAY RESERVATION;
EFFECT ON CAPACITY OF UTE TRIBE TO EXERCISE
ANY EFFECTIVE JURISDICTION.

This Memorandum is being written to each of the above in
order that
I might express the v|ery candid and personal
cbservations I have made while living and working with the Ute
Tribe for over 15 years.
It is not written out of spite,
disrespect, or desire to cause problem^
In fact, most members
of the Tribe will admit that I have been a champion of and for
the tribe and Tribal rights.
During the past 15 years I have
probably represented at least 707. of the individual members of
the Business Committee in their £^r sonal matters.
I am
committed to the concept of meaningful and representative tribal
self-government.
Hopefully this
H emorandum will
help to
illuminate some of the more prevalent) existing problems of the
Tribal governrent; suggest some possi bl e remedies; and resolve
future conflicts before they get out of hand.
I have found that personal experi ences are perhaps the most
meaningful way tD help others understan d any situation.
Eecause
of that f I have decided to use my exp erience as lead attorney in
what has come to be known as the " Enrollment Cases" entitled
"Chapoose« et. ai« vs. Ute Tribal Pusin ess Committee, et seq."
It will not only document what has happened, but the frustration
my clients and I have had in dealing with a group who do not
respect the "Rule of Law."
Page
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I have diviaed this Memcrandum
I.
II.
III.
IV.

ilnto tne following areas:

BACNGRCUND
SUMMARY CF EVENTS
CDMrEr4T5
RECOMMENDATICMS

As indicated
above, this
Memcr bndum will attempt to relat
mv observations concerning each
ot
tne
four
(4; areas liste
aoove.
I have tried to be as object tve as the circumstances an
my memory will allow me to be*
I. BACKGROUND
I have
been involved
in the
jdiaicial wordings of the Ut
Tribe since 1971. At that time it had a C-R cou^t, presided ove
bv Judge Henry Uochego.
Judge
LiDChego often
discussed with m<
tne
"new" Law
and
Crder
Code that the Business Committee wa
going to adopt so tnat the Tribe then
the Tribe would have it'<
o**n tribal court ana be anle to handle "everything" that involve!
tribal members on the reservation, except
serious crimes,
ht
often ast ed
fcr mv comments and rezommencati ons, wnicn I gave t:
m m in an appropriate matter.
When The Lite Law And
Order
Cod^ was -finally acopted anc
puDlisned, I received one of the fi st copies, and I was one ci
the first attorneys admitted
to prac ice be-fore tne new Tribal
Ccurt.
The code clearly provided folr tribal courts and judges
I was one of the few memoers of the Ut|ah State Bar who attenoec
the
shearing
in of
Henry
Upcnego as the first Chief Judae.
During the next 10 years I probably tried
more cases before the
Tribal Court
than any
other attorney!.
I respected the Tribal
Court, and found it fair, efficient, and a creait to the trioe.
Unen the^e were issues that m v o i v e o complicated legal issues, a
I also DC-served tnat the
law-trained judge was mane availaole.
Associate Juoge Norma Jean
lav judges, Chief Juage
Upcnego ano
the National
School for
Gray had received excellent training a
tribal
Judges
in Reno, before
the |/ unoe-took presiding Dver
trials, hearings, etc.
It was my
pt^ception
that
the trioal
courts were
dispensing justice to triDal memoers in as fair and
equitable manner as was being done by ^he
justices of
the peace
and municipal
courts in the State
o-^ Utah.
In snort, the Ute
Tribal Courts were affording "CJLKE: Process" to tribal
members. I
often expressed
that opinion
to tellpw
memoers of the Bar, and
encouraged otner members of
the local
bar to
actively practice
berore the Tribal Court.
During
this time the Tribal Business Committee seemed to
respect the independence
and
integrity
of
the Tribal Courts.
Even though
the committee
and its mumpers were named as party
derenaants in several actions, they sqbmitted
themselves to the

Fage
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•isciction of the Tribal Court, and at least made
ccmolving with the final Orders of the Court.

"appearances

This ODservation ccntinued until
April of
1925.
In Apri
.^25,
tne Business Committee
made
its -first overt attempt t
strio"
tne
Tribal
Court
of
some
of
the court's
inheren
;urisdacticn.
At
that
time
tne business Committee passed a
jurisdiction
of m e m b e r s m
Ordinance that purported
to
remove
cases from
the Tribal
Court and
to place them exclusively wit!
tne Business
Committee.
The Tribal
Courts issued
a series o
Craers
to
Show Cause
in re Contempt
to the Tribal Busines
Committee and it
memoers.
At fir|st the Business Committei
^:ncred the O r d e r s , out after a prolonged interval, did respond
In June 1936, tne
Trical Court
found the
Business Committee ir
contempt of Court, Ordered them to l mn|.edi atel y comply with all otne courts Draers, held the Tribal Attorney in Contempt, awarder
certain
costs, attorney
fees, and
imposed certain penalties,
Following the June 1936 Order, the EJusiness Committee initially
indicated its willingness to comply wi :h tne Orders of the Court.
Since August, 1986, tnere has been
•partial" compliance by tht
Business Committee
but only
with lone portion of the Court's
Crier.
Otherwise there has been a complete and total
refusal b^,
the
E'usiness Committee
to
comply witn the rulinas of its cwr
court.
This background has of necessity
^ = -:r. general.
Tne ne;:t
section dealing
with Summary
of E v e n t s , is designed to fill ir
some of the gaps.
II.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

1.
In
1937,
the
Indians
of
tne
Uintan
and
Ouray
Reservation
organized
themselves
as
tne Ute
Indian Tribe by
aocpted a Constitution.
Wnile tne
hibal Constitution provides
-fcr a
means to maKe amendments, there nave besn no amendments
maae to tne Constitution.

3.
Over a period of
years the
Tribal Business Committee
accpted a series of Ordinances wnich riqui^ed that in order for a
cnild to De enrolled as a member of the Tribe, it not only hac to
oe born to an enrolled memoer, but possess a requisite quantum of
Ute Blood.
As a consequence, hunorids of
Indian children wno
were constitutionally entitled to Tribal membership were excluded
from
the
Tribal
Rolls.
The BIA
approved
each
of
these
ordi nances.
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was
tijie "official" congressional
In
sups-vision o-f Indian Tribes. As i
pclicv to terminate feae^ai
c
Law
671, et. seq.
(25 U.S.C.
.-^iult, congress adopted Puo
T
M
S
provided
tor
tne
division
o
f
tne tribt
Sec,©71, et.
seq.).
into two (2) grcuos, i.e., tne miMed bloods which were those witr
hose who elected to join witf
1/2 or
le=s of Ute bleed,
plu
or more o*
tr.s.Tj, and tne -full Dlcoas, wnion were tnose with 1/2
Tne mixed bloods were tc
Ute DloGd, plus any other Inaian Diced
oe terminated in
19ol f
and
the
ful 1-Dloods were
to adopt c
program to provide -for termination th^reafter.
5.
At that time it was felt by jmemoers o-f the BIA that the
Ute Tribe had become a "Closed" trib|e and
that no new members
cruld
be
added
to tne rolls.
Cong |re = s specifically addressed
t~at issue by amending Fuolic Law
o71
et seq. to
provide tnat
new memoers would continue to oe acded to the tribe "in their o**n
TriDal
Constitution and
right"
as provided
-for in tne Ut
Croinances adopted thereunder.
<b.
Subsequently
tne
Tribal
Business Committee adopted a
more restrictive blood-quantum requirement for tribal membership.
The new requirement
was -tor
tne cnild
to possess 5/S's o-f
Historic Ute Indian Blood.
Blood quantum's specifically excluded
tne blood lines from a parent that had been terminatedThe BIA
specifically approved this ordinance.
7.
In about
1974 or
1973, the Tribal Business Committee
accpted
a tribal
court
system
as provided
in
the
Tribal
Constitution.
Until
that
time thire was no effective, and
independent forum for trioal members tq> seek redrt
from actions
taken by the Tribal Business Committee.
S.
In 1976-77, several trioal memosrs approached my office
tn^ir" c m l d r e n
enrolled as
to request
assistance
in Crtting
d
had
b^^n
born
to (a) an
members of
the Ute
Trioe.
reservation at tne
i G i n c on the
enrolled (r,~T,tjBr, wno it)
was r
i me of birth.
They eaz;
rsoressnteld that
for years they had
been petitioning
the Trioal
Business Committee to enroll tneir
children
as provided
-for
in
the Constitution,
but that tne
Business Committee would oeny Each apol cation based on the blood
quantum ordinances.
9.
In 1976-77 I filed in the Tri
. Court the "first-wave"
of
the enrollment
complaints
on
be half
of these individual
families.
The cases
have
subsecue ntlv been rBierred
to as
"Cnaocoss, et. al , vs. The Ute
Tri pc-,l Business
Committee, et.
sen.
Tne i-omoiaints were
founaea i>> the Indian Civil Rights
Act,
alleging
that
the
plaintiffs Were being
denied
their
constitutional right
to tribal members nip without due process of
law, etc.
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10.
These complaints were heard by Judge George Armstronc
Judge Armstrong
was law trained and had several /ears exiierierc
the Nationa.'
ct being a tribal
judge and in nelp ng t o set-up
Indian Tr ia 1 Jucges Szhco1 i n Renof
J Lido e

11.

Npvaca
found

each
ot
t 1 i«
,
Trioa]
e n ---»-» -., t o
MemDership, and t n a t the r e f u s a l of tips T r i o a i Easiness Committ
t o e n r o l l the c h i l d r e n was a d e n i a l of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g n t
to t r i b a l
membership without
due process
cf I aw ,
wt 11cn was lr
v i o l a t i o n of the Indian C i v i l Rights Act.
The business Committer
was Crdered t o e n r o l l each of the p l a i n t i f f c h i l d r e n , t o pay tnen
dividends f r o m t h e 11 m e o t t h e i r l a s t a p p l i c a t i o n -for e n r o l l m e n t ,
plus i n t e r e s t at 6*1 p =-r annum u n t i l o
The T r i b a l

Business

- m:

ong

Committee

appealed

t h e Enrollment

decisions to the Tribal Appellate Court. A special three (3) ff.cf
appellate court was convened
to hear the matter.
The Appellats
JuGges were Floyd
M. Wyasket
of the Ute Tribe, F. Browning
Pipestem from Oklahoma, and Donald D. |DuFuis from Montana.
13.
On January 2 2 , 1 9 3 1 , after p^o-lcnged briefings an^
extensive
oral
arguments, t h e Appellate
Court
affirmed
the
decision of the Tribal
Court.
The decision was 2-1, with Judge
Pipestem
dissenting solely on the grdunes of possinle sovereign
immunity by the Business Committee.
then enacted
legislation
14.
The Business
Committee
The
authorizing the Appellate
Court to jre-hear the matter.
Appellate Court entered its Order auth o n z i n g a re-hearing.

|i=r^ j-|.ie i e g a | issues were
again thorougn I y brie-fed to the
Appellate Court, and extensively
argubd in oral arguments.
On
'•Over.oer 2 3 , 1931, the Appellate Couht in a unanimous decision,
affirmed its prior ruling, cellaring that the Easiness Committee
members were
not protezteG -from suit by "sovereign immunity*' a no
ordered the immediate enforcement or Juoge Armstrong' Geeisi en.
16.
Based en the Appellate Court decision, Chief Judge Gray
directing
the Business
issued
an
Order
ii \ December 1951
Committee to immediately comoly
with the Judgment or to appear
and Show Cause why they should n o t .
On January
14, 19B2, in apparent
compliance with the
Orders
of the Tribal Court, the Trioal P u s m e s s Committee adopted
32-05 which
autnoriie^ the enrollment of the
^esoluti on Nc
plaintiff
children,
subject
to
approval
the
of
tne
Superintendent, etc.

1

13.
It was. then
unknow
"
the plaintiffs,
plaintiffs
were subsequently
made
aware that prior
Business Committee
adopting
Resolution
No. 82-05,
Page
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but
the
to t h e
the BIA

Regional Solicitor and otner BIA officials had assured the Triba
Business
Committee
tnat
as
an "accommodation' 1 to the Busines
Committee, any resolution enrolling the plaintiff
children woul
rc - r&z~+^&
secretarial approval.
19.
Cn January 21, 19 32, less than 10 days after the Triba
Business
Committee
adopted
said
Resolution, the
Enrollmen
Resolution was in -fact disapproved by the Superintendent of th
Lintan and Ouray Reservation.
20.
The plaintiffs
did timely
aopeal the decision of th
3aoeri ntendent to the F h o e m x Area 3-ffice. For reasons that wer
not clear, the matter was rBtBrred
djirectly to the Commissi one
in Washington 4cr review and determin
21.
A suosequent Crder to Show Cause was heard in Feoruary
1-22.
At that time, a stipulation wafe agreed to by the attorney
-for tne Business
Committee
and
the plainti-f-fs whereo/ tn<
interest
accumulating
on
the
dividends
to be paid
to tn(
p] ai nti-f-f s under
the judgment
of
the Tribal Court, would fai
increased to be the
same as the average o-f the interest rate:
being earned
each year
by the Lite T^*ibe on its' certi f l cates o
ceoosit, etc.
22.
During
t!" »e intervening
period,
several
additions!
complaints
were being
filed
by
myself
on behalf
of othe>
individuals who claimed to be e n t i t l e ^ to tribal
membership as •
matter of a constitutional right.
In each instance, the ai'.crre^
tor the Business Committee stipulated with
me that
the oecisior
o-f
the
administrative
proceedings
or
subseouent
-feoera]
litigation would be binding in &=<ch case, and
would resolve th*
question o-f tribal memnership.

rol lowing
the deatn
o-f (thief »u a g e
: o in • 7 / 7 ,
ribal Judae Norma Jean Gray was :00Ol i i u r-u»
.o fill the
or aoout l?r0. Judge
un-e;-. oireo
term
of
Judge Upon ego.
Armstrong also aied.
He was reolacid D>
William A.
irorr,
Salt Lake Attorney with
considerably InGian Law experience, anc
r*ho was an American Indian.
n -

:=>I_JL_ i

a

v. tf

»

24. rJn April
23, 19B3, i
^ letter
Decision
-from ths
Assistant
Secretary
of
Indian
?~ *: fairs,
the decision
of the
Superintendent
to
disapprove
the
Enrollment
Resolution
wa=
li^hel

d.

25.
JI »e April
23, 19S3 decision was directi / contrary tc
the recommendation of the Chief
o-f the BIA Branch
O T Tribal
Enrollment
Service.
This
individual
had
recommended
in c
Memorandum dated January 2 3 , 1933, that the Enrollment Resolutior
as passed b > ' t he Ute Indian Tribe, b e approved.
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26.
Upon r e c e i p t
of
. nal
Administrative decision
plaintiffs filed an action
lr, w;,<_ United States District Cour
fcr Utah, Case Mo.
C-S3-1145W.
Th4 litigation involved severa
causes of action.
The only cause th^t
pertains to this subjec
."natter, resulted
in a Writ of Mandamus m e m o r a n d u m Decision an
Order of Apr i 1 .1 1 , 19B5f Judge
Da v i d W i naer J t o t fte appr D p n a
iuthorities in the Bureau
of Indian
Affairs, directing them t
cease from interfering with the Ute I ndian Tribe in
determinin
who was entitled to tribal membership
27.
Following
the Decision
by
Judge Winder, the Iriba
Business Committee announced that the Federal court had held tha
tfte Business
Comm111 e e was the on1y source to determine who wa
en 1111ed t o triba I memoer sn i p.
19E5.

^.a.

B u ^ i nes-

the

followin g action:
A.
B.

C.

Commi t t e e

XOri

th

P a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n r e s c i n d i n g R e s o l u t i on
82-05 which e n r o l l e d the p l a i n t i f f
children;
P a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n o r | ordinance declaring
t h a t the T r i b a l
C o u r t s had no jurisdiction
t o h e a r e n r o 1 1 m e i »t mat! ers;

Declared that tne Trib 1 Business Committee
was the only and prope r "forum" to hear
enrol 1 merit matters.

29.
In May
1785, plaintiffs obtained a Order to Show Caus
from Judge T h o m e , directing the Busi ness Committee to appear a
a time
ai id place certain in June, 19B5, to Show Cause, if an
there b e , why the prior
judgment
of
the court
should not b<
enforced.
jorney appeared
before th30.
Plaintiffs and
their <=
Neither tn<
Tribal Court at
the time
and placj*is specified.
Business Committee nor
their
attojrIrney appeared, nor did the
request a continuance of any kind. I|in fact, tha attorney for th
Business Committee personally infcrmelcd me that neither he nor hi
clients intended to appear. He indic|<at ed to me, t > at f ie and hi'
clients <the Business Committee)
considered the issue of Triba
Membership
to be a "political"
question, and
not a propei
question -for the Tribal Courts to be considering.
31.
Plaintiffs requested
that
tne Business Committee am
its attorney be held in contempt
of bourt.
The Court took th
matter under advisement, and issued aj written Crd^r
directing th<
plaintiffs and the Business Committee! to submit written response:
to a series of questions.
32.
The plaintiffs
did timely | file their response to thi
questions posed in the Order
of the Cburt. However
the Busines
Committee did
not do so. The Court- on its own motion extendei
Page
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tne date tor the Business Committee tp respond. Finally in earl
! 9 3 D , the Business Committee and its Attorney -filed a response t
tne questions raised in the Order or tne Court,
Oral argument
we-e set t^y the court and
the attorneys -for plaintiffs and th,
business Committee each appeared
and argued
the contempt mattei
to the court.
The court took the matter under advisement.

3.
On c
wri tl n O r d e r w
A.
B.

C.

D.
E.

F.

about June 4,
ch provided a-

'tG-.s, Tribal

Juc,c

TK

orne

issued

t c11, 1 o w s :

The Business Committee|was to enroll each of the
plaintiff children;
The attorney for the Business Committee h*«D to
pay to the plaintiffs' attorney S500.00 Icr his
contempt;
The Business Committee
«as
to
pa/
to thi
plaintiffs their accruid dividends, plus the
accrued interest;
Plaintiffs were to submit a i • a f f i d a • 1 1 c: f 1 1 e i r
costs and attorney fee^;
The Business Committed was to be assessed a f i m
of S100.00 for each day the Court's Order
was no'
fully complied with;
The Business Committee
was given 90 days withii
which to fully comply! with the Court s Order oi
face ft ir ther contempt action.

34.
Thereafter
the attorney
for
the Business Committei
requested that I discuss with him howjthe Court's Orders could b<
complied with
and yet create a minimum of difficulties for thi
Ute Tribe. Based on what appeared to!be a good faith
attempt b1
the Business Committee to resolve wlfiat had been a very long an;
sometimes bitter litigation, I willingly agreed to the same.
35.
Because I felt the Business|Committee had determined t;
finally respect
the integrity
of th©
Tribal Courts, the Triba
Constitution, and comply
with
the
Court
Orders,
I agreed t<
several
extensions
requested fay the Attorney for the Busines;
Committee, which served to extend the 90 d3Ly period listed in #3i
(F) above, to October 4, 1986.
36
The attorney
for the Business
Committee
expressl>
promised to have
the matter
resolved
by
the latter
parr oAucust, 1?E6.
Based
on that
assurance I agreed to recommend •
payment plan to my clients so t!~»at the Tribe did not have to com.
up with all of the judgment moneys at one time.
37.
In August
1936, Associate Tribal Judge Julius "Chunky
Hurray was released from his positionjas a Associate Judge by th
Business Committee for "personal" reasons.

Page
8
Memorandum on Ute Tribal Jurisdiction^ etc.

1937, Associate Tribal Judge Willi
33.
In late
August
i Judge -for tne State of Utai
Thorne was appointed to be ai Circuit
CircuitiJudge
which necessitated his resignation from the TriDal Court.
39. At
this
time Chie* Judge
Norma Jean Gray becar
C3ricerned about her own appointment cf>r term of office, and sougf
w 4 4 n tf"t Business Committee in o n e ' *:> : l a r i f y tfr
dii audience
same.
The records indicate that after her initial a p p o i n t m e n t t
complete the term
of
Judge U p c ^ g o
in
1977, the Busines
Committee hn 1 hr^er formally re-appointsd her I D additional te r n
as Chief
Judge.
Thp Business CJommittee had
continued
reccgnire her
a=> the- Chief
Judgq
in all
matters, i.e.
correspondence, tribal
records, aoplications icr
grants in ordt
to run the tribal courts, shearing
in
of
new
merrDtrre
of *
Business Committee and ether judges, etc.
it- t September
4,
1936, J U J J P
0>ra/ hac u
40.
Cn c f
aopointment to meet with
the Business
Committee.
However, sh
was not allowed to e n t e r the meeting fcom.
Rather she was hands
l
a envelope t», t t
Secretary
of the
Business Committee.
Th
envelope contained
a copy
of a Resolution setting her term o
1936, but
relieving her of he
office to end on
September
duties as Chief Judge as of September 4, 1936.
the/
>ad vi ol ated th
41.
In apparent
rezcgmticn
?
to
terms ci the Law and
Crder
Coae relative
to tne r emovai an
aopointment
of J u d g e s ,
about
Septefbe'" 6,
L9C£ , th
Business Committee rescinded the previous appointment
which ha
set September
3 0 , 1936 as the end of the term, and declared tha
the term had ended cn September 4, 1946.
42.
As a consequence of the varioub events, the tribe wa c
without any
judge to hear any matters, Judge Floyd Wyasket, <
rrember of
the
Arpe!l^Le
court
handled
*
few
pressinc
arrai gnnents, but
trials were cancel|ed, and
no orders could bt
issued on any matter necessary to th ^ crflBrly adninistrati on o4
Justice.
43.
The Business
Committee issued
a ttTUurary did limitec
appointment f i Judge Mjri a ;
to htji
natters for one (1) month,
and then there was no judges to hear anything. Several prisoners
were held in jail for up to 30 and 40 days without
being brought
before a magistrate, simply because there was no judge available.
44.
Beginning
in
September,
1736, the Business Committee
td/ertized for applications for the position
of Chief
Judge and
associate
judges. Apparently
INt-re were
several
applicants,
including Norma Jean Gray.
Despite
[ler extensive training and
nearly
ten
years
of
experience, thfe Business Committee failed
and/or refused
t j appuii t Norma Jean
Gray as either the Chief
Judgp or an as r oriatp judge.
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45.
In what was claimed to be a "budget - c u. 11 i r g • m e a s u r e
the Business Committee eliminated the positions of an / of th
court personnel who had any connection or familiarity with th
Enrollment Cases.
The irony of this action is that th
positions eliminated were funaed en tirely or almost entirely b
government grants ar td wei e designed to facilitate proper an
adequate tribal CDUT t systems.

4,6 .
I n Cc t oDe r ,
Ir- ? B 6, t h e B u s i n e s s C o m m i t t e e d i d par t i a 11
comply with the D r a e r s
of
tne
Tribiil
Court by enrolling th
plaintiff children,
a l o n g with o v e r £ 0 0 o t h e r e l i g i b l e c h i l d r e n
All otheroorticns
of
the
Orders
of the Tribal Court wer

lqncred.
47.
In mid-November 1936, Jonn &. Gale, a non-member of th<
tribe and a former justice of the Peace for the State of Uta!
received a "temporary and limited11 appointment as a Tribal Judge
He was specifically instructed by the Business Committee that hi
was not to hear an / enrollment mattery.
4S. Recent! y tf :.e Business Committee appointed Kathryn Jenki
as a Associate? Tr ibal Judge. Judge Jinks has finished 8 years oschooling, and has received no trailing or education in how ti
conduct a court; how to decide legal issues; how to interpret hi
tribal laws; etc.
I am personally Acquainted
with Judge Jenks
and knew her to be a very sweet and accommodating person
However, she would be among the first to acknowledae she does noi
know how to conduct court, etc.
49. During the month of Deci •iTiber, 1986
the Business
Committee requested tnat three (3; jut ges from other tribes visil
the Lite Tribal Court to assist in the handling some of the cases
that had "piled" up.
SO. Effectively and for all intents and purposes, the Utt
Indian Tribe has been without a judicial system since September
1936, and no proper forum exist^ on the Ute Reservation tc
hear any claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act, or to enforce
the prior judgments of the Tribal Court
51. From all appearances, as wel 1 a s f r cm i n f or mat i on g i vei
Business
but reliabl!
to me by confidential
sources, t h e
Committee has indicated that it doe4 not intend to comply an>
further with the Orders of the Tribal Court relative to the
Enrollment matters, and that any judge appointed hereafter will
be instructed that their appointment will prohibit them from i r
any way dealing with that issue.
52.- While
the
Eh i s i i >ess C o m m i t t e e h a s made some " o u t w a r d 1
i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e y ar&
"trying" tq
get q u a l i f i e d individual?
t o s e r v e a s T r i b a l J u d g e s , t h e r e s u l t ^ o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s a r e tc
the c o n t r a r y .
Presently, there
is
r\o
effective
f o r u m on t h t
Page
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Uintah
and
Ouray
Reservation for resolving Claims involving
seems mci
Indian Civil Rights ActThe Bukiness Committee
intent on appointing judges that the feel they can control, th
"Rule ci
Law" :
seeing that due process if guarantee^ and the
properly applied.
III. COMMENTS
Until the adoption of the Law ahd Order Code, the Ute Indi<
Tribe -functioned with only one branch
of government.
Althouc
not
specifically
authorized
to
do so under
the Trib.
Constitution, the
Business
Committee
had
acted
as tt
legislative, executive
and
judicial
forums for
the tribi
Members aggrieved by the actions of the Business ^Committee coui
only lock
to the Business Committee
-for relief. The decisicr
that w.ere made were more often
what was
"politically" expedier
and
were not necessarily
legally] morally or constitutional]
correct.
The Ute people had apparently recognized the need for
Tribal Court
when they
provided in the Constitution that it wc
one of the enumerated powers of the Jribal
Business Committee i
create a Tribal Court.
The creation
of
a
Tribal
judiciary was a bold ar
commendable attempt to create a fair
and impartial
tribal fori,
to h e a r , decide and
enforce, excluding major crimes, all of tt"
legal questions involving tribal
members and
tribal government
It has been my observation that the Tribal Business Committee he
subscribed to that philosophy -for tli
courts, so long
as tl~
Court's decision
agreed with what th e Business Committee wanted
The Business Committee has seemed to entertain the notion that i
alone
is the final
"determiner" o-f issues, and that by som
strange
magic
the Tribal
Constitu tion
has
transformed
th
Business Committee
into the
"soverejign".
Somewhere the Triba
Business Committee and/or its legal a dvisors
have lost sight o
the facr
that the true sovereign is the Ute PeDple.
It is tru
that the Ute People have conferred c rtain enumerated powers uoo
the
Tribal
Business
Committee, however the Ute People, as th
true sovereign specifically retained to themselves all powers no
specifically
granted
to the Business Committee. None of th
enumerated powers of the Tribal
Busihess Committee
in any wa
contemplate that the Business Committee could or should discharg
any judicial function.
The Ute Tribe is anxious to ceveicp and expand its role as
self-governing
sovereign.
This
seems to be upper-most in th
minds of the people
and the members o-f the Business Committee
In order for the Ute Tribe to be trulj/ self-governing, there is
need for
some material
and
important
changes in the Triba
Constitution, so as to clearly provide for separation of power
and for
some checks and balances.
This seems to be especiall
important in
light of
the recent
affirmation by the US Suprem
Court that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
over larg
Page
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areas o-f land in
the Uintah Basin. Apparently that jurisdictic
extends to non-members of the tribe.
Under the Indian Civil Rights A c t , the Ute Tribe in tiexercise of
self-government, cannot
deprive anyone of thei
property and certain other
rights without
"due-process" of la*
It is
impossible for me to conceive that the present method c
regulating and determining tribal judges can
possibly assure an
genuine, orderly
administration of
justice or
"due process" c
law.
After over
15 years of
first--hand
observations, I hav
forced the opinion that
once an ind;ividual is elected
a memos
of the Tribal Business
Committee, that
a transformation take
place.
It is as if the individual feels that he or she t^avB bee
elevated above the law. They act as if the/ do n o : have to ans^e
to
anyone, that
the\
»n directly interfere with the courts
p o l i c e , and all other officials in the discharge of their swor
duties.
If the Tribal Business Committeeman does not obtain rh
results that are requested, the individual who fails to comply i
either
terminated
or h i s
or her
job is placed in jeopardy
Directions are given and decisions a r ^ reached,
not on what tn
constitution or law provides, but whaft the individual or group o
Business Committeeman desire.
this approach
makes th
o rce
tribe
more of
a private
social club or a exclusive politica
party than a fair, democratic and representative governing unit
There is no way feasible way that the existing tribal governmen
can afford true due process of law tD al1 Tribal Members.
I might say that
while the opinions that
I have expresses
are iTiy own, they
do represent the feelings of a large number o
tribal members.
1 - — 1.
o
Another
problem
I
have
perceived
is
the
1 C.C K
understanding
and
appreciation
among
Tribal
members for tn
political process.
I have observed
that often there ar e nearl
a£ many
persons
running
as c^ndi (bates fcr
a vacanc y on th
Business Committee, as
their individuals
who
vote i n thi
election.
Because of
the impcr;anc^ of tribal election s to thi
Tribe itself, and to the greater comrroUnity of non-tribal members
it
is important
that
Tribal
Members
be given some hel p an(
guidance in how to educate the voter, and
get the voter s to thi
pol1s.

During the past year Mr. Ron Uilliam£, a member of the Ute Tribi
and President
of
the Ft. Duchesne
Community, has made somi
serious and
conscientious attempts tcf> get to the root of severe,
matters involving
the
"high-handed"
dealings of the Businesi
Committee.
To date his efforts have largely fallen on deft ears
and have been blocked
at every
possible avenue by the Businesi
Committee.
In effect, they
have
"stonewalled" Ron in ever'
request he has made
for information,
including information tha'
Pane
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ne as a tribal member has a right to have access to. Recentl
Mr. Williams has been seeking to have the Tribal Constitutic
revised so as to clearly provide for three (3) separate branche
cf tribal government, with some built in checks and balances.
Mr. Williams request, I have drafted a revision of the Tribe
Constitution. The draft is intended to be a "working" draft, bu
it does lay the groundwork for a workable, representative, viabl
and "balanced" tribal government.
It would be based upon th
coctrine of separation of powers,
I was very careful to folio
trie basic provisions of the existin g Tribal Constitution, an
then relied upon the constitutions of the United States and th
State of Utah for creating the articles dealing with th
executive, legislative and judicia
branches.
Currently Mr
Williams and his co-workers are revi swing this draft, and ar
discussing it with tribal members to get further input.
To me the Ute Tribe is a gentle, awaking giant, that neithe
understands nor comprehends its rble, power,
strength an
destiny.
It has been abused bctn__^
frbm within and wi thout. It '
leaders need to develop the proper perception of their rcle an
duties as leaders, as well as confidence in the "Rule of Law" a
the governing principle for tribal government.
The Triba
leaders need help in understanding the meaning of and how t
apply a written Constitution.
IV RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are a few of the recommendations that I tnin
need to be implemented
on benalf of the Ute Tribe as socn a
reasonably possible.
1.
The Tribal Constitution should be revised so as t<
provide for a separation of powers with checks and balances
This would assure two or more independent branches of triDa!
government, one of which must be an independent judiciary. If
addition, the
traditional
tribal cepneept of General Councils
and powers and influence of a General Council could more fully ti
defi ned.
2.
BIA supervision of the Tribe should either be cone awa^
with or made truly meaningful. If the 5IA is going to actually
supervise the Tribe, then the supervision should be such that the
BIA consistently
and conscientious ly
makes sure that th*
decisions of the Business Committe »e are
based on corred
Ccnsti tutional Principles, guarantee
"due process", and noi
merely serve to "accommodate" the whims and wishes of thf
Busi ness Commi ttee.
3.
A federal Court, such as th* Indian Court of Claims, be
empowered to reviEW the final decisions of the highest appellate
court of any tribe.
This Court would help to formulate e
consistent body of Indian Law, and tjo assure that the Indiar
Page
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Civil Rights Act is being fairly alnd eauitably applied by eac
tribeThe purpose of this court woqld not be to change india
laws and/or customs, but to see that Indian la^s, customs an
constitutions are fairly and equajll/ applied and that Mdu
process" is afforded to all.
Congress needs
act affirmatively to cietermine th
role of the Ute Tribe on this r\ eservation, over non-trioa
members, taxation, hunting and fi shine, etc. c.^^n though th
Supreme Court has failed to revieU the 10th Circuit Court'
decision, the state of affairs is si^ch that for Congress to fai
to act is going to mean several more years of litigation. Whil
that may be an "attorney's relief jAct", it certainly is not i
the best interest of either tne Ute Trioe or the non-member
residing within the confines of the original Ute Reservation.
rm or program woulq be developed in cocperatic
with one or more of the Universities in this State to provide or
going leadership training for present and potential tribe
leaders. Perhaps a program could be arranged or developed wher
interested tribal
members could
receive some concentrate
leadership and political science training, and then be allowed t
work with city, state and/or federal governmental leaders. Thi
should be in almost every level
and branch of governmeni
Refresher courses should be made available on the Reservatior
Qualified
individuals ought to b^ invited to come to tt
Reservation and to work directly with different tribal leaders s
as to observe their job functions ancji to assist them in improvir
their leadership skills.
A sy<

6.
In addition to developing and enhancing the leadersh:
capacity of Tribal members, I would urge that one or more of tt
local universities be invited to use their upper-classmen c
Graduate students to come to the reservation and study t\
political workings of the Ute Trib^.
Hopefully they would I
able to formulate some realistic plans for involving mere member
of the tribe in the political proc< ss. especially in the actu<
voting in primary and general elections.
CONCLUSION
While there are several
immediate problems that face t!
integrity of the governmental
process of the Ute Tribe, the
problems are not insurmountable. With the support of the prop
authorities and some quick and decisive action, these proble
can be transformed into positive experiences, for the benefit
both the Ute Indian Tribe and their neighbors.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED;
GEORGE E; MANGAr4
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MAILING CERTIFICATE)
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of Decerier, 1986, I
r.ailed a true and correct copy of the attached Mer.orandun, dated
recerier 29, 1986, to Bureau"of Indian Affairs, 1951 Constitution A
Ave. NW, Washington, DC 2C240; Superintendent, Uintah and Ouray
t\ r e. *_v, Fort Duchesne, Utah 94025; Area Director, Bureau of Indian
*\ a irs, P.O. Bex 7007, Phoenix, AZ E501I; Bureau of Indian
^ £ — —irs, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, 1951 Constitution
Ave • NW, Washington, DC 20240; Office of Ithe Secretary, U. S.
Leea rtnent of the Interior, Washinctcn, DO, 2C240; Senators Orrin
Kate h and Jake G a m , 125 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
8411 5; Congressman Howard Nielsen, 8S We^t 100 North, Prove, Utah
4; Ute Tribal Business Cenrr.it.tee, Uirjtah and Ouray Reservation,
O ~i C J
Fort Duchesne, Utah 84G25, by depositing the sa.T:e in the United
-s Pest Office Rccsevelt Utah,
r-\ i
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A t t o r n e y at Law]
47 Norm 200 East
Rooseve't. Utan B4C55
B01-722-2C2S
George E Manoan

Utan Bar

January 15, 1937

Governor Norman S. B a n g e r t e r
213 S t a t e C a p i t o l B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
P-a

Meeting with Ute Tribal Business Committee/Jurisdiction

Dear Governor Banc

:er:

Last week I listened with a great deal of interest to
levision and radio news reports concern: ng the visit of the Ute
ioal Business Committee and its attor ^iey to your office.
I
al so read an account of it in the Deserei News. I was amused by
th is "play" for publicity for a variety oi reasons. Perhaps i f I
sh are with you some of my experiences w lith the Tribal Bus iness
remittee and its attorney, you will unde: stand my amusement. In
ca rticular (shades of Rodney Dangerfield) I noted that the Tri
cf ficials were claiming that they "get nb respect". I learne
lo ng time ago that the best way to gain r spect is to earn it.
has indicated its ! willingness to c 5 c JT.tt
The Ute Tri:
jurisdiction over a large area and population en the original
reservation. A willingness to do something and the ability to co
it are two different things. Personally, I could live with the
Ute Tribe exercising jurisdiction within the framework of whai
the Court and Congress might intend, if the Tribal 3jsiness
Committee were caoable oi rover nm*:
is
opinion that as structured and advised, the Business Committee cf
the Ute Tribe is not ready to assume the responsibilities and
obligations that are involved with "truly? governing. There is a
difference between governing and "dictating".
The Ute Tribal
Business Committee does not understand the difference. My point
may best be illustrated in a Memorandum and Notice of Civi]
Rights Claim that I recently prepared. I I am enclosing copies for
your information. These documents explain ten years of my firsthand experience, with resulting frustrations of trying to get the
Ute Tribal Business Committee to govern py simply complying with
its own Tribal Constitution.
If you or your staff will read the
Memorandum and Notice it should not tak£ you long to determine
why the Ute Tribal Business Committee is pot equipped to serve as
a governing body.
I would challenge the Business Committee or
its attorney to produce evidence that i the information in my
Memorandum is not correct.

i :
In August of 1986, you appointed William
A. Thorne, Jr., as

f
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I personall
one of the Circuit Judges in Salt Lake City*
recommended him to the nominating committee as one qualified an
aole to ser ve as a judge of any court. ! Mr. T h o m e served as
Judoe for t he Ute Trioe for about six years and as such was on
of the most effective and fair judges thjat I have dealt with
Judge Thorne had been a steadying and compelling
any level,
fcrce in a ttempting to get the Tribal Business Committee t:
comely with the terms of the Tribal Constitution. In June 193
he found both the Business Committee and its attorney in contemc
He imocseo some rather suosta ntial penalties on eac:
or court.
while the Business Committee ani its attorne;
of them.
dicated
they were going to cojtply w i ^ the Crcers c:
actually in
Mr. Thorne1<
However, upon learning o
their own Court.
appointment to the Circuit Court, the Bu|siness Committee cease:
Court.
a
to comply a d proceeded to dismantle the T n oSal
First, those lay judges who had anything to do with the
decisions that resulted in the Contempt Order were ter~ .natec .
(See enclosed Memorandum for explanation of the cases J
Next,
all court personnel who were in any way i n v o l v e d w:
contempt decisions were terminated.
Net p e r s o n n e l were h i r e d
with specific instructions not to aaccep
o r f i l e any document
anvthina to do with the s u b j e c
that
m a t t e r l e a d i n g to the
B u s i n e s s C o m m i t t e e ' s c o n t e m p t . F i n a l l y , t h e n e w judges that
h i r e d w e r e s p e c i f i c a l l y instructed that they c o u l d not handle any
m a t t e r involving that s u b j e c t m a t t e r w i t h o u t h a v i n g it appr oved
b v M r . M a r t i n S e n e c a , J r . , the a t t o r n e y f o r t h e Tribal Busi ness
rr\r* ^ i t t e e .
T h e n e w j u d g e s and the c l e r k s have informed me and/or
h a t does not r e c e i v e
.ev are to refuse anvthmi
m v s t a f f , fthat
S e n e c a s aoor: val . Tne irony
eazn i n s t a n c e , tne
Business Committee and its members are
n the
cases, and Mr. Seneca is its attorney. T h o : C 5 u . . 1 3 w.i = ;
the defendants 1 attorney who decides what can or cannot be f n e a
and what the Court can or cannot hear. !iOW
ice?
willingness and
Isn't that a beautiful example of bot
ability to govern, or should I say dictat e? This conduct cf tne
Business Committee and its attorney is not amusing. The Busi ness
Committee's conduct in your office was amu sine .
t is d i f f icjit to respect any g o v e r•ping body which does as
it p l e a s e s and r e f u s e s to respect tne R u l e cf Law* My Memorandum
d e t a i l s h o w J u d a e T h o r n e c a m e to find the Ute Tribal Business
Committee to be in contempt of court.
presently, the Business
Committee is accumulating a fine at the r|ate of $100.00 per day
for each day it fails to comply with tne Court's Order.
Its
attorney, Mr. Seneca, was also found to qe in contempt of court
He has
has a f i ne of $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 o u t s t a n d i n g a g a i n s t h i m .
the s a m e .
It is my o p i n i o n that M r .
to take c a r e
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Seneca has willfully and intentionally counseled his clients and
i n d i v i d u a l members a s t o how t h e y c jan a v o i d c o m p l y i n g w i t h
± u
T h a t i s why t h e t r i b a l c l e r k s
th e O r d e r s of t h e T r i b a l C o u r t .
matter that involves
an d t h e j u d g e s a r e n o t a l l o w e d t o c c e o t a n y
%
ca
s
approval.
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Mr.
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T r i b a l C o u r t ' s C o n t e m p t O r d e r t o be e n f o r c e d .
I n my t w e n t y y e a r s
of p r a c t i c e , I h a v e n e v e r s e e n s u c n a f j l a c r a n t d i s r e s p e c t of a
c o u r t o r d e r a s h a s b e e n e v i d e n c e d by M r . ! S e n e c a and t n e B u s i n e s s
C o mm i 11 e e .
With this in mind, perhaps you c^n better understand -y
amusement when I read the accounts of y o u r m e e t i n g w i t h t h e
Tribal Business Committee.
Is it a cas e of t h e k e t t l e c a l l i n g
the pot black, or the victimizer claiming t o be t h e v i c t i m ?
Is
the Business Committee using the age old t a c t i c of c r y i n g "wolf"
so as to detract attention away from whkt i t i s d o i n g t o t h o s e
who are or ought to be members of the Ute
the members of tne Business Committee qan s h o u t l o n g and l o u d
about the fact that individual Indians k r e h a v i n g t h e i r r i g h t s
a b u s e d by w h i t e m e n .
But I am h e r e on tipe Ute R e s e r v a t i o n and I
individual Indians
having t h e i r
rights
see
g r e a t n u m b e r s of
Business
Committee.
The B u s i n e s s
abused
bv t h e Ute T r i b a l
C o m m i t t e e may c l a i m t o be a c t i n g u n d ^ r
t h e g u i s e of
selfg o v e r n m e n t , b u t i t s conduct i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as being s e l f dictatinc.
I t s a c t i o n s a r e and h a v e b e e n a c o n t i n u i n a v i o l a t i o n
Its
of t h e clear and exoress terms of its own Constitution.
a fundamen tal principle of this
actions
make a
mockery
country, namely, respect' for the "Rule of | Law
?. i 11 e e , the Tribal"
It is my considered opinion that as
Business Committee is net vet ecuipped wi th the advisors, the
ability, the intelligence nor the foresight to be a governing
Mv conclusion not only aoolies t o its ability to fairly
body.
covern non-tribal members, but extends to members of tne Ute
Tribe.
This is because it is unwilling to follow the "Rule of
Law", to respect the law, or to ei/en abide by
Constitution.
Until such time as the Tifibal Business Committee
is willing to follow the Rule of Law and |to obey lawful orders of
a duly and properly constituted court, it is impossible for me to
recommend that anyone submit to the j Lirisdict ion of the Ute
Indian Tribe.
As I recently pointed out to Mr. Seneca in a
personal letter, it appears that it is t he Indian who now speaks
with a "forked tongue" and cries "wolf, (wolf", when there is no
wolf.
Please do not misunderstand me. There are many fine, even
outstanding individuals who are members of the Ute Tribe.
In
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Re Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdiction

rae , there are individual members of the 3usiness Committee I
These individuals have the capacity and
con sider outstanc :ng .
iities
to
assist
the
Ute Tribe to b|e truly self-governing.
aci
t
is
net
the
question.
The quest ion is, when will the
Tha
m
e
s
s
Committee
start
using
those abijIities correctly? V.:hen
Bus
I perceive that
w: 11 they cease to insist on being diet ators?
•-ho existing 3usiness Committee does not govern by leading.
The
*.ittee prefers to get things dene by
dictating.H
Whether
iugh its legal counsel, or the advice
the EIA or on its own
*--*i
;rd, the Business Committee has mace i self a law unto itse
no one had better Question it.
The Business Committee can and hjas received a lot of
publicity by crying and whining and bekgging and pleading and
claiming that it is not getting the despect to which it is
entitled.
That does not make it so.
that he is being treated like an incompetent. Whether he is or
not, may not be the question.
The question may be, is the
reputation earned?
So far, I have found the Business Committee,
as a Committee, not willing to pay the price that is necessary
for it to cause me and others to conclude that it is competent to
covern. If an individual or a arouo want$ the privilege of being
treated with respect, then that individual or group must accept
the obligations and responsibilities
t\ iat being treated with
resoect imooses.
If the Business Comm ittee truly desires to
assume jurisdiction over non-tribal members, then it ought to
first try exercising jurisdiction properl y within the Ute Tribe.
The Business Committee must pay the price that leadership
imposes, namely that it, too, must follow the law, and net be the
law.

^volution a r i s i n g out
This nation was founded because of a
of "taxation without representation".
I r|i 1937, we now have the
potential fer that situation on the Ute Rz
Reservation. We have the
Business Committee trying to assume jurisdiction over nonmembers.
Jurisdiction carries w: :h it the power to tax. Both
I n d i a n s and n o n - I n d i a n s who
not t j r i b a l members
ill be
w i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e Ute
al dovernment.
Is t a x a t i o n
the lack of
without
representation
still
tyranny?
Wn
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s bad enough f o r the n o n ^ I n d i a n s , there already

AU.
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1 5 , 1987
t o Governor

Bangerter

Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdic tion

refjses to enroll these individuals who cpnstitutionally and "by
birth" are tribal memoers, then these individuals are not allowed
to vote in elections of their Tribe,
Ttjius, these individuals,
wno are Ute Indians, are not able to register their opinions at
the ballot bcxr nor have a voice in theirj Tribe. Why, when they
are constitutionally members of the Ute Tribe, and citizens of
the Ute Nation? Their constitutional riglht to triDal membership
Their actual members [hip or lack of it, is
is being ignored.
oeing determined by the personal whims of [the Business Committee.
This has been going on for over forty (4 0) years. It has been
sanctioned
by every
BIA bureaucrat t hat has been on the
Reservation curing that time. The BIA sa notion has extended far
beyond the Reservation, to the highest officials of the BIA.
"accepted"
for t ribal membership have
Even
those who are
difficulty getting information, assistance! or even their property
from the Tribe, if it does not suit jthe purposes that the
Business Committee has in mind.
The B|usiness Committee lets
every one know that it can make it rough on them if they try to
make waves. Those threats are complied wi th whenever anyone gets
cut of line.
No wonder the Business Co|Immittee suffers from a
lack of resoect!
Please be assured that there is morej than just the Business
Committee's or my side to this story. Th ere are ntanv individual
Indians who would like to have the privilege of expressing to you
the frustration, disappointment and actual discrimination being
exercised against them by the Business Committee. They try, but
have a hard time cettinc heard on the Reservation because the
Business Committee does not find it in th e best interests of the
T* V
Business Committee to have anyone speak out against
are interested in hearina from some of these people, I will ce
happy to arrange the same
Whether vou want one or a hundred or
two hundred, I can get them to assemb>|le for you.
You can
determine whether to meet wi :h them in Salt Lake or on
Reservation, but just give them a chance J to be heard. All they
want is justice and equality.
They want the law fairly and
correctly applied.
They know what it is like to live on the
Reservation and to be discriminated against by their "own"
government.
If it is that way for Ute [Tribal members, can you
imagine what it would be like for those who have "no voice" in
any of the Tribal elections or affairs?
For ten years I have hoped that the Business Committee would
wake up before it is too late. The Business Committee has yet to
learn it can only gain the respect it dejsires by showing proper
respect for the Rule of Law.
The Rulings of the Ute Tribal
Appellate Court have been in place for [nearly six years.
The
Ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court has bee^i in place less than six

JUL*1

January 13, 1987
letter to Governor 3angerter
Re: Ute Trioal Business Committee/Jurisdiction

nont hs. If the Business Committee wants the white community to
foil ow the rulings of the U.S. Suorem0 Court, why doesn't it
fell ow the rulings of its own Cou *---* It might be surprised at
Meanwhile, it truly anus es me that the Business
the results.
Z enm ittee and its attorney want immediate implementation of tne
rs of the "white man's" Court, but refuses to comply with the
Orde rs of the "Indian's" Court. Since th Business Committee has
brou ght the issue of compliance witn Court Orders to the
ntion of you and the public, I have c hesen to do the same. I
lee to set the example of
icallv challence the Business Ccmmitt
u
71 n; w11n cour
orders by leading *- - le wav.

- s

• , -

1

S incerely yours ,

George E. Manqan \
Attorney at Law
^
r* r?

cc
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Tribal Business Committee
Duchesne County Commission
Uintah County Commission
Senator "Jake" Garn
Senator Orin G. Hatch
Rep. Howard C. Nielsen
Rep. Wayne Owens
Rep. James V. Hansen
Uintah Basin Standard
Vernal Express
Deseret News
Salt Lake Tribune
KSEU, Roosevelt,
KVEL, Vernal
KUTV, Channel 2
KTVX, Channel 4
KSL, Channel 5
Martin E. Seneca, Jr.
niar.s
Ron Willi
a
Haskell Chapoose
CNN - Atlanta, Georgia
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE
STATEMENT OF
R. DENNIS ICKES
ON BEHALF OF
DUCHESNE AND UINTAH COUNTIES], UTAH
TO
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CfEVIL RIGHTS
FLAGSTAFF, ARIZONA
August 14, 1987
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While the U.S. Civil Rights Commission should be
concerned about abusive use of power against its members and
non-members, the Commission should not solely focus on whether
the abuses reach impermissible degrees.
abusing their powers.

Mariy tribes are not

However, the void left by Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez, leaves wide open the possibility and the
opportunity for abuse of tribal powers when jthere is no
effective remedy available to persons coming within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation.

The Commission

should address its concern to how meaningful] remedies may be
fashioned so that when a tribe does abuse itjs power that
effective and meaningful remedies are available to the victim.
The practical impact of Santa Clar^ Pueblo v. Martinez
is that:

(1) generally accepted discretionary constitutional

rights are converted from being rights into being privileges;
(2) tribal courts are more likely to become political courts
rather than courts of law; (3) there is no oversight by federal
courts or by non-political bodies who can actually enforce
rights; (4) the lack of access to any court,j such as was the
case in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho andl Shoshone Tribes is
substantially increased; (5) realistic and meaningful remedies
are diminished; (6) reservation tribal members are made second
class citizens; (7) non-tribal members are miade third class
citizens; and, (8) reservation government based upon tribal

AJU.O

membership r a t h e r than upon the consent of the governed

is

p e r p e t u a t e d because t r i b a l membership has h i s t o r i c a l l y been
based upon p o l i t i c a l and r a c i a l

criteria.

In applying the Santa Clara consequences to the Ute
R e s e r v a t i o n area of t h e S t a t e of Utah, the i|mpacts upon
n o n - t r i b a l members become more obvious and s e v e r e .

The

d e c i s i o n of Ute Tribe v . S t a t e of Utah has hiad t h e following
l e g a l and p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s :

(1) i t quadrupled the Reservation

in geographic t e r r i t o r y , to make i t t h e second l a r g e s t
r e s e r v a t i o n in the United S t a t e s ; (2) i t encpmpassed 15,000
n o n - t r i b a l members; (3) i t encompassed approximately 70-75% of
all

fee l a n d ; (4) i t expanded the t e r r i t o r y over which the Ute

t r i b e has s i g n i f i c a n t

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y over people and

p r o p e r t y , i . e . , hunting and f i s h i n g , water c o n t r o l , c o n t r o l of
i n g r e s s and e g r e s s , t a x a t i o n , l i c e n s i n g , b u s i n e s s

regulation,

zoning and land use, c o n t r a c t r e g u l a t i o n , an$ many other
day-to-day a f f a i r s ;

(5) i t placed t h e T r i b e , S t a t e and l o c a l

governments i n t o d i r e c t competition for revenues from most of
t h e same p r o p e r t y and p e o p l e ; (6) i t e l i m i n a t e d a c c e s s to
f e d e r a l c o u r t s by both t r i b a l members and non-members; (7)

it

placed approximately 15,000 non-members unde^ the governmental
c o n t r o l of a t r i b e in which they have no p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s ; (8)
i t placed approximately 15,000 non-members wi v hin t h e removal
powers of the T r i b e ; (9) i t ousted the S t a t e and l o c a l
governments from c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n in rhany i n s t a n c e s ;
(10) i t placed most governmental a f f a i r s
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in ^he hands of 450

tribal voters; (11) it increased the likelihood of much more
litigation over jurisdictional rights withirj the 4,000,000 acre
reservation; (12) it imposed greater burden$ and stresses upon
tribal courts; (13) it increased political attentions and
sensitivities between tribal members and nori-members; (14) it
diminished respect for and support for the tribal government by
non-tribal members; (15) it diminished respect for the federal
government by non-members because the federal government has
allowed the Santa Clara condition to continue since 1978; (16)
it has increased political pressure upon the! tribal government
by tribal members and tribal government advocates to expand
tribal powers under theory that if they do n|ot use the tribal
power they will lose it; (17) it diminished values of existing
reservation property owned by non-members; (|18) it diminished
the interest of economic development within [the reservation by
persons who live within and outside the reservation.
The adverse impacts upon the Ute Reservation's
population is readily apparent.

The Commission must be aware

that not only should it be concerned about the rights of tribal
members who live within the reservation, butj non-members as
well.

The Utah situation dramatically points out this problem,

but every reservation probably has non-member residents.
Whether one person is deprived of his civil rights or 15,000
should not make the difference.

The Commission should make

recommendations to overcome these unfair practices through
legislative recommendations.
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Unfortunately, tribal governments, (for the most part,
do not support changes to the Indian Bill o£ Rights and the
Indian Civil Rights Act.

In my opinion, it lis in a tribe's

best interest that an improved Indian Bill <^f Rights be enacted
with provisions that more closely incorporate the principles of
the United States Constitution and which projvides for federal
judicial oversight under reasonable circumstances.

Tribal

governments desire to have respect from theij]r members, from
non-members and from other governments.

Thepir support for an

Indian Bill of Rights which incorporated conjsstitutional
principles and federal oversight would accomplish improved
respect.

It would also improve opportunities for reservation

investment where tribes desire economic development through
investment from outside the reservation.

And most importantly,

it would improve the quality of life on reservations for all
residents and persons having relationships w|.th the
reservations.
It is also very much in the national interest to end
the dual standard of citizenship rights thatinow exist as a
result of certain tribal failures to implement the Indian Bill
of Rights.

I make the following recommendations to you for

careful consideration as you make your own recommendations to
the President and to the Congress.

Any solution should

incorporate the following principals:

(1) preserve and protect

the principal of meaningful triba] sovereignly; (2) balance the
rights of the individuals, both member and ncjn-member, against
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the powers of t r i ba]

governments;
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The BIA'S limited IBOR involvement can be largely
explained.

Due in large measure to Mortoft v. Mancariy 417 U.S.

535 (1974), BIA personnel charged with executing its mission
were generally tribally affiliated Indian persons who had been
in positions of power in tribal governments or were related to
tribal political leaders or were affiliated in some manner with
tribal politics and politicians.
BIA non-enforcement or limited enforcement activities
can also be traced in part to the collective influence of
tribal leaders who demanded that the BIA ^tay out of tribal
politics, and the lack of any significant demand by individual
Indians that the BIA involve itself in IB0R matters.

As a

general rule, reservation politics was divided between those
who were in power and those who were out of power.
Nonetheless, both those in and out of pow£r possessed a common
desire to preserve the powers of the tribe in its dealings with
outsiders.

Further, the Bureau was comprised of mostly Indian

personnel, some of whom were tribal members.

Thus, BIA

involvement was feared as being potentially partisan.
The Indian Bill of Rights was commonly perceived by
Indian politicians of nearly every faction as a threat to
sovereignty and their political power.

EVen those whom used

the IBOR to secure their political power saw that it could be
later used against them.

Thus, it was natural for BIA

personnel to lean heavily in favor of strong tribal governments
and to suspiciously view the Indian Bill of Rights.
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As a

result, the Indian Bill of Rights was not a priority with the
BIA.

Further, the Office of Indian Right$ was viewed as the

responsible agency for its enforcement.

With the Martinez

decision and the termination of the Office of Indian Rights,
the principal impetus for any government Agency enforcing the
Indian Bill of Rights within reservations was lost.
THE BIA'S ROLE AFTER MARTINEZ
After Martinez and after the demise of the Office of
Indian Rights, there has been no apparent and visible federal
government enforcement of the Indian Bill of Rights.

Tribal

councils have controlled access to their courts and in many
instances have influenced judicial decisions either before or
after the tribal judiciary has acted.

Eacpn tribe has been left

to its own devices as to if and how it will enforce the Act.
There is no obvious involvement by the BlA in causing tribes to
enforce the Act and there has been no visible organized effort
by individuals to lobby tribes, the BIA, ©r the Congress to
compel tribal or Bureau enforcement.
Does this condition suggest that there are no
problems?

The answer is clearly no!

Your hearings in Rapid

City and Flagstaff and various news articles reveal that there
are many reasons to believe that there ar$ substantial bases
for Congress to reassess the Act and the lack of oversight.
The principal reasons that there is not a greater
outcry against the current situation include the fact that
general reservation poverty limits the financing of organized
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activities by individuals, there is a perception by individuals
that they cannot beat "city hall", there is a perception by
individuals that tribal council power is supreme over tribal
judicial remedies, there is no recourse outside of the tribal
system, there has been a diminishment of publicly funded legal
services, there is a general reluctance by publicly funded
legal services to attack tribal actions, ^nd there is a concern
that challenges to tribal power will weaken the ability of
tribes to deal with their outside adversaries, i.e., state and
local governments.
Many tribes are not per se opposed to the enforcement
of civil rights within their reservations but, instead, they
view civil rights as a luxury which they Cannot afford.

Tribal

budgets are principally devoted to badly needed support
services with minor portions available to defend civil rights
claims.
Rights1

Other tribal concerns arise out cbf the Indian Bill of
I
enforcement history from 1968-1978. Many Indian Bill

of Rights' contests pertained to the conduct of tribal
elections where tribal power was often placed at the mercy of
activists who could paralyze and intimidate tribal government
by the filing of an action in federal cou^rt, often using
publicly financed lawyers.

Memories of tliiose years have been

partially responsible for chilling any support for any new laws
which would again place tribal government on the defensive and
where they may be placed in financial jeopardy.
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WHAT ULTIMATELY MUST BE DONE
The long term solution to meaningful civil rights
protection resides with Congress.

It has the plenary power to

define the rights of individuals and to define the limits of
tribal powers.

In addition, it must provide a meaningful

enforcement mechanism.

Tribal government advocates will

initially be uniformly against the idea in much the same way as
the states were opposed to the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments
and the implementing of federal legislation which states
perceived diminished their powers vis-a-vis the federal
government.
Legitimate tribal concerns can bk dealt with by new
legislation which strengthens, or at least maintains, tribal
powers while enhancing the rights of individuals.

It is not

necessarily true that anything which strengthens individuals in
their relationships with tribal government results in weakening
tribal government.

Congress could strengthen the rights of

individuals and simultaneously strengthen tribal justice
systems1 courts, and its law enforcement administration.
Any revised Indian Bill of Rightjs should include a
Congressional commitment to finance a reservation justice
system that meets defined minimum standards.

Those minimum

standards should include a judiciary that is independent of
political interference during a reasonable term and whose
members are law trained (not necessarily a lawyer), and a
police force that is trained in law, techniques for
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enforcement, and knowledge of the Indian Bill of Rights.

Pay

standards should be established for the justice system that are
attractive within the geographical area served.
For tribes to be truly capable of surviving in times
of shrinking federal funds for tribal programs, a case must
also be made for conforming the Indian Bill of Rights more
closely to the United States Constitution.

All tribal members

are citizens of the United States and are considered residents
of the states within which they reside.

With few exceptions,

tribal members generally have extensive contact with
non-reservation situations, i.e., they attend school with
non-Indians, they shop off-reservation fou many items, they
often work off-reservation, they frequently marry non-tribal
members, their reservations are often checker-boarded or have
significant areas of non-tribal lands, an<$ otherwise have
substantial interaction with off-reservation persons,
governments and private enterprise.
It is not practical for private investment to
seriously consider a reservation as a place to locate or to do
business if the tribal justice system is significantly
different than non-reservation situations with which private
investment is familiar.

It is not practical for tribal members

who have the means to develop their potential within the
reservation if the tribal justice system is
political change.

subject to dramatic

It is not practical fot tribes to impede

their own development by adhering to a government system that
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offends the majority society's or members' sense of fairness.
It is not practical for Congress to permi^ tribes to operate
without guidance as to what is and is notjacceptable concerning
governmental power and individual rights.
It is not fair for citizens of t}ie United States to
have enclaves within the United States' boundaries where
Constitutional principles are not in effect.

It is not fair

that non-tribal members residing within reservation boundaries
are without the protection of the United fetates Constitution
and federal courts.

It is not fair that tribal members are not

assured that they will have recourse to a judicial system that
is not subordinate to the tribe's political body.
The current situation with the IJBOR is neither
practical nor fair to any of those who liJTve, work, invest, or
govern within Indian country.

I implore you to report this

situation to the Congress and request that Congress begin the
process for simultaneously strengthening individual rights and
the tribal governments' ability to assure those rights.
Not only should Congress be concerned with the rights
of tribal members within a reservation,fc^utit should also take
into account numerous non-member Indians and non-Indians whom
are not participants in the tribal political process and yet
are subject to many tribal powers.

In s<j>me reservation areas,

the numbers of non-Indians substantially exceed the numbers of
tribal members.

In my own State of Utah^ the Ute Reservation

has a non-Indian population that outnumbers the Indian
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population eight to one.

The Ute Reservation includes

incorporated towns and substantial business activities.
Nonetheless, the non-Indian and non-member Indian population
have no political voice in the tribal government that governs
Not only are the non-members subject to I itigating certain of
their disputes with tribal members in tri bal courts which are
in turn subject to the political power o^ the tribe's governing
business committeef but such non-members have no political
voice in the election of the business confmittee even though the
non-member resides in the same political [territory as the
tribal members.

This anomaly must be confronted and an

equitable solution found.
CONCLUSION
Indian people and Indian governments are striving not
only to survive but to survive with dignity and respect.
Tribal governments want respect from those they govern and from
those whom are their neighbors outside the reservation.

Tribal

governments want their legitimacy to be Accepted by others.
Tribal governments want to safeguard the uniqueness of their
race and political institutions.

Tribal governments want to

control their land, resources, members, knd activities within
the reservation that affect their intere sts.

Tribal

governments want to influence state and national policy as
those policies impact them.

However, tr ibal governments' wants

require monetary resources to finance thbir operations.

In a

time when tribal financial resources seep to be outstripped by
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tribal wants, tribes must acknowledge that an important
ingredient to solving their financial neeas lies in the support
of off-reservation people, communities, governments, and
private enterprise.

Any significant off-reservation financial

investment on reservations will be contingent in part upon how
seriously tribes take their responsibility to provide a fair
and equitable justice system which implements laws that are
compatible with the United States Constitution.
Until Congress acts upon this Commission's findings
and recommendations, there are only the tribes themselves whom
can effectuate Congress1 intent in the enactment of the IBOR.
In the interim, the BIA must use the authority and powers
available to it to provide all individual within tribal
jurisdictions the assurance that they are not second and third
class citizens.
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BUSINESS COMMITTEE
FOUND IN CONTEMPT

%=
By John Martin
The Business Committee members
have been ordered to pay $250 dollars
every pay period to tribal court til they
abide by the back payment part of the
court-order in the enrollment decision
handed down on June 3,1986.
Judge William Thome had stipulated in that decision that the leaders
esroti- 15 flaintif^' children in
Chapoose va/Ute Tribe* and award
them back dividends to the time they
were denied enrollment on June 20,
1977.^
The council (fid pass a resolution to
abide by that court-order, but during a
special meeting with the people, they
learned that the tribe was against the
back payment A petition was presented the Business Committee for a
referendum vote and the people voted
405 against, and 21 for.
- The children have been enrolled
since September 6, 1986, and are receiving regular dividends. But they do
not getretroactivepayments according
to stipulation in the enrollment decision.
Associate Tribal Judge Lany
Yazzie ruledonFriday, April 8, that the
council members were in contempt of
court and denied dismissal of the case
as John Boyden Jr.t Tribal Attorney,
had insisted.
The ten-year issue stems from the
tribal constitution not having written
into it the actual blood requirement of
5/8's as it is spelled out in the 1956
ordinance, which the Council has been
following according to its promulgating authority in the constitution, to
enroll new members.
The Council was led to believe,
leaders have said, that the 5/8's ordinance was valid. Yet, it was on that
very point the tribe lost the enrollment
case.

According to Boyden, the Business
Committee abide by court-order by
passing a resolution to enroll the children and pay back-dividends. But the
people overruled the leaders' action by
referendum vote when they said no.
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She was also told that any involvement
outside the Ute Tribe where cluldren
were concerned, they could not be
enrolled.
"In my opinion," said Natchees, "it
seems you want us to violate the voice
of the people (tribal constitution), who
I draw my sttength from."
Irene Cuch, Vice Chairwoman, said
that it's been through the constitution
and by-laws that business has been
conducted over the years. The representative said she's been standing on
tbeealh of office to perform her duties
. and that Elders are important as

This was the argument John Boyden
presented in tribal court on Monday, ,spokes people.
April 4, during a show cause Waring. - Wilford Conetah talked about the
He stressed that the council was not in chiefs and sub-chiefs in the Bear Dance
^contempt because the tribal court did and Sun Dance. Efc also said, "1 had to
oof have jurisdiction to review council honor tfcrreferendumvote. 1 had the
' action. He, therefore, asked the]judge people to answer to."
Here, John Boyden suggested getv to dismiss the case.
ting
historical material and bringing in
- "The Business Committee is not in
Elders
if it would help the case, adding
contempt," jaid Boyden, "and the
that
the
Tribe only wanted the plain
court has no jurisdiction to review the
meaning
of the constitution; that the
council's action. The people have spopeople
spoke
oat in the referendum
ken. They followed the constitution,
vote
and
reversed
the court decision,
-and the decision is conclusive and
"which
is
bincfing,"
he stressed
binding." ,
9
T i l the people change them," con"It^s hogwashl' said Oeorgel Man9
tinued
the tribal attorney, "these are the
gan, plaintiffs attorney, "1 DM no
rules
we
have to play by: the will of the
delegation of authority to review the
people."
"" *'
court decision," adding that there are
.
"We
might
as
well
take their arguprecepts in the Indian Civil Rights Act
ment
to
its
ridiculousness,"
said
that cannot be taken away.
'
George
Mangan.
"Everytime
there's
a
Mangan said there was a judgement
court
decision
someone
can
disagree,
on propertyrights(dividends), add that
then the Business Committee can reit can't be taken away without due
view the case."
process of law. T h e Business ComRepresentatives Gary Poowegup,
mittee is not a court ofreview,"bk said
Stewart
Pike and Chairman Lester
T h e Appellate Court is."
Chapoose
were cut off from testifying
According to Mangan, the plainon culture when Judge Yazzie was
tiffs' children have always been enreminded
that the tribe only wanted the
titled to membership and benefits in the
plain
meaning
of the constitution.
Ute Tribe,
j
All
six
council
members were presDuring the afternoon, Judge Larry
ent
during
testimony
on Monday, exYazzie, of Tucson, Arizona, hid the
cept
the
chairman,
who
was excused
council members testify on Ute Tribal
before
noon
for
his
dialysis
appointcustoms and tradition so he could better
ment.
understand how they arrive at deciAt the Friday hearing on April 8,
sions.
Boyden
called Dr. Floyd O'Neil to the
Marine Natchees said that as a child
witness
stand
as an expert on die Ute
she was taught to respectfully listen to
Tribe,
Indian
self-rule
and self-deterher Elders, and according to the tribal
mination. The historian, from tlie
constitution, T h e Business CommitAmerican West Center at the Univertee is subject to review by the people,"
sity of Utah, said be was "not perfect in
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his knowledge, but knowledgeable."
O'Neil testified that up to 1936,
before the tribal constitution was ratified, the Ute people decided issues in a
simplified, community way. They
chose war leaders and hunting leaders
by community action, and took on
government powers only when forced
by white seizure of lands.
Boyden asked him if there was any
evidence of separation of powers.
"None I can think of," said O'Netf.
T h e final power rested with the
people."
The historian said that during the
Reorganization Act, there was skepticism in the community in accepting the
tribal constitution til the people were
assured that the final power would rest
with them and not the Business Committee. Again, he said there was no
evidence of separation of powers.
The Historian explained that power
was by consent of the people as a
community function. "In the white
world," he said, "the US constitution is
the power," and in the Indian world the
community consent of the people is the
power - "the traditional way."
Boyden told the court that there is no
evidence of the Ute Tribe practicing
the Anglo separation of powers. He
added that the issue the court must
decide is if the general council meeting
and referendum vote are binding on the
court, and the Business Committee.
T h e constitution is very plain,- he
said, "that the vote on the referendum
election is conclusive and binding. The
court gets its authority from the council. Are we going to honor the
constitution?" asked the attorney.
There's no choice for the Business
Committee but to. Does the Tribal
Court have authority to bold the Busienss Committee in contempt? The
court c a n \ because the Business
Committee has the authority*to review
the court"
Boyden then asked that the case be _
ismissed.
Mangan said it was difficult for him
> see where the council acted in good (
rith when they had time to respond to
wrt-order. He said the Business
ommittee, the Tribe and the people in
social ncedtosec that tbeavil Rights
ct is followed.

The attorney saidtoerightto re
cannot supercede individual rights
adding that in the Ovil Rights Act,
defendants cannot re view when there
due process of law.
There wece not new issues, according to Mangan, as John Boyden has
insisted about the referendum vote
having ultimate power over the council, but "just a new whitewash that was
orchestrated. The by-laws do not give
dignity to the constitution.
Judge Yazzie, who is also a professionally trained attorney, said the
council's resolution to pay back dividend was invalid, that the referendum
vote just dealt with that issue, and the
"It invades my sense of Indiannes
said the judge, "to enter a decision an
denyrightsof membership (to the cl
dren) and the decisions before. It woul
be undermining the dignity and status
of the court system." He said there w^s
already a movement in this country to
undermine tribal courts based on tlie
Civil Rights Act '
T h e referendum does not challenge tlie authority of this court," said
Judge Yazzie. "It's difficult for me to
understand - that these children will nit
be a strength to the tribe. Shall we ask
them to leave? They seem to be Indian."
The judge said that according to his
interpretation, the issues on enrollment
have already been litigated, and the
tribe had the opportunity and ample
time to raise a defense.
He then denied dismissal of the case
and reminded the parties Judge
Thome's stipulation, wherein the
* council was ordered to enroll the children and pay them back dividends. He
said the $500 dollar charge against
former tribal attorney Martin Seneca
was paid to tribal court for distribution
among the plaintiffs. ^
When asked about the $100 dollars
a day charged to the council representatives, Boyden said that it was not
done.
Judge Yazzie asked, "Did the referendum say not to pay?"
Boyden said, T h e tribe was compelled to not pay through the referendum."
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T h e prim decision will be enforced," said the judge. T h e referendum does not absolve the Business
Committee of the court-order."
*' Thejudge then sought out a compromise among the council, the plaintiffs
and children of the different families
by having them meet with the attorneys
and the judge • "to deter further contempt charges," said the judge.
" But no. Judge Yazzie's said he was
sad to report that the council did not
wish to comply with court-order, that
be bad hoped to avoid further contempt
charges against the Business Committee. Then be reaffirmed Judge
Thome's decision.
T h e constitution is based on custom and tradition," said Judge Yazzie,
that the Court of Appeals is the supreme law; that the constitution mandated a separation of powers between
the Business Committee and the tribal
court, which "interprets and enforces

law."
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The judge said the overruling consideration was the Indian Civil Rights
Act and former decisions.
George Mangan stipulated in his
contempt charge that the Business
Committee pay the back dividend at an
assessed interest rate wherein each
plaintiff child would receive over
$32,000 dollars; that the council be
fined up to a $1000 dollars a day, or be
jailed for non-compliance. Mangan
asked for attorney fees of $135 dollars
a day for himself and $105 for his cocounsel.
v
Then he said, T h e enrollment case
has been ip appeal for eight years, and
in federal court for tliree years. Nothing
but game-playing."
Judge Yazzie accepted all but the
incarceration of council members,
saying that lie was enforcing actions of
non-compliance with orders and stipulations. He said the council had gone
back on its word.
Boyden said there's been a new
issue siuce the Appellate decision,
because of the special meeting and
referendum vole. "It's not to show
contempt of this court, your honor, or to
go back on our word - but honoring a
higher authority: the people."

He asked the incarceration of council members be softened, because the
police are under the BIA and the court
has no jurisdiction over that
••We've got to do something about
this order," said Mangan, and suggested taking the members to any appropriate facility. *
Judge Yazzie bad the defendants
step forth and testify under oath as to
their understanding of the court-order
and if they would coqiply; reiterating
again, that the US constitution through
the Indian Civil Rights Act, and litigation that went before inlhe Tribal Court
of Appeals and the Federal court of
appeals, established in law, rights of
die plaintiffs' children.
T h e referendum vote does not
override the constitution and Civil
Rights Act," saidthe judge, "as applied
and interpreted by this court. So, will
you use your best efforts to cany out the
court's decisions?"
Stewart Pike testified that MI do not
feel the Boyden Firm represents me. I
do not recognize that And will not
That's got us into this situation." Pike
added that he was going to raise his own
defense, "because we're charged as
individuals."
4
Irene Cuch said she understood the
decision and woulc^not comply with
the court decision - as the referendum is
interpreted
Wilford Cooetah said, "I will listen
to what the people have to tell me."
" Gary Poowegup said, *The people
have spoken. We gotta listen." He respected the court's decision but said the
people's referendum vole threw a different light on the situation.
And finally, MaxineNatchees said,
"I understand the ruling according to
your interpretation of the constitution," but she wouldn't comply, because she couldn't violate the
constitution and the people.
Judge Yazzie said the defendants1
excuse for non-compliance" was insufficient and the referendum vote did not
amend the tribal constitution.
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~riie Business Committee chooses
notit to|
toab
abide by court-order," he said,
and found the council in "willful disobedience and disregard to a lawful
judgement order." Judge Yazzie called
out the council's names and said they
were in contempt," stressing that,
"We 're back to the same place after ten
years'* of litigating the enrollment issue.
He granted Mangan's motion for
contempt, except confining the leaders
and charging them $ 100 dollars a day.
He did fine them $250 dollars every
pay period, which starts after the judge
signs the order and the council members are served.
'*"" Juagc* Yazzie said he would consider more serious fines if there was
non-compliance with the order, which
would be issued without further notice.
He said the defendants were entitled to
the Appeals Court, and any stay on the
decision must be lodged with die trial
court J He granted Mangan the $135
an hour attorney fees: $105
an hour for his co-counsel, and
a stay on the decision that
n felt the tribe was entitled to.
isions of the past should be
concluded Judge Yazzie.
lefendants had ample opportunity to raise their arguments" on a case
's been before the Tribal Appeals
Court twice, and once before the Federal Court of Appeals.
M
I encourage you to take seriously
the words spoken here. *T ve straggled
with you very hard and appealed to
your sense of reason. I leave the door
open to you, and pray, you will accept
the invitati
Itation.
"Court will recess."

Martin Seneca, Esq.
11647 Newbridge Court
Restcn, Virginia 22091
Tel. (7C3) S6C-9012
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Daniel K. Israel, Esq.
Cogswell and Wehrle
1700 Lincoln Street
Suite 3500
Denver, CO 8C203
Tel. (303) 661-2150
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
NATURAL RESOURCE A^ r

attorneys to:
Ute Indian Tribe c: tne

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAS

THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE, LESTER CHAPOCSE,
CHAIRMAN, UTE INDIAN TRIEE,
tiOMPLAINT FOR REFUND
OF TAXES, DECLARATOR'
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIE!

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SZkZZ OF UTAH; UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION; DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH;
Defendants.

For their claims against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege the
following:
JURISDICTION
1. This is a civil action for refund of taxes, declaratory
and injunctive relief. This Court has jurisdiction to hear these
claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1362 and 1343. Pliintiffs' claims
arise under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, Article VI, Clause 2,
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; under the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, as amended, 25 U.S.C.
§? 396a-396f (1976); the Indian Joint Ventur* Act of 1962, 25
U.S.C. § 21C2, et s e c , and 30 U.S.C. § 191.
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PARTIES
2. Plaintiff UTE INDIAN TRIBE ("the Trifc>e") is a sovereign
American Indian Tribe, with a governing body, the Ute Indian
Business Committee, duly recognized by the United States
Secretary of the Interior as the governing bo^iy of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation (the "Reservation")
Plaintiff Lesier
Chaooose is the Chairman of the Ute Indian Tribe and is charged
with the responsibility of administering the [Tribe's governmental
resocnsibilities.
Defendant STATE OF UTAH ("State" or j"Utah") is a
sovereign State of the Union, pursuant to the Enabling Act of
July 16, 1894, 26 Stat. 107. The Department of Community and
Economic Development of the Stare of Utah is authorized by Utah
law to distribute federal mineral lease revenues to Utah
communities under 30 U.S.C. § 191. As used i ir> this complaint the
term "Utah" shall include the Stare of Utah,
s agencies, and
its subdivisions.
4. Defendant Utah State Tax Commission is charged by
statute with the responsibility of collecting! the taxes levied
under the Utah Mining Occupation Tax Act and the Utah Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. 1973 §§ 59-5-66 et sec, and 406-14 et sec, respectively.
Defendant Duchesne County, Utah, is a political
supervision o- the state. Part of the Ute Lndian Reservation and
a large portion of the Ute Tribe's oil and ga s resources held in
trust by the United States are encompassed wi thin the exterior
boundaries of Duchesne County. Duchesne Coun y is charged by
Utah statute with the responsibility of collej ting taxes under
the Utah Ad Valorem Property Tax Act § 59-1-1
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6. The United States holds in trust and the Tribe is the
beneficial owner of oil and gas reserves underlying portions of
the Reservation.
7. The Ute Tribe and its members maintain their tribal
customs, ceremonies and language. They have ;their own
government, which manages their own tribal j?o lice force,
maintains their own roads, and manages their own social services,
all in accordance with the provisions of the Ute Indian
Constitution and Tribal Code, and at all time s in conjunction
with the United States government. By providing substantially
all necessary governmental services to the Re|servation in a
coordinated program with the United States, the Tribe has freed

-2-

Ac& Sr

the State of Utah from the obligation of providing on the
Reservation State services it provides throughout the non-Indian
portions of the State.
8. The Tribe has leased approximately orte hundred thousand
acres of lands held in trust by the United States to non-Indian
companies for the purpose of oil and gas exploration and
production pursuant to either the federal Indian leasing program
or the mineral joint venture program, both enicted by Congress
and supervised by the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribe is
currently negotiating with other companies vh^ are interested in
developing the Tribe's oil and gas properties^
S. The federal scheme under which the U^e Indian trust land
is leased to non-Indians for the purpose of ojLl and gas
exploration and production is detailed and comprehensive. Its
purpose is to maximize both tribal self-government and economic
prosperity, free of outside interference.
10. The State of Utah has enacted three statewide taxes
which relate specifically to oil and gas production. They are
the Utah Mining Occupation Tax, the Utah Oil j& Gas Conservation
Tax, and the Utah Ad Valorem Property Tax. The Occupation tax
and Conservation tax generate revenues which are placed into the
State1s general tax fund. The Ad Valorem property tax is
collected by Duchesne., County and generates revenues which are
placed into the County's general tax fund.
11. Through these taxes Utah and its subdivisions have
collected over the last five years nearly $24,000,000^from
Reservation oil and gas production. During the same period of
time Utah and its subdivisions have orovided minimal governmental
services r.o Reservation oil and gas activities, and hay^. provided
in total, including..public schools, governmental services to thel
Reservation programs costing the State and it[s subdivisions
"approximately "20%~~bf the oil and gas tax revenue's generated from
the Reservation. VTrtuaiiy all of the Reservations oil and gas
tax revenues collected by Utah are expended bff the Reservation
and most of the oil and gas tax revenues collected by Utah's
subdivisions are also expended off the Reservation.
12. The continuing unabated imposition of Utah's oil and
gas taxes is (a) preempted by the comprehensive federal scheme
under which Ute Indian trust minerals are to be developed so as
to maximize the economic return to the Tribe;and its members, and
(b) infringes upon the sovereign right of th£ Tribe to gcvern its
Reservation so as to maximize its revenues fjrom the Reservation's
resources free of outside interference.
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12. During the very time period Utah arid its subdivisi.ens
transferred
Ute oil and gas
eras wealth from the Reservation
have
lands and have failed to return an appropriate amount of such
wealth to the Reservation in the form of Statie and local
services, Utah has also systematically excluqed the Reservation
f^cm receiving—federal-monx-es- allocated to Idnds in Utah impacted
by federal energy development.
14. During the past five years, Utah has received nearly
5150,000,000 from federal mineral development, a portion of which
is derived from federal lands neighboring on the Reservation.
Congress directed Utah to distribute such sunjs giving priority to
those areas of the State socially or economically impacted by
federal mineral development. Rather than following the federal
mandate that such funds be equitably spent irj energy impacted
areas, Utah has elected to place the funds in| State institutions,
subdivisions, and non-Indian communities, an4 none of the federal
money has been directed into impacted portiorjs of the
Reservation.
15. The plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm and have
no adequate remedy at law.
16. An actual controversy exists between the plaintiffs and
the defendants as to the validity of the past and current level
of Utah oil and gas taxes imposed on Ute Indian oil and gas
production, and the validity of Utah's policy of excluding the
Reservation from the benefits of 30 U.S.C. § 191.
CLAIM ONE
17. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by
reference.
18. Defendants1 taxation of oil and gas operations and
production without abatement on Ute trust land is preempted by
federal law, and therefore violates Article I, Section 6, Clause
3 (the Commerce Clause) and Article VI, Clause 2 (the Supremacy
Clause) of the Constitution of the United States.
CLAIM TWO
19. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorpqrated herein by
reference.
20. Defendants' taxation of oil and ga^ operations and
production on Ute trust land imposes an impermissible burden en
commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8/ Clause 3 (the
Commerce Clause) of the United Stares Constitution. No
production occurs within State jurisdiction 4nd yet Utah and its
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subdivisions tax such operations and production, without
abatement, in violation of the requirement that all taxes be
assessed on fairly apportioned income.
CLAIM THREE
21. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by
reference.
22. Defendants1 taxation cf oil and gas operations and
production on Ute trust land without abatement violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution since the taxes assessed and collected are
net fairly related to the services provided t|o Reservation
residents by the State and are distributed ori a discriminatory
basis as between Reservation portions of Utahf and non-Reservation
portions of Utah.
CLAIM FOUR
23. Paragraphs 6 through 16 are incorporated herein by
reference.
24. Defendants1 refusal to distribute ^ny of the
$150,000,000 it has received from the United IStates over the past
five years to the Reservation violates -30 U.S.C. § 191 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth "Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek from this Court a declaration
that the State of Utah oil and gas taxes are unlawful as applied
without abatement to oil and gas operations ^nd production on the
Ute Indian Reservation, and an order restraining Defendants from
collecting such taxes without abatement in tiie future.
1. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that an amount of
Utah oil and gas tax revenues collected by tljie State of Utah and
Duchesne County from the Reservation since January 1, 1982, to be
determined at trial, is deemed to be held by the State of Utah in
constructive trust for the use and benefit of the Ute Indian
Tribe of Indians, and an order directing the State cf Utah to pay
over the amount of such unlawfully collectedImonies to the Court
for distribution to the Tribe.
2. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration ihat the State cf
Utah's systematic exclusion of the Reservation from the benefits
cf the $150,000,000 in federal mineral revenues provided the
State of Utah under 30 U.S.C. § 191 since 19$2 is unlawful and an
order restraining Defendants from perpetrating such exclusion in
the future.
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3. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration t:(iat an appropriate
amount of the 5150,000,000 in 30 U.S.C. § 1911 funds improperly
excluded from the Reservation, to be determined at trial, is
deemed to be held by the State of Utah in constructive trust for
the use and benefit of the Reservation and an order directing the
State of Utah to pay over such amounts, to th6 Court for
distribution to the Tribe for energy impact purposes, together
with interest, costs and attorneys' fees to t|ie extent provided
by lav, and for such other relief as this Couijrt deems proper.
Dated:

1967.
Respectfully submitted,

Daniel H. Israel
Cogswell atid Wehrle
1700 Lincoln Street
Suite 3500
Denver, COj80203
Tel. [303]|861-2150
Martin Seneca, Esq.
11647 Newbridge Court
Reston, VA 22091
Tel. [703]I860-9012
Attornevs for Plaintiffs
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I Jnited States Department of the Interioi
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
|
EAGLE BUTTE, SOUTH DAKOTA 57625
IN REPLY REFER TO:

dministration
1306-10

MAR 3 i ^88

CERTIFIED MAX*. RETU1N
RECEIPT JUWJMTW) —NO. P20 0758455
Mr. Don Liston, Manager
Dupree City Package Liquor
P.O. Box 33
Dupree, South Dakota 57623
Dear Mr. Liston:
This is to inform you that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has
provided me with information regarding compl iance with the
Tribe's Liquor Ordinance, and has asked tttat the United States
take action to enforce that Ordinance.
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has enacte<|l a Liquor Control
Ordinance, and that Ordinance was certified by the Secretary
of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register in accordance with Title 18, United States Codi, Section 1161.
The Ordinance requires license to introduce, purchase, sell
or deal in liquor within the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.
The sale of intoxicating liquor without the necessary Tribal
Liquor License is a violation of Title 181 United States Code,
Section 1154. Conviction under that Section for the first
offense could result in a fine of $500 or imprisonment for
not more than one (1) year. For each subsequent offense, the
individual could be fined not more than $2,000.00, or imprisonment not more than five (5) years, or poth such fine and
imprisonment.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has the resp< msibility to enforce
the Federal Statutes referred to above, a id it is this Agency's
intention to do so. Since the Bureau of [ndian Affairs has
the responsibility to enforce the Federal Statutes referred
to above, along with the Cheyenne River S Loux Tribe's request
to initiate action to enforce their Liquo:: Control Ordinance,
I am hereby requesting your cooperation i i complying with the
Tribe's Ordinance by May 30, 1988. Failu :e to comply with
the Tribe's Ordinance, after this date, w .11 leave this office
with no alternative, but to initiate acti >n in accordance with
Title 18, United States Code, Section 115
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If you have any questions regarding your obligations under
the law, I urge you to contact this Agencpy, or an attorney.

Agency Superintendent

Add, 4 4

Wayne Ducheneaux

Trua Clown, Sr.
Vernon M t t t t t
DISTRICT 2
Tad Knlft, Sr.

SECiREJ***
AflSneThompson
TREASURER
Mona R. Cud more I
VICE-CHAIRMAN
Everett Hunt

J i trie 6 ,
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1988
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DISTRICT 6
Calvin " R e d " Travarsia
Joan LaBaau

KENN

**?*—

P.O. Box 590
Eagle Butte, South Dakota 57625
(605)964-4155
(605) 964-4984

DISTRICT 3
Maynard C. Duprlt
Donald Annla
DISTRICT 4
Rooart Lofton, Sr.
David " B u d " Duprla
Everett Hunt
DISTRICT 5
Gilbert Marshall
Sam Eagla Staff
Banna Chasing Hawk
Gilbert LaBaau
Lanny LaPlant

"
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BUSINESS^ICENS^
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBEJ3F SOUIH^DAKQIA.

Dear Business Owner:
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has been Regulating
businesses and the transactions thereof sinc£ the passage of
Ordinance One (1), approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
and adopted and enacted in 1937, the Ordinance was later amended
in 1987. The Ordinance governs the regulation of businesses
within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenfie River Sioux
Reservation, including the granting and issuances of the
appropriate licenses thereof.
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe as a sovereign, governmental
entity possesses the authority to regulate activities within the
reservation. The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe is becoming
increasingly aware of the seriousness of the problem wherein
businesses within the reservation have failed to make
application and to remit the r quired fee tq the Tribal Council
for the appropriate business license, thereby failing to
acknowledge the Tribe's sovereign, regulatory powers.
Previously, the Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe has mailed to you written notice regarding the
Tribe's business licensing requirements. The records of the
Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River Sidux Tribe indicate
that your business does not possess the required tribal business
license. Therefore, the Tribe is, again, asking for your
The blue represents the thunder clouds above the world where live the thunderbirds whl> control the four winds. The rainbow is for the
Cheyenne River Sioux People who are keepers of the Most Sacred Calf Pipe, a gift from thi White Buffalo Calf Maiden. The eagle feathers
at the edges of the rim of the world represent the spotted eagle who is the protector of all Lakota. The two pipes fused together are for
unity. One pipe is for the Lakota, the other for all the other Indian nations. The yellow hocips represent the Sacred Hoop, which shall not be
broken. The Sacred Calf Pipe Bundle in red represents Wakan Tanka—the Great Mystery. Ail the colors of the Lakota are visible. The
red, yellow, black and white represent the four major races. 1 Mue is for heaven and the green for Mother Earth.
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Page 2 . - .LETTER TO B U S I N E S S E S WHO A R E O P E R A T I N G W I T H O U T
APPROPRIATE TRIBAL BUSINESS LICENSE.

c o o p e r a t i o n a n d r e q u e s t i n g that your b u s i n e s s e s t a b l i s h m e n t
comply with t h e g o v e r n i n g l a w s o f t h e C h e y e n n e River Sioux
T r i b e . T h e T r i b e will r e q u e s t that your b u s i n e s s c o m e into
c o m p l i a n c e , u p o n ten (10) d a y s o f r e c e i p t o f this l e t t e r .
This
s a m e letter w i l l b e s e n t to a l l b u s i n e s s e s w i t h i n t h e exterior
b o u n d a r i e s o f the C h e y e n n e River Sioux R e s e r v a t i o n w h o p r e s e n t l y
ar e o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t the r e q u i s i t e tribal b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e .
The T r i b a l C o u n c i l d u r i n g their Regular C o u n c i l S e s s i o n on
May 7 , 1 9 8 8 , p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n r e g a r d i n g t[he r e g u l a t i o n of
b u s i n e s s e s w i t h i n the r e s e r v a t i o n . A copy c^f the r e s o l u t i o n ,
Resolution N o . 1 2 6 - 8 8 - C R , h a s been e n c l o s e d for your r e v i e w .
Should your b u s i n e s s fail to c o m e i n t o c o m p l i a n c e w i t h tribal
o r d i n a n c e g o v e r n i n g the b u s i n e s s l i c e n s i n g ifequirements, the
B u r e a u o f Indian A f f a i r s may b e forced to i m p l e m e n t federal law
regarding t h e F e d e r a l T r a d e r ' s licensing p r o v i s i o n s
The T r i b a l C o u n c i l o f t h e C h e y e n n e River Siou x lit ibe
forward to your c o o p e r a t i o n a n d m u t u a l s u p p o r t .
Sincerely,

Wayne^
C H E Y E N N E RIVER S I O U X TRIBl
WD;pdJ :m 1 i

Enclosur e :
xc:

Individual B u s i n e s s L i c e n s e e F i l e
Diane Johnson

File
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RESOLUTION NO.

IZO-SO-UK

WHEREAS, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of South Dakota i s Ian unincorporated
Tribe of Indians, having accepted the provisions (jf the Act of June
18, 1934 (48 S t a t . 984), and
WHEREAS, the Tribe, in order to e s t a b l i s h i t s t r i b a l organization; to conserve
i t s t r i b a l property; to develop i t s common resources; and to promote
the general welfare of i t s people, has ordained aiid established a
Constitution and By-Laws, and
WHEREAS, the Government of the United S t a t e s desired peace with the Great
Sioux Nation and, thereby, executed the 1868 Treaty with the Sioux,
of which the Chiefs and Headmen of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
were s i g n a t o r i e s t h e r e t o , and
WHEREAS, the Act of March 2, 1889 s e t apart the Cheyenne R|.ver Reservation
f o r the sole use and occupation of the Minniconjoti, Itazipco and
Siha Sapa Bands of the Great Sioux Nation, and
WHEREAS, the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat- 984), duly aut (lorized and
empowered f e d e r a l l y recognized Indian Tribes to ajiopt Constitutions
and By-Laws for the development and strengthening of the governmental
infrastructure of Indian t r i b e s , and
WHEREAS, t h e Cheyenne R i v e r S i o u x T r i b e duly a c c e p t e d t h e fcerms o f t h e Act

o f June 18, 1934, and enacted a Constitution and jiy-laws for the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, said Constitution and
By-laws were approved December 27, 1935, including subsequent
amendments t h e r e t o , and
f
WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the sovereignty of

Indian t r i b e s over both t h e i r members and territory stemming from
the early Supreme Court cases of Worchester v. Georg;ia, 31 U.S.
(6 P e t . ) 515 (1832); and Cherokee Nation v . Georgi a, 30 U.S. C5
P e t . ) 1 (1831), and
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s has continually recognized

Indian t r i b e s as domestic, dependent Nations, with sovereignty
extending over t h e i r members and t e r r i t o r y , and with which laws of
the State can have no force or e f f e c t .
(Worchester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and
I
WHEREAS, the inherent sovereignty of Indian Tribes has be0n recognized by
the Government of the United States and through Subsequent United
S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s , and
WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States has plenary pov|rer over Indian
Affairs which i s traced t o the Indian Commerce CJause, A r t i c l e I,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the United S t a t e s , and
IVHEREAS, Indian Tribes possess the f u l l a t t r i b u t e s of sovereignty which are
subordinate only t o the superior sovereign, the fJnited S t a t e s , and
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WHEREAS, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian Tribe can only be
extinguished or limited through specific and express Acts of Congress,
and
WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States duly enacted a statute governing
traders with Indian on August 15, 1896 (19 Stat, 200), codified at
25 U.S.C.A. § 261, 262, and duly authorized the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs with the sole power and authority to appoint traders
to the Indian tribes and to adopt such rules and liegulations thereto,
and
WHEREAS, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs duly adopted sajid rules and
regulations in 25 C.F.R. Part 140 et., seq, and
WHEREAS, Article IV, Section 1 (i) of the Constitution of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe duly authorizes and empowers the Tribal Council to
adopt ordinances governing the licensing of businesses on the Cheyenne
River Reservation, and
WHEREAS, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe duly adopted and enacted Ordinance No.
One (1) regulating the licensing of businesses on the Cheyenne River
Reservation, including amendments thereto, and
WHEREAS, it has come to the attention of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that
certain businesses within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne
River Reservation have failed to recognize the sovereignty of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in its implementation dnd enforcement of
Ordinance No. One (1), now
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe hereby requests the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, United States
Government, to enforce Title 25 U.S.C.A. § 261 an4 262, governing
the licensing of Indian Traders within the exterior boundaries of
the Cheyenne River Reservation, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Revenue Department of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe shall forthwith submit a list to the Agency Superintendent,
Bureau of Indian Affairs of those businesses withiin the exterior
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation who tjave failed to
recognize the sovereignty of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe through
their willful failure to obtain a business license through submitting
an application and paying the required fee, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe hereby directs the
United States, as trustee for the Indian Tribes, to uphold the
integrity and sovereign status of the Cheyenne Riyer Sioux Tribe
through the enforcement of the Federal Trader's Licensing provisions
of 25 C.F.R. Part 140 et. seq., of which the United States is
obligated to enforce.

A&.<W

'RESOLUTION NO. 126-88-CR
Page Three

CERTIFICATION
I, the undersigned, as Secretary of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, certify that
the Tribal Council is composed of fifteen (15) members, of whom.-12, constituting
a quorum, were present at a meeting, duly and regularly called, noticed, convened
and held this 7th day of May, 1988, Regular Session; and that the foregoing
resolution was duly adopted at such meeting by an affirmative vote -of 10 for, 0
against, 2 not voting and 3 absent.

Arlene Tho
Cheyenne River Si

A<W. *
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OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAll
RICHARD P. T1ESZEN
CHIEF DEPUTY

ROGER A. TELLINGHUISEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 28, 1988

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. Perank, No. 860243

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to your recent telephone conversation, I have
enclosed a copy of the Brief for the States of South Dakota,
et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner filed in the
United Statefs Supreme Court in State of Utah, et al. v.
Ute Indian Tribe, 773 S. 2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert,
denied, 107 S.Ct. 596 (December 1, 1986), by South Dakota
and New Mexico. Additionally, the states of California,
Montana, Washington and Wyoming, by and through their
Attorneys General joined this amicus efforjt.

I
I understand that the same issue involving the original
Uintah Reservation is now before your Court in State v.
Perank, No. 860243. As we told the United States Supreme
Court in the Ute Indian Tribe case, a correct resolution of
this issue is "of substantial importance to the State of
South Dakota and other states with present and former Indian
reservations. The United States Court of | Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has concluded that Acts of| Congress with
operative language restoring Indian reservations to the
public domain were not intended to disestablish those
reservations. The Court of Appeals premised its decision on
a misreading of Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), and
plaintiffs in New Mexico and elsewhere are already
specifically relying on this misreading to resurrect
boundaries of
Indian reservations
loijig deemed
disestablished."

STATE CAPiTOL

Pierre, South Dakota 57501-5090

m \oo

^one (605)773-32^5

Geoffrey J. Butler
June 28, 1988
Page 2
"In recent years South Dakota participated in Solem and two
similar cases before the United States .Supreme Court,
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The
decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts in principle with
all three of these cases.11
I appreciate this opportunity to bring out position in the
brief to the specific attention of your Court in Perank.
Thank you for your time and considerationJ
Si^aeerely,

ROGER A. TELLINGHlilsEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAT:Id
Enc.
CC:

Michael M. Quealy
Kirk C. Bennett
Stephen G. Boyden
Herbert Wm. Gillespe
Tom D. Tobin
Attorneys General of the States of California, Montana,
New Mexico, Utah, Washington and Wyoiiing
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Add.ioz

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the language of the Uncompahgre Act
of August 15, 1894, implemented by the Act of June
7, 1897, and the Uintah Act of May 27, 1902, as
amended, providing that the unallotted lands of these
original Indian reservations shall be restored to the
public domain, constituted clear language of disestablishment, as this Court has recognized, or whether
the original reservation boundaries continue to exist
because this Court's decisioi} in Solem v. Bartlett
changed the effect of such language, as the en banc
majority of the court below held.
2. Whether the original Uncompahgre Reservation
was disestablished in light of! the express statutory
language and the facts that the United States has
not treated the disputed area;as a reservation since
1897, that in 1965 the Tribe recovered damages from
the United States on the basis that the Uncompahgre
Reservation no longer existed, £nd that the population
and land use in the disputed area are more than
ninety percent non-Indian.
3. Whether the original Uibtah Reservation was
disestablished in light of the express statutory language and the facts that the [United States did not
administer the disputed area as|a reservation for more
than sixty years after the dat^ of opening, that contemporaneous Presidential, Congressional and administrative treatment of the area showed that it was no
longer considered a reservation, that more than half
of the original reservation was! made into a national
forest and that the population) and land use in the
remaining area are more thai} ninety percent nonIndian.
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INTEREST OF THE STATES OF SOUTH DAKOTA
ET AL.

This case presents an issue of substantial importance to the State of South Dakota and other States
with present and former Indian reservations. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
has concluded that Acts of Congress with operative
language restoring Indian reservations to the public
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domain were not intended to disestablish those reservations. Pet. App. la-62a. The Court of Appeals
premised its decision on a misreading of Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S 463 (1984), and plaintiffs in New
Mexico and elsewhere are already specifically relying
on this misreading to resurrect boundaries of Indian
reservations long deemed disestablished.
In recent years South Dakota participated in Solem
and two similar cases before this Court, DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). The
decision of the Court of Appeals coiiflicts in principle
with all three of these cases. The Ajnici Curiae unequivocally support the petition for a writ of certiorari.
DISCUSSION
1. The en banc majority's rationale, premised on a
misconstruction of the significance of ''public domain"
language, is of substantial concern to amid. Heretofore, the equation of public domain language with
reservation disestablishment has b^en a universally
accepted principle of federal Indian! law. Throughout
the Western States, Congress and the Executive
Branch routinely utilized such terminology in the language and legislative history of Acts such as presented here. In South Dakota, for example, millions
of acres of Indian reservations wer^ ' 'restored to the
public domain".1 Until the en banc majority's decision,
no court seriously questioned that such operative language was not precisely suited to disestablishment.
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 354-55
1

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 589 (1977). See,
generally, Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United^ States, 316 U.S. 317
(1942).

3

(1962); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n. 22 (1973).
See, generally, United States v. Pelican, £32 U.S. 442
(1914).
Indeed, in 1975, when this Court franged the issue
in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425
(1975), it did so in terms of an underlying inquiry for
"public domain" indicia:
|
These two cases, consolidated for jiecision,
raise the single question whether t\ie Lake
Traverse Indian Reservation in Sobth Dakota, created by an 1867 treaty between the
United States and the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians, was terminated
and returned to the public domain, b^ the Act
of March 3, 1891. DeCoteau, supra at 426427. (Emphasis added).
Since the legislative history in DeCoteau indicated
that Congress intended to restore the reservation to
the public domain, the issue was decisively resolved.
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 441, where, ^fter noting
that the intended effect of the Act was (made clear
by the sponsors, this Court set forth in I the text of
the opinion two ''public domain'' excerpts from the
Congressional Record ("surrender of a l^rge portion
of their reservation to the public domairi"; "all this
land is opened by this bill to settlement as a part of
the public domain"). Id. at 439-441. In concluding,
the Court reiterated this basic understanding:
That the lands ceded in the other agreements
were returned to the public domain, stripped
of reservation status, can hardly b^ questioned, and every party here acknowledges
as much. The sponsors of the legislation

4

stated repeatedly that the ratified agreements would return the ceded lands to the
'public domain.9 See supra, at 440-441. Cf.
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, *t 504 n. 22.
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. (Emphasis added.)
Two years later, in Rosebud Siowti Tribe v. Kneip,
430 U.S. 584 (1977), this aspect (\i the issue was
treated essentially the same. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at
589, 600, 600 n. 21. Even the Rosebud dissent expressly acknowledged that '"restored to the public
domain'" was '"clear language of depress termination'". Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In the instant case, the district court and the panel
below premised their initial decision on this fundamental understanding (Pet. App. 694, 76a, 78a, 79a,
83a, 84a), as the en banc majority acknowledged (Pet.
App. 17a-18a). Subsequently, however, this Court decided Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). The en
banc majority's conclusion that Solfrm "dictated" a
different result with respect to the crux of this case,
the significance of operative public aomain terminology, is explicitly stated:
The original expression 'return ^o the public
domain' does not reliably establish the clear
and unequivocal evidence of Congress's intent to change boundaries. Soleifi, 104 S.Ct.
at 1166 [majority opinion].
Our conclusion is that the phras£ 'restore to
the public domain' is not the same as a
congressional state of mind to disestablish
[majority opinion].
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Although the district court and the panel
viewed this as language of cession, I believe
that Solem dictates a different result [concurring opinion].
Prior to Solem, 'public domain' language
could have been construed as more conclusive
evidence of disestablishment; following Solem, the term must be viewed as ambiguous
in portent.. . [concurring opinion].
Ultimately, I interpret Solem to hold that
'public domain' language standing alone is
insufficient to support a finding of explicit
congressional intent to disestablish [concurring opinion].
Pet. App. at lla-12a, 17a-18a. (Emphasis added). State™ clearly did not dictate this principle. See Pet. at
14-17, 19-21. Although the en banc majority addressed
other points, some of which are noted below, it is
evident that the ultimate conclusion centered around
this fundamental misconstruction.
As a result, this Court is now presented with la
conflict of even greater magnitude than the related
issue presented in Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe,
U.S
, 10J3
S.Ct. 3420 (1985):
Because the Court of Appeals' decision appeared to conflict in principle with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d
1161 (per curiam), cert denied, 449 U.S. 905,
101 S.Ct. 279, 66 L,Ed.2d 136 (1980), we
granted certiorari, 469 U.S
, 105 S.Ct.
242, 83 L.Ed.2d 180. We now reverse.
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Oregon, 105 S.Ct. at 3427 (Emphasis added). The importance of the principle resolved in Oregon (i.e. reservation rights remaining after cessions of Indian
reservations) highlights the important of the principle at issue here (reservation rights remaining after
restoration of Indian reservations to pjublic domain).
Moreover, with respect to operative public domain
language, the decision of the en banc | majority unequivocally ' 'conflicts in principle" withj not just one
circuit but all circuits—in fact, it appeals to " conflict
in principle" with all reported decisions that have
addressed, indirectly or directly, the] effect of a
Congressional act or Executive order w^ose operative
language restored an Indian reservation to the public
domain. Pet. at 13-21. This controlling j aspect of the
opinion below, which influenced the en bhnc majority's
view of other pertinent factors, thus clearly warrants
review.
2. While amici unequivocally support and share the
concern of Petitioners that the second largest Indian
reservation in the United States (4,000,(^00 acres) has
been resurrected in Utah as a result of this misconstruction, the sweeping mischaracterization of Solem
by the en banc majority undermines thi^ area of federal Indian law and is thus of even broader consequence.
The recent New Mexico cases, aiscussed by
Petitioners at 12, where the plaintiffs specifically rely
on this misreading of Solem by the en tianc majority,
will not be isolated examples. Nor is the list of twentynine public domain areas in other states cited by
Petitioners, extensive as it is, all inclusive. Pet. at
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11-12. Kappler identifies nine additional Orders in the
short period of 1876 to 1883.2
Compounding the en banc majority's mischaracterization of Solem and making even more certain the
predictability of additional litigation in these areas is
the evaluation in a recent Comment in the American
Indian Law Review that was awarded first place in
the Indian Law Writing Competition at Harvard University:3 The author there concludes, as d}d the en
banc majority, that after Solem "[t]he caiegory of
statutory language terminating a reservation has been
reduced by eliminating 'public domain' . . \. the argument, approved in Solem v. Bartlett, that the pubic
domain language in surplus land acts carried little
meaning
", id. at 69-70, 73 (Emphasis added). In
context, the remarks in Solem obviously were not
intended to support such a conclusion.4 Nevertheless,
2

Seey e.g. Exec. Order of October 30, 1876 (I Kappler 814)
(White Mountain); Exec. Order of May 3, 1877 (I Kappler 821)
(Mission Res.); Exec. Order of February 5, 1883 (I Kappler 823)
(Mission Res.); Exec. Order of August 19, 1874 (I Kappler 856)
(Blackfeet); Exec. Order of March 29, 1884 (I Kappler 885) (Turtle Mountain); Exec. Order of January 28, 1876 (I Kappler 889)
(Malheur Res.); Exec. Order of September 13, 1882 (t Kappler
889-90) (Malheur Res.); Exec. Order of May 21, 1883 (1 Kappler
890) (Malheur Res.); and Exec. Order of February 2^, 1883 (I
Kappler 904-05) (Chief Moses).
3
Comment, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts and the
Question of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 A.LL.Rev. 57
(1986).
4
In contrast to the operative public domain language in the
Utah Acts and Proclamations, the reference to public qomain in
Solem was an isolated one. Public domain terminology did not
appear in the operative language of the Solem Act, andialthough
the reference itself was deemed supportive of disestablishment,
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that such a conclusion could be erroneously attributed
to Solem shows how unsettling and disruptive the en
banc majority's decision promises to!be.
Authoritative review by this Court at this time will
stem the tide of writs for habeas corpus and other
actions, in precisely the same manner as in DeCoteau,
when this Court acted decisively and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for . a similarly fundamental Misconstruction.
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 430, 447. In the absence of
such review, an inordinate expenditure of time, effort
and resources will continue to be wasted on an issue
that had been settled for decades.
3. Solem. If Solem can fairly be faulted with respect
to a lack of clarity on the public domain issue, as has
been suggested, then this Court's attention to other
aspects of Solem at least merits additional consideration. Apart from the fact that Soutjh Dakota's position before this Court in Solem mak^s clear its view
of the holding in Solem, the guidance of Solem in
other respects leaves more to be desired. Insofar as
the "fairly clean analytical structure" that Solem
counsels, (465 U.S. at 470) even the Ajnerican Indian
Law Review Comment, supra, recognizes: "a contorted body of doctrine"—"two interpretations of the
history of the allotment policy as applied to the surplus lands acts"—"two historical interpretations of
what the allotment process meant for the reservation
system: one, that it ended the reservations, and another, that it did not."—"The interpretations of surSolem noted that it was "hardly dispositive'1 when "balanced
against" other persuasive evidence of continuing reservation status. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475. See the discussion in Pet. at 1417, 19-21.
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plus land acts is confused"—'The preseht case law,
discussed below, is now so confused." Id. at 61, 62,
69.
In light of this lack of clarity, it is noi difficult to
understand the widely divergent views knd marked
disagreement below—or elsewhere for th^t matter. It
is left to this Court to settle conclusively I what Solem
means and to state whether the Court intended to
contradict more than a half a century of jurisprudience regarding the significance of public |domain language.
a. Part of the apparent confusion may} stem from
a study that figured prominently in the Solem opinion.
Solem, 465 U.S. at 466 n. 5, 477 n. 21,1479 nn. 22
& 23, 480 nn. 24 & 25. This study deallt only with
the Cheyenne River Reservation. Subsequent to Solem, it was discovered that a prior comprehensive
thesis of the allottment era (1880-1920) kjy the same
author (1) significantly contradicts the autpor's Solem
study and (2) expressly recognizes that th^ Utah Uintah Act and others "followed the model" pi the 1904
Rosebud Act—the same Act that the Rosebud Court
held reflected the baseline purpose of disestablishment
in the Rosebud legislation.5
b. Although Rosebud effectively and correctly rejected the Ash Sheep* and related lingering-beneficialinterest argument, as "logically separat from the
question of disestablishment", (Rosebud, <30 U.S. at
601, n. 23) and although Solem cites Rdsebud with
5

F. Hoxie, Beyond Savagery: The Campaign to Assimilate
The American Indians, 1880-1920 at 390 (Univ. Microfilms1977).
6
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 1(1920).
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approval repeatedly, Solem also cites Ash Sheep with
approval and again lends support throughput to the
Ash Sheep and related lingering-beneficial-interest argument. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468. While §ohm recognizes that it is now " settled law that soriie surplus
land acts diminished reservations...and other surplus
land acts did not. . .", {Solem, 465 U.S. at 469) it is
doubtful that this Court really intended for a holding
in a particular case to actually depend upon which
analysis of the same argument a particular court
might find persuasive. Rosebud, 430 U.S. ^t 601, n.
23; Solem, 465 U.S. at 469.
4. The en bane majority goes beyond Solem in several
additional respects. Although not at issue, the court
below initially describes this case as one involving
lands and title to lands:
. . .this writer agreed. . .who generally !ruled
that the Uintah Reservation and its lands
remained the property of the tribes that are
involved. As to the question of whether the
acts dealing with the Uintah Forest and the
Uncompahgre Reservation mean that the Indians lost title to these lands, the view of
this writer is contrary to the view of the trial
court.
Pet. App. 3a. (Emphasis added.) But the parties in
this litigation were not contesting the title to the
lands involved. Secondly, while this Court has held
that opening land to settlement was not necessarily
inconsistent with continuing reservation stjatus, the
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en banc majority initially "assumes the very question
to be decided"7:
Actually the intent was to open the reservation to non Indian settlers and this couldn't
[disestablish the reservation].
Pet. App. at 4a. (Emphasis added.) But se$, DeCoteau
and Rosebud.
I
Moreover, while Solem did note that there are "limitations as to how far we will go to decipher congress's intent in any particular surplus land act" this
Court has consistently and meticulously, on both the
evidentiary and pragmatic level, at least considered
all arguments. The court below categorically rejected
this approach:
I
No particular significance can be given to
these articles since they were writteii from
the white settlers' point of view.
I
Pet. App. 13a. See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431, 432,
where documentation similar to that rejected by the
court below is set forth at length in the text of the
DeCoteau opinion.
5. In other instances, the en banc majority simply
ignores Solem. No particular significance is paid to
the fact that the area in dispute encompasses more
non-Indian land than any "Indian reservation" in the
United States and is populated by over 90% nonIndians. Pet. at 9-10. DeCoteau and Rosebiid discuss
justifiable expectations at length, and Solem specifically notes that such pragmatic factors, not present
7

Escondido Mutual Water Company v La Jolla Band of Missum Indians, 466 U S. 765, 777 (1984)
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in Solem, were still entitled to considerable weight
and consideration. Solem, 465 U.S. at 4^1. The en
banc majority does not even discuss this aspect of
Solem. In this instance, the u Solem standards'' were
ignored.
6. The en banc majority also ignores the fact that the
United States has consistently taken the pcjsition that
the Utah Uncompahgre Reservation ceased to exist
because it was restored to the public domain After
nearly a century of reliance upon expres^ representations of the United States, by the people, he courts,
the state government and the Congress, the en banc
majority should have at least discussed th^ merits of
this position. This is especially so in light bf the fact
that the United States does not lightly Conclude a
reservation has been disestablished. In Seymour,
Mattz, Rosebud, DeCoteau and Solem the United
States argued against reservation disestab ishment.
7. The en banc majority does not, however, neglect
to mention that the Justice Department supported its
conclusion with respect to the Uintah Reservation
when it appeared for the United States £s amicus
curiae. However, the arguments of the United States
have not been consistent with reference tjo the Act
of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, (GeneralJAlIotment
Act). In Seymour and Mattz and until DeUpteau, the
focal point of the position of the United States was
the General Allotment Act of 1887. Because there
were no major subsequent adjustments in federal Indian policy until 1934, the United States reasoned,
logically, that any Congressional constancy I in federal
Indian policy vis-a-vis the surplus land statutes, must
necessarily be tied to the General Allotment Act. The
United States therefore concluded that surplus land
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statutes subsequent to the enactment of the General
Allotment Act were not intended by Congress to disestablish reservations. After this Court held in
DeCoteau that Congress utilized the General Allotment Act in surplus land statutes to continue to disestablish Indian reservations after 1887, the United
States abandoned its argument relying on Congressional constancy in federal Indian policy. In jits stead,
the United States substituted a case by cas^ analysis
based upon more subtle indicia of Congressional intent. According to this new argument of tl}e United
States, such an analysis must necessarily reflect that
Congressional intent vacillated from time to jtime and
from act to act. At any one time Congress might
utilize a standard format intending to disestablish one
reservation and the next time utilize the same or
similar format not intending the same result. The
concept of such vacillating Congressional intent is
made more elusive by the fact that no Congressional
enactment between 1887 and 1934 has yet surfaced
to establish when such a fundamental shift in
Congressional policy occurred. (Not only is the historical record everywhere silent with respect to any
contemporary documentation to support such an argument, but it also affirmatively refutes the existence
of such an ill conceived Congressional plan)i. Nevertheless, the United States maintains this is wpat Congress intended. Fortunately for Utah, the pqsition of
the United States with respect to the Uncojnpahgre
Reservation does not hinge upon such subtleties.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition foi^ writ of
certiorari should be granted.
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT REGARDING JURISDICTION ON CEDED
INDIAN LAND DURING THE ALLOTMENT ERA: HISTORY
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Conflict regarding the prerogative^ of tribal governments on
Indian'reservations has escalated steadily in recent years.
resident tribal enrollees have complained
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country, many Indians were threatened
them as citizens of the United
reservation

residents

to

were

Ojibway

the

across

the

scattered

by the loss of justice due

States without

deprived

Country,

of

recourse, and most

economic

opportunities

because "businesses... important to the well-being of reservation
economies"
courts."

were

"scared

"Federal

"Congress... failed
held
Bureau

Indian

by

judges

unjust

refuse[d]

and
to

incompetent
hear

"authority

Affairs

had

over

Indian

"powerful

- 2 -

though it

tribes,"

leverage"

tribal

appeals."

to pass laws curbing) abuses," even

constitutional
of

away

to

and

the

enforce

federaL^laws*. with "the $1.4 billion ^t

dispenses annually for

tribaF governments."
As they championed the rights of Ihdians who lived under the
jurisdiction of tribal governments, the Minneapolitans were left
with the embarrassing
not

competent

to

conclusion

govern

that reservation leaders were

without

federal

supervision.

Their

escape from the charge of racism was a ploy used often by outside
observers who breeze through Indian Country. To blame were not
self-serving tribal politicians, after all, but "the long history
of white men's exploitation of IndiansJ1
Cultural self-condemnation did not assuage the resentment of
Oglala Sioux journalist Tim Giago. Froto his Lakota Times office
at Pine Ridge, he wrote not only in defense of the chief judicial
officer

at

Red

Lake, but

also

in

protest

against

non-Indian

journalists who passed judgment on reservation societies.

Using

news releases about Wounded Knee-1973 and Red Lake-1986 as prime
examples,

he

accused

uninformed

Whijtes

of

calling

Indians

incompetent without justification, failing to give the victims of
journalistic
erroneous

condemnation

conclusions

tribal members.

a

that

chance
impaired

to

respond,

the

"It is patently wrong

and

opportunities

reaching
of

all

for white reporters to

overlook the ancient customs and laws of the much older tribal
governments" when appraising
Giago. And he challenged

the applications of justice, wrote

the authority of the United States to
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intrude,, contendin&Jthat its Constitution was "not„the law of the
land on the sovereign Indian nations*"

At the end, Giago employed a tactic used often by Indians to
escape the charge of racial bias for the blanket condemnation of
White people.

To blame for problems on the reservations was not

abuse by non-Indians in general, but erroneous judgments by White
historians

in

particular, who

persist

in

teaching

that

Indians

were "uncivilized savages when the white man first arrived
More

troublesome

still

than

conflict

about

the

.,2

affects

of

tribal governance on Indians has been distress regarding judicial
sanction
within

for
the

tribal

original

jurisdiction
boundaries

aver

of

White

Tndian

people

who

reservations.

live
While

weighing arguments about the civil authority of Indians submitted
by tribal lawyers and federal spokesmen against counter arguments
advanced

by

judges have

counsel
ruled

for

state

indecisively

or

local

on one

governments,

side, then

federal

on the other,

Non-Indians have felt betrayed by attacks against state and local
authority

that has worked

They have complained
time-honored
leaders

have

affairs

so

for

long

in

thrpugh

several

generations.

that tribal governance might deprive then of

constitutional
asked

them

why

guarantees.

White

the

past,

(See Appendix

people,

who

have

could

not

live

A) Indian

managed
under

their
tribal

authority in years to come.

Consternation

escalates

partly

- 4 -
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because

of

legal

implications, and^more

due

to inevitable

At issue in" Sioux Country during
ordinances
eighty

designed

percent

tribal

on

attacked

on

by

unemployment

with
road

Whites

ordinances

the slimmer of 1986 were

Indian

federal

mainly

the

ease

reservations

enrollees

accomplished

to

economic^consequences.

th£

the

Indian

of

a special

directly,

road

workers*

tax
3

to

In

but

fund

this

excess

of

preferential

hiring

of

which

past.

the

have

Few

South

William Janklow took exception indirectly
legality

in

prqjects,

in

tribal

been

non-Indians

Dakota

Governor

when he challenged
training

instance,

a

of

the

prospective

ruling

on

the

preferential employment of Indians may determine whether families
of Indians or Whites who dwell within reservation boundaries will
afford

the

necessities

of

life,

antagonism will be the result.

and

increasing

intercultural

At issde in the summer of 1986,

too, was whether Pine Ridge Reservation residents should purchase
Oglala

tribal

automobiles;

or
and

South

Dakota

whether

should

prevail

in

halls,

which

have

the

federal,
regulation

been

under

corruption by crime syndicates.
of

state

or

tribal

state

license

stat^
of

or

plates

tribal

tribally

for

jurisdiction

operated

investigation

their

for

bingo

possible

In these instances, the coffers

governments

are

likely

to

be

affected

considerably•

Because
applications

tribal
of

jurisdiction

practical

and

action to restrict or expand

hias

economic

so

many

consequence,

potential
no

federal

it will sa tisfy both tribal members
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and White people.

At the grass roots* tihey\ar^ ejer^at odds, and

express divergent

opinions

resolved.
believe

Most

that

regarding

non-Indians

tribal

and

government

how the conflict

sora^

is

relocated

should

be

mixed-bloods

anachronistic,

and

say

that

tribal jurisdiction if not the entire reservation system ought to
be abolished.
noteworthy

Nearly all Indians who occupy allotments or derive

benefits

reservation

from

reservation

affiliations

life under tribal authority

contend

is essential

that

to cultural

survival, but they disagree about the extent of power that tribal
leaders

should

retain.

City, a Yankton

On

the

one

Sioux who served

harid, Harold

Shunk of Rapid

more than three decades in the

U. S. Indian Field Service, has expressed the opinion that tribal
authority

ought

land.

the

On

devoted

has

to

honor
be

restricted

hand,
the

extreme.

subordinated

Country is wrong.
should

be

other

his life

the opposite
that

to

Leonard

study

of

tribal

Within

the

management

Bruguier,
tribal

to

White

reservation

liberty

boundaries.

to

But

live

governance

those

should be encouraged

who

own

cannot

Indian
who

leaned

has

toward

assumption

across

Indian

boundaries, tribal leaders

no constraint

and

of

Yankton

history,

except

the presence of Whites. As national

at

a

opinion, an historical

In his

be sovereign with

to

citizens, they

property
adjust

the obligation

within

to

tribal

to

should

reservation
regulations

to relocate (possibly with the benefits of a

voluntary relocation program and an employment assistance plan at
federal

expense),

and

all

who

resist

- 6 -
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the

authority

of

tribal

officials openly ought to be removed*
Controversy in dialogue has brought action among officials,
which

has

further

jurisdictional

aggravated

dispute.

agreement in the belief

and

Indeed, many

of

policeman has resigned
his

reservation
7

laws."

White

increasingly
theoretical

he
and

Already,

at

victims

of

have reached

answer

be preferable

the controversy.

the

adversaries

that a definitive

either Indians or Whites would
escalation

confused

which favors

to the continued
least

one

tribal

because "nobody could tell him where on

could

arrest

Indian

suspicious
questions

of
they

susbects
'

and

enforce

reservation

residents

each

through

oth^r

barely

issues that affect them directly.

understand,

Indian

have

grown

debates

about

and

practical

Federal judges have floundered

in the contents of briefs and testimonies containing incomplete
or faulty information.

Attorneys have grown antagonistic about

the erratic behavior of the courts, and increasingly intolerant
of the performance of researchers who hjave worked as consultants
on

jurisdictional

historians

have

cases, with
not

called

some

Indians

ji^stif ication.
"uncivilized

All

public

savages," as

Giago has charged, but some have done jurisdictional research in
violation

of standards

that

govern

their

profession.

Out of

indolence, incompetence, or commitment to social causes, all too
many historical consultants have skirted the grueling pursuit of
truth in contexts and data to fashion selective information into
polemical insLr urnenLs lor use in a righteous effort to make up
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for past inequities.
Compounding

the

uncertainty

and

the

seriousness

of

the

problem discussed above (who has jurisdiction over whom on Indian
reservations) is an additional

and mofe serious

jurisdictional

dispute, which is the subject of this p^per, namely: dispute over
the intended
Section

effect

5 of

of

surplus

the General

reservations •

land

Allotment

}.aws
Act

enacted
on

the

pursuant

to

boundaries of

The issue is: did Congress, through Section 5 of

the General Allotment Act, intend to disestablish these surplus
land areas from the reservation, or did it not?
One historical consultant who supplied information for this
type

of

jurisdictional

boundary

litigation

in

a

case

that

involved a Sioux tribe either stumbled ^Lnto files that supported
his

sense

of

fair

play,

or

gathered

evidence

selectively

by

design, and permitted its use to demonstrate congressional intent
to sustain recognition of original reservation boundaries, even
though

the

weight

opposite was true*
or abandoned
retribution
process.

of

evidence

should

have

revealed

By

an

the

In other words, he either lacked competence,

the pursuit of truth for the role
as

that

advocate

doing

so,

of
he

one

adversary

ignored

an

in

of referee on
the

obvious

judicial
trend

in

jurisdictional history, and confounded the proceedings of justice
Q

all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States,
The decision in that case has confused subsequent litigation

- 8 -

AM. 12.?

in pursuit, of a definitive

answer

to i the central:question

every oner of the Section 5 jurisdictional disputes.
era

between

termination
Congress

the
by

passing
the

mean

to

of

Indian
leave

the

Dawes

Act

Reorganization
intact

federal

in

in

Through the

1887

and

its

Act in 1934, did
tribal
and A jurisdictional

authority, or did it intend to disestablish the affected portion
of the reservation?

Because

cogent

historical

statements,

selective

congressmen

consultants

passages from legislative

that pertain to intent.

of

that

era

have

left no
presented

an|d administrative

Attorneys hav^ tortured

records

phrases here,

and marshalled implications there, to support divergent postures
toward

how congressmen

should have

responded

eighty

or ninety

years ago.

Judges have listened to the^.r arguments, mulled over

conflicting

precedents, reviewed legislative and

histories,

even

taken

Indian-White

population

administrative
ratios

into

account, and from appearances relied excessively upon their own
social values when reaching decisions.
From their inconsistent rulings ha$ evolved only confusion.
How much better it would be to also search for elusive intent in
evidence regarding
that

era

allocations

as
on

the behavior

they
the

worked

of administrative

with

management

congressional
of

Indian

officials in
support

affairs.

and
Using

publications nrul cloctnnont.s tlmt d m I with t lie* npplicnlion IIM wrll

I
as the formulation of federal policies, historians with impartial
disposition and proven expertise should
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be able to extrapolate

intent with^little margin of error.
In every case they research, they 6ught to take into account
three things: (1) as background, JURISDtCTINAL POLICY FOR INDIANS
from colonial times to the late nineteenth century, before many
of the tribes moved

onto

reserves

surplus land sales according

and

accepted

allotment

and

to the terms of the Dawes Act of

1887; (2) the GENERAL PLAN OF FEDERAL {LNDIAN POLICY through the
period from 1887 to 1934, before the DaWes Act ceased to function
; and (3) the AFFECT OF FEDERAL POLICY upon governance within
reservation

boundaries,

where

Indian

Field

Service

officials

managed agency affairs with congressional support.
Unique

historical

developments

jurisdiction somewhat, of course.
Pine

Ridge

and

Lower

Brule

may

cloud

the

issue

of

In Teton Country, Wanbli on

both

come

to mind, where

federal

officials assigned peoples to lands they declined to accept, and
were

forced

records

of

jurisdictional

to

make

each

special

concessions.

reservation

litigation

that

must

be

Accordingly,

becomes
searched.

involved
No

the
in

general

assumption regarding congressional intent can be applied without
corroboration by records pertaining to the tribe whose history is
subjected to judicial judgment.
The
according

affairs
to

the

of
same

nearly

all

general

reservations

policies,

were

however.

managed
Hence, a

historian who has kept up with the literature on federal policy
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toward

Indians*

and,£ has

labored

in

the

records

of. a

major

federation of tribes for long, can present a scenario for the
typical

tribe

that

had

a

typical * relationship

with

Congress

through the era when the Dawes Act was in effect.
Any historian who has pursued Indian history as a specialty
should find it easy to trace JURISDICTIONAL POLICY FOR INDIANS
down to the passing of the Dawes Act. l|t is readily available in
recent

publications

supplemented

by

a

narrow

selection

reveal

that

of

9
original

documents.

Sources

at

harid

general

suppositions about the sovereign authority of Indian leaders to
govern

have

been

fairly

consistent

since

the

formulation

of

policy for this issue soon after the founding of Jamestown in
1607,

Jurisdictional Policy Prior to the Dawes Act

Throughout the colonial era, Anglo-American officials looked
upon groups of Indians as political entities with title to land,
which could
Few

White

exterminate

be "quieted" only by purchase or conquest in war.
colonials

proposed

to

tribes as means of

ignore

aboriginal

territorial

claims

acquisition.

or

Like

officials in England, they thought of areas occupied by Indians

- 11 -

as- therilRytfur?p"oasessiona*of* their tribesr accepted the borders
of

Indian^ Country

exercized

as

boundaries

jurisdiction

negotiated often vrLth
international

over

within

tribal

tribal

spokesmen

deliberations

to war.

tribes through

affairs; and

sovereigns

of

dealt with Whites

Europe.

as they had

formal discussions in preference

The process of treaty making evplved almost naturally.

several

rights

leaders

by procedures in use for

White diplomats were more aggressive
for

Indian

diplomatic

between

Similarly, Indian representatives
with neighboring

and

which

to

reasons.
land

philosopher

in

There
short

Emmerich

agricultural

de

was

a

than tribal spokesmen,

supposition

supply

explained

Vattel.

He

by

argued

universal

the

that

European
sedentary,

life

was

superior

existence, assumed

that

"the earth beloqgs to all mankind" as a

"common dwelling-place

to

about

diversified,

semi-nomadic

and source of subsistence," and contended

that no component of mankind should apprppriate more land than it
could use if other parts were in need of space.

Secondly, there was the belief shared by colonials regarding
New World
first

"discovery."

claim

to

a

tract

A European
had

the right

European monarchs in competition
It

could

be

exercised

as

sovereign
of

whose

agent

preemption

over

for Western Hemispheric

quickly

and

extensively

staked

as

other

empire.
tribes

relinquished claim by treaty, or lost it in war.

In addition,

there

was

an

assumption

- 12 -
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that

sovereignty

was

divisible, and in the process
had

from

might

Especially

or

through

other

second

order

rights

of

in

right

divine

supreme magnitude for

of its Reduction English
acquired

tribal

discovery,
motivation

Christian^

mission

and

the

assumed

To
of

perceptions

right

of

of

on expansion.

and

fo |r their

to lose

sovereignty

Vattel's

Non-Indian colonials were hell-bent
federations were bound

of

hypothesis,

assumptions

capitalist's

measure.

dominion

sovereignty

coloni^ 1

from

greatest

recognized

and

governments,

and

aggressive

they

ordination,

themselves,

the

monarchs

was

added

about

a

exploitation.
Tribal groups

failure

to act in

concert.

In spite of this, colonials

dealt

tribal spokesmen were their diplomatic
ranking

officers

in

Indian

diplomacy,

the

or

several

war,

over

often for land as though
equals.

colqnies
land.

Until the 1750s,

were

responsible

Beginning

in

the

for

1750s,

Superintendents of Indian Affairs did the work of diplomacy while
British generals or colonial governorsi were in charge of war.
the terms of the Proclamation
the

separation

Country. Through
near

the crest

of

land

the
of

Act of |1763, Parliament made clear

ceded

for

colonial

1760s, surveyor^

the

Appalachian

were two jurisdictions, and

By

fixed

from

Indian

an approximate

Mpuntains.

a non-Indian

use

could

Officially,
not enter

line
there

Indian

Country legally without permission fr^m British authorities.

During

the

American

Revolution,

- 13 -
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many

White

people

crossed

demarcation

lines

vigilance.

But

illegally
the

with

Second

the

breakdown

Continental

of

British

Congress

vested

responsibility for Indian affairs in central not state or local
government*
change,

Adopting

national

colonial

practices

dealt wljith

authorities

the

domain could

transfer

of

land

be accomplished

from

only

tribes

substantial
as

sovereign

Lilke colonial leaders, they

entities, and resumed negotiations.
supposed

without

Indian

Country

by | treaty

to

public

or war, and that

non-Indians might not cross the line irjto Indian Country without
federal permission.
Congressmen

who

legislated

u jnder

the

Articles

of

Confederation as organic law from 178 \L to 1789 perpetuated the
same assumptions.

They

attended

to

the

separation

of

Indian

Country from land owned or occupied le^ ally by Whites, prohibited
the

entry

of

non-Indians

for

trad ;

or

settlement

without

permission, and tried to arrange the l^gal entry of pioneers,
The restraint of non-Indians was not easy, because arable
land available for expansion was in short supply.

The average

farm in New England was less than ha [Lf the size it had been a
century

earlier,

cultivation.

and

Substantial

plantation

states

production

without

southern

farmers

farmland

from

placed| marginal

tracts
the

lay

mining

fertilization

or

in

ruin

of

land

crop

was sometimes abanldoned
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acreages
across
for

few

southern

cash

rotation.
in as

under

crop

Indeed,
as three

years, and plantation* owners paralleled tjhe efforts of northern
prospectors toward the opening of virgin ijand iir the* WestV
Shortages forced Confederation congressmen to act*
they

dispatched

occupied
confine

by

negotiators

squatters

on

to

the

bargain

for

northwestern

the tribes to smaller

areas.

Quickly,

acreages

already

frontier,

and

to

At the same time, they

stipulated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that land in Indian
Country

belonged

to

tribes

until

it

was

relinquished

by

the

issue

of

consent of their spokesmen. 13
The

Ordinance

of

1787

also

dealt

with

the

jurisdiction on ceded land, where it specified that "criminal and
civil...laws shall be in force,!f and for their enforcement the

I

i

Governor of a Territory shall "lay out the parts of the district
in which the Indian titles shall have
counties

and

population

townships."

reached

Lt

60,000 free

went

been extinguished, into

JDH to

say

that

inhabitants, a state

when

a

"shall be

admitted... on an equal footing with the original states, in all
respects

whatsoever"

with

liberty
14

constitution and State government."

to

"form

a

permanent

One supposes that "in all

respects" included the application of "criminal and civil laws"
on

land

ceded

by

Indians. A blue

print

for

the

transfer

of

jurisdiction over White and relocated citizen Indians from tribal
through federal to state authorities was in place.
I

When the authors of the Constitution of the United States
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added

the power

prerogatives

to

of

deal

"with

congress,

the

Indiaji tribes" to the

implicat ^on

Dy

they

other

ordered

the

perpetuation of previous practices, and pi aced ultimate authority
in

the

legislative

Department
treaty

branch.

officials

took

negotiations,

administrators

advice and consent
treaty

terms

of

with

Congress. After

to

or

exercised

through

the United

end

and

of

treaty

by

making

in

1871

both

agreements."
issues

the

implemented
houses

of

territorial

ll egislative

fundamental

and

by and with

pertainin )g to Indian
a

Interior

policies

States Senate, and

"congressional
of

War

settlements

remained

charge

of

approve d

allocations

in

sijre,

management

diplomatic

transfer

were

be

the

the

1871, business

ownership

congressmen

over

but

concluded

To

prerogative
All

along,

pertaining

to

land and jurisdiction.
With

acreage

in

short

supply

across

the

upstart

agrarian

nation, no issue was more critical to early national leaders than
was

territorial

Northwest
Indians.

expansion

Ordinance,
Through

the

through

followed
1783

by

Paris

the

application

the acjcquisition
Treaty),

the

of

of

the

land

from

relinquishment

of

colonial sea-to-sea land grants by state)*s, a major Indian war or
two

and

claimed

several

Indian

sovereignty

non-Indians

out

of

over
areas

treaties,
some

by

1802

225,000,000

recognized

as

the

United

acres.

Indian

States
To

Country

keep
until

arrangements for transfer were complete! congressmen made tribal
f
land inviolate to any except those who entered with permission
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from federal authorities when they drafted Trade and

Intercourse

Acts, beginning with that of 1790,

Ceded land in public domain was processed
first under

the 1785 Land Ordinance, then through

Act and subsequent legislation.
the

legal

assumptions

jurisdiction, but also indicated

the 1796 Land

The attachment of a footnote to

1796 Act in the 1861 edition

summarized

for private entry

of Statutes
regarding

at Large

not only

sovereignty

and

their abiding application.

Discovery constitutes the or p.ginal title to lands
on the American continent, as t etween the different
European nations.
The title t hus derived was the
exclusive right of acquiring the i oil from the natives,
and establishing settlements upon it... . By the treaty
with Great
Britain
and
the I nited
States, which
concluded the revolution, the pow[ers of government and
the riftht of soil, which hncl boo
previously in Great
Britain, passed ciefiniLoJy Lo Lhe United States.
The United States, or the s pveral states, have a
clear title to all the lands...
subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy.... Whenever a tract of land
has
been
once
legally
ap propriated
to
any
purpose ... [it ] becomes severed fr|om the mass of public
lands: and no subsequent law or ] roclamation, or sale,
would be construed to embrace i t. . . . A state has a
perfect right to legislate as sh e may please....
But
Congress are invested by the
onstitution with the
power of disposing of public l^nd....
Whenever the
property is passed...[by federa: laws, it] like all
other in the state, is subject to state legislation; so
far
as
that
legislation
is
consistent witik the
admission that the title passed, land was vested.
Down

to 1861, Congressmen

evidently

thought

it

traditional

and axiomatic that acreages acquired fjrom tribes, and transferred
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44J-ir*

to

public

domain

for

private

ent^ry

under

legislation, fell under state jurisdiction.
was

implicit

decades.

in

congressional

National

attention

focusq d

land

The same disposition

over

action

federal

the

upon

next

the

several

industrial

revolution in the East, which thrived on resources and services
from

hinterland

economies

trans-Mississippi
congressional

West.

legislation

in

territories

Immigrants
that

and

entered

screen bd new

states

of

freely

arrivals

the
under

only

for

national origins and objectionable tendencies.

Population grew
17
by some 33,000,000 from immigration in only seventy-five years.

On frontier provinces acquired through) Indian wars, treaties and
congressional agreements, immigrants and citizens from the East
who crossed the Mississippi River found ample space to settle on
plots governed

by federal

land

legislation, which was amended

often to suit western conditions.
caused

by post-Civil

states

entered

the

War

Af per a lull in state making

partisan

Union

in

c jonflict, nine

less

than

a

new

quarter

western
century,

beginning with four under an omnibus bjill in 1889. The ceded land
they

contained

jurisdiction

passed

from

according

tribal

to

through

congressional

to

policy.

otherwise about
transfer of jurisdiction over ceded aboriginal land. 18

appearances,

no

federal

official
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A<U 13?

said

federal

state
From
the

General Application of the Dawes Act

All the while, Indian tribes weri segregated
reservations

managed

by

employees

or

the

U.

from Whites on

S.

Indian

Field

Service, wherein additional acreages 4ere relinquished and opened
for non-Indian
created
be

settlement.

Section

procedures whereby

communal

dissolved

With

and

allotting

ill-qualified

allotted

agents

at

to

5 of

the

tracts

they

individuals

the

by

scenen-often

interpreters,

irate

Dawes

Act

of

contained

executive

in

the

1887
could

action.

presence

of

tribal

traditionalists,

meddlesome missionaries, and troublesome White

hangers-on—tracts

deemed adequate for subsistence farming or ranching were parceled
out arnonft tribal
Act

prescribed

members

in

scvorntt y.

Section

LlmL on the cuinplctio I oi

said allottees" they would "have

6 of

the

"pnten Ling oi

Dawes

lands to

the benefit" and "be subject to

the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in
which they may reside."

After

tribal needs for allotments

were

satisfied, surplus areas could be "sold or released to the United
I
States" by tribes "for the sole purpose of securing homes to
actual

settlers,"

interest

among

Allotment
lands,

Act.)*

or

allowed.

Indians.
19

managed
Proceeds

educational

whose

The

(This
United

their
went

support,

example

or

in

to

the

States

sale
into

was

^as

per

- 19 -

AU. 13^

heart

either

piecemeal

tribal

encourage

as

accounts
ctapita

of

agrarian

the

General

purchased

surplus

rapidly

as

for

mainly ir

use

payments

to

demand

sustaii

illottees

and

their

families,

self-sufficiency

from

reservation

administered,

protested

so

rigorously

who

allotted

at every

yere

expected

h|eirship

or

land.

Indians

some

to

attain

On

each

filibustered

stage ih the application

or

of the

Dawes Act, but on most the majority aqceded to the plan, albeit
under duress.
Historians
applications

of

of

Indian-White

Sections

relations

5 and

6

of

understand

the

reservations failed miserably at the time.
termination

of

treaty

annuities,

^nc*

Dawes

that

Act

on

the
most

Reasons included the
depletion

of

tribal

accounts, before self-sufficiency was attained; a disinclination
by many Indians to take up farming an<d ranching full time; the
infertility of acreages on allotments; land hunger among Whites;
adverse climatic
general

conditions; an inadequate

discouragement

dependence

on

of

Indians

paternalistic

land

about

regimes

base; and the

their

in

charge

increasing
of

their

reservations.
Students of the applications
reservations
contributed
applied.

know,

too,

to reservation

how

of the Dawes Act on western

littl^

economies

Indian
since

allotments

the

Dawes

Act

have
was

Indian Office industrial surveys of the 1920s revealed

that only three families in an enrolled population of more than
2,000

Yankton

Sioux,

whose

administrative

history

is

most

familiar to the writer, attained self-sufficiency from their own
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AUK6

land.

Statistics

show

that

Yankton

acreage

had

gone

from

11,155,890 to 430,000 by the terms of tfhe 1858 treaty, and
through

allotment,

surplus

acreage

transfer

and

subsequent

allotment or heirship land sales, aggregate tribal and
holdings
years,

comprised
Yankton

containing

only

about

people

only

3.6

40,000 acres

retained
percent

by

recognized
of

the

allotment

1940. In

title

tract

to

to

that

seventy
an

area

which

their

20
prcdccossors

coded

aboriginal

claim.

M

On

overage,

the

other

Sioux tribes fared little better.

Sensitive
regret

and

observers

desire

to

have

looked

somehow

back

on

a

tragic

rectify

history of Indian-White relations.

this

with

error

deep

in

the

Some have published to elicit

support from readers in the effort to follow up post World War II
monetary

payments

through

claims

awards

with

other

kinds

of

not

be

compensation.

Additional
tailored

recompense

would

be

just.

It

should

by judges, however, or counsel, or expert witnesses, or

historical consultants seeking retribution through jurisdictional
adjudication.
by

Such an approach could only compound one injustice

the addition

of another.

Worse,

it| would

further

aggravate

reciprocal images and relationships between Indians and Whites at
scenes of jurisdictional dispute, where race relations have been
tortured by war, social bias or fear for generations.

Recompense

should

be

made

through
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Add. m |

some

other

means,

and

jurisdictional
intent

in

federal

disputes

developments
and

tribal

reservation areas.
to leave

resolved

federal

by

related

a

to

governance

search

the

for

applications

witnin

the

of

same

state,
original

To the question of yhether congressmen

and

tribal

jurisdiction

intact

lands contained by the original borders of the
intended

congressional

to transfer jurisdiction

meant

throughout

all

reservations, or

from tiribal to state and

local

governments over land ceded as surplus fpr entry by Whites within
those

boundaries,

there

is

statements by congressmen
the

general

Dawes

purposes

himself

of

a

reply

implication

and administrative
the Dawes

expressed

|by

the

Act.

belief

In

thdt

distant when the holding in severalty

officials
various

"the

time

in

most

regarding

ways,
is

Henry

not

far

wiill prevail all over this
21

country among Indians as well as white npen."
meant

to

Attorney

encourage
General

of

de-tribalization.
the

United

States

In

By this he surely
1905,

wrote:

the

Acting

"Undoubtedly

the

ultimate purpose of the allotments provided by the Act of 1887 is
to wipe out the reservations."

His belief in the elimination of

tribal

and

governance

was

clear,

he

added

that

"it

is

for

Congress, and not for the courts, to say when that purpose shall
22
take effect."
Because the Attorney Geheral's focus was on the
rot en Lion of COIIJ» r »»MM I onn I jnr indie I nI o|iover rrnrr vu t 1 OILS MM
"federal institutions" containing
may

not

versus

apply
state

directly
or

local

to

Indian "inmates," his statement

recent

governments.
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AJd.Hl

litigation
Ye£

his

involving
view

of

tribal

"ultimate

purpose" expresses the expectation of de-tribalizationf and so do
many other official opinions pertaining to the Dawes Act in that
era*

(See

Appendix

B)

From

a

broaa

and

JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY, an historian ih

general

survey

of

likely to conclude that

tribal jurisdiction over aboriginal land was ceded with title,
and

that

tribal

authority

over

land

on

reservations

was

considered a temporary expedient even on the acreages assigned to
allottees•
Recent

literature

on

the GENERAL

GOAL

OF

FEDERAL

INDIAN

POLICY for that era bears a similar message*

Policy reflected

suppositions

times:

handed

down

from

co|lonial

Vattel's

hypothesis; preemption rights to sovereignty and supreme dominion
over tribes by the United States; and Christianity coupled with
free enterprise economics as guiding f eatures in federal goals*
Field

Service

congressional

administrators
support

labored

and

missionaries

to transform

backed

Indian

people

by
into

self-supporting citizens of the United] States; to separate them
from

tribal

including

ties,

and

to

attach

those of governance.

them

to White

Congressmen

institutions,

authorized

as they

funded these processes year after year with published information
at

hand

regarding

administrative

efforts,

and

considerable

instruction from lobbyists with influence they could not ignore.
That congressmen knew the reduction of tribal authority was part
of the general plan they authorized anp funded is surely implied
in

appropriate

chapters

of

Francis
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AJd.»43

Paul

Prucha's

The

Great

Father,

for

example,

and

the

text

ofl William

T«

Hagan's

The

23
Indian
the

Rights ^Association,

imposition

Indian
was

habits

the

The

of mainstream
and

goal

beliefs

philosophies

of

fawning

latter

in

indicates

and

most

eastern

tribal

authority

was

part

of

practices

of

their

that

in

place of

with

enormous

the destruction of

acpulturationists f

the

that

manifestations

do-gooders

influence among congressmen, and implies

clearly

plan

all

along*
Records

pertaining

tribal

governance

least,

suggest

could

not

roots.

have

Their

to

within

that

the

the

been

the

AFFECTS

reservations

congressmen

blind

awareness

OF

to

what

from

|who
was

FEDERAL

of

Sioux

listened
happening

participation

POLICY

on

Country,

at

to

reformers

at

the

seems

grass

clear

in

abundant evidence preserved

by the National Archives in "Letters

Received

Indian

by

the

Office

Classified

File";

collections

called

Kansas

City

and

of
by

"tribal

annotated

the

Affairs"

and

Federal

Records

decimal

files," such

in a publisheq

"Indian

as

inventory

Central

Centers

in

the ones

in

for

Pine

Ridge

document |ary holdings, mission

files

Reservation records.
The contents of federal
and

other

archival
several

collections

reveal

that

tribal

governments, generally,

(a) the abiding

forces

erosion

as

were

well

op |enly

as
at

secondary
work

throu h the period

of legitimate

_ 24 -

Acid, m

tribal

to

sources
undermine

1887 to 1934:

authority

that had

taken place through official action sinc£ the Age of Jacksonj (b)
an intensified
Policy

under

under

the

the

one
were

of

(By

assumes,

Agents

1880,

and

upon

the

affairs

inasmuch

not

support

between

as

of

these

older

1880

required

the

and

determination

but

Committees
who

either

by the outset

government

over

of

tribes

reservations

on

recognized

to

claim

under

authority

was a

agreement.)

to erotje tribal

early

An

to

recognition,

Act

effect.

1910

congressional

rights

aboriginal

tribal

de-tribalization

in

Peace

of

them defunct

key to success in every
was

as the

Superintendents,

powers

federal treaty or congressional

(a) Previous

in

effort

their agendas or rendered

reservation

based

and,

instituted

tribal governments with Business

control

1920s.

western

Grant;

particular

traditional

manipulated
of

(c) a

of acculturation
S.

Ulysses

commitments,
supplant

program

statement

effort
of

while

intent

the Dawes

to make

this

part of federal policy for trans-Mississippi tribes appeared in a
plan

for

William

acculturation
Clark

to

submitted

Secretary

1826, in which he urged

of

by

War

Saint
Jaftes

federal action

Louis

Superintendent

Barbour,

on

March

1,
T!

toward tribal members

to

teach them to live in houses, to raise grain and stock, to plant
orchards, to set up land marks, to divide their possessions,11 to
"establish
common
to

the

laws

for

learning" and
authority

settlements

their

government,

"give

to the tribes the idea

of

civil

to

government"

"over which a competent
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AcU.tH^

get

the

and

agient should

rudiments
of

to

of

submission
gather

be placed

in
with

9A

full power of conducting

the executive

Soon a plan like this was implemented
S*

Farmers

and

other

regular

part of a Government*"

widely by U. S. Agents, U•

employees

of

the

Indian

Field

payers

and

tribal

Service, with ever increasing effect.
(b)

At

accounts,
under
and

considerable

the

Ulysses

plan

was

enlarged

S. Grant's

missionaries

expense

Peace

labored

with

to

tax

and

enforced

Policy,

Field

congressional

on

reservations

Service

employees

encouragement

and

support to educate young Indians about rion-Indian culture, to put
adults to work as farmers and ranchers, to replace Indian beliefs
with those of Christianity, to supplant individual attachments to
tribes

with

undermine

ties

if not

to

civil

prohibit

governments
the

through

pra<:tic$ of

citizenship,

tribal

folkways

to

that

seemed incompatible with nrainstream proclivities, and most of all
to subdue if not
application
citizenship
depletion

of

of

dismantle
these

awards

and

tribal

traditional

Indian

strategies

culminated

fee

land

simple

accounts

with

per

governments.
in

issues
capita

a

frenzy

The
of

followed

by

the

payments.

By

the

early 1920s, many grass roots observerls thought

de-tribalization

I
for most

Indians

congressmen

that

was

nearly

caused

accomplished.

them

to

support

(The
the

temperament

of

acculturation

of

Indians was related to the attitude which caused them to fund the
export of culture throughout
age

of

the

"White

Man's

the Progressive Era. Theirs was the

Burden,"

"missionary

diplomacy,"

other manifestations of non-Indian cultural imperialism.
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and

Indians

were not.the only victims.)
(c)-The notion that men in Congress who flaunted
American

culture

around

the

world

imposition

upon Indian

tribes

not

illogical,

but

only

pertaining

to

governance.
there

the

exists

in

reactions

up

and

agreement

in

the

government

was essential

individual
society

of

dismantled

belief

tribal

traditional

comprising

with
other

to

Superintendents.
management,

pleasure

ties

for

or

Business
The

claims

the
to

over

officials

Indians,
general

development,
were

Superintendents,

voted
tribal

summoned

sometimes
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into

the

tribal
the
of

mainstream

years,

uniform

they

procedures.

government
forces

by
on

advisory

committees

these

turn

in

which

chaired
on

Department

the detachment

councils,

Committees

Committees

They

£tnd

least,

of

recognized

and

at

unmistakeable

replaced

as

is

tribal

tribes, and

entry

governments by fairly

headmen

Country

Interior

of

its

records

toward

manipulation

Methodically

and

with

command

was a key

tribal

compliant

memberships.
of

the

"made-chiefs"

assemblies,

authority

of

the control

federal

chiefs

reservations

tribal

to

and

in

in question

personnel

War

that

period

for Sioux

chain

authority

from

Characteristically,

elected

the

citizens.

traditional

agency

of

wavered

inconsistent

preserved

down

Indians

as

of

have

the

also

correspondence

officials

dissolution

through

is

In documents

mi^ht

mainstream

such
fund

with

delegated
by

things

agency
as

allocations,

infrequently
remained

land
and

at

the

inactive

for

years, and in most though not all instances were defunct by the
early

1920s.

erosion

of

Traditionalists

independent

protested

tribal authority

in

vain

through

against

the

petitions

and

delegations to Washington, DC. For Sioux Country it is fanciful
to

suggest

government

that
of

any

viable,

federally

recognized

tribal

people's unencumbered choice existed on a
25
by 1910.
Where Indians participated in decisions

reservation

the

about the general affairs and resources of their tribes, it was
through

Business

Committees

headed

ai)d

controlled

by

agency

Superintendents.
In spite of this, during recent prbceedings lawyers argued,
and evidently

justices were swayed

to believe, that

effective

tribal government existed with congressional sanction on a Sioux
reservation

through

the

Progressive
26

implementation of the Peace Policy.
evolved

from

records,

scanty

research,

correspondence

Inspectors1

Reports

otherwise.

Some

despicable, but

of

and

governments intact.

because

Interior

officials

following

the

full

Their assumption must have

congressional

iedornl
lew of

Era,

Indian

Field

Department
documents

m n y hnvc

thorn were ioolfi onough

boon
Lo

Service

officials,

all

indicate

crooked

and

leave tribal

They picked them apart and transferred their

functions mainly to regular agency employees in aggregate teams
that ranged in size from a few on small reserves to scores on the
larger reservations.

From the Agency, Authority was delegated to

employees at Sub-agencies or Farm Districts who dwelled in the
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communities*

^At the^grass roots, Sub-ag0nts and Farmers (one and

the

many

same

in

instances) marshalled

effectively to remain in control.

the

forces

around

them

27

Included in local teams were tribal members, mainly those of
mixed-heritage

with

tractable

Assistant, Additional
various

wage

labor

dispositions.

or District

employees.

Farmeijs; Tribal

Involved,

served for little or no remuneration.
treated
period

as
of

restricted
agency
Farmers

liasons
intensive
and

or

instruments

personnel.
herded

To

children

Social

and

by Farmers,

be

sure,

to

too,

served

as

Policemen; and

were

judges,

who

All Indian appointees were

of

acculturation,

controlled

They

control

their

through

prerogatives

Superintendents

Tribal

schools,

Police

and

and

imposed

a

were

and

other

Assistant

other

agency

regulations.

But they did so under careful supervision by Agency

Farmers

other

and

superiors.

decisions in cases involving
federal

policy

appellate

Superintendents
reverse

their

recognized

or

sovereignty
through

the

system

reviewed

their

decisions.
employed

with

The

by

the Peace at

agency

documents

for

made

of

the low end of an
S»

Farmers

or

cases

with

the

authority

to

contention
g^tve

recognition

records

long

by

U.

applications of federal Indian policy.
over

judges

wherein

agencies

congressional

examination

tribal

Indians. But they were empowered

like Justices of

judicial

Grantpd,

must
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Aid. IH<)

that

Indian
to

expression
cannot

pertaining

to

officers

be

tribal
defended

the

local

A historian who has pored
reach

the

conclusion

that

congressional as well as federal administrative intent was not to
recognize

but

to

quash

tribal

sovereignty.

Under

federal

sanction, Indian leaders exercised little authority in the lives
of tribal members, and almost none over the lives of White people
who settled on surplus lands pursuant to Section 5 of the Dawes
Act. (See Appendix C)
Rigorous effort by agency officials to dismantle and control
if not destroy tribal governments should not have been allowed,
according to recent popular opinion, |>ut it went on with tacit
approval
protest.

by

congressmen

What

through

happened

almost

allocations
a

qentury

of

funds

ago

can

without
only

be

superseded, either by congressional action or by an amendment to
the

Constitution

of

the

United

States.

As

the

Acting

Attorney-General put it in 1905: "it i$ for Congress, and not .for
the courts, to" legislate federal policy for affairs on Indian
reservations.
If the urgency of need for a solution to current confusion
regarding

federal

and

tribal

boundaries of reservations
conflict

presented

at

the

jur isdi|c tion within

is not clcnr enough
beginning

of

this

the original

in examples of
paper,

it

is

dramatically apparent in the review 0f briefs and decisions on
Section 5 jurisdictional boundary cases that have come before the
federal courts since the early 1960s. Given the outline above as
background, it seems clear that the courts are sorely in need of
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the information and methodology which historians can supply when
focusing

on

SccLlon

5

of

legislative implementation.

tho
28

Geiicrrtl

ALlolmcnL

Act

and

ita

A colleague from the discipline of

law on the faculty of the University of South Dakota

underscores

the

of

need

for

the

help

of

historians

in

her

review

central

cases, which follows.

1. January 4-7, 1986
2. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, March 30, 1986.
3. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, July 22, 1986.
4. Sioux Falls Argus Leader, July 27, Sdptember 16, 1986*
5. Personal interview by the writer in Pierre, June, 1986.
6. Personal interview by the writer at Vermillion, August, 1986.
7. Personal interview by the writer
prefers anonymity, July, 1985.
8. Solem v.

with

former

policeman

who

Bartlett.

9. Francis Paul Prucha's the Great Father (Two Vols.; Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1984) supplies the best general
coverage of Indian policy from colonial times to 1980.
10. The Laws of Nations or the Principles of Natural
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, jL916), 37-38, 84-86.

Law

11. The official view of sovereignty is summarized in a note
attached to the Land Law of 1796 printed in the 1861 edition of
Statutes at Large. 4 Stat., 465.
12. Howard Lamar, The Reader's Encyclopedia of the American West
(New York: thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1977). A survey of early
federal land policy appears on pp. 632-642.
13. Greater
detail
about
early
national
available in Prucha's The Great Father.
14. I Stat., 50-53.
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Indian

policy

is

15. 4 Stat., 469-474.
16. 4 Stat., 465,
17.
Henry
Steele
Commager's
piece
about
the
impacts
of
immigration on the character of Americans in Modern Maturity
(February-March 1986) contains this estimate for the period 1865
to 1940.
18. For example, the Yankton Sioux surrendered aboriginal claim
and jurisdictional authority on 11,155,890 acres in present-day
South Dakota east of the Missouri river when they accepted
recognized claim to 430,000 acres in th$ 1858 Washington Treaty.
19. 24 Stat. , 388.

2 0 . C h a r l e s J . K a p p l e r , I n d i a n T r e a t i e s , 177S-1883
Interland* Publishing, I n c . , 1972), 776-|80.
2 1 . 49 C o n g . , 1 S e s s . , C o n g r e s s i o n a l

Record,

p.

(New

York:

1559.

2 2 . " A u t h o r i t y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o v e r I n d i a n s — o p i n i o n of
Acting Attorney-General,11
Department
of J u s t i c e ,
Washington,
D . C . , May 3 5 , 1 9 0 5 . The w r i t e r found t h i s i n F o r t Peck L e t t e r
Books a t t h e F e d e r a l A r c h i v e and R e c o r d s C e n t e r i n Kansas C i t y .
2 3 . T u c s o n : The U n i v e r s i t y of A r i z o n a P^ress,
2 4 . Record Group 7 5 , M234, r o l l

747, N a t i o n a l

1985.
Archives.

2 5 . An example of t h e l o n g term p r o c e s s of d i s m a n t l e m e n t
is
contained
in
Herbert
f.
Hoover,
"The
Yankton
Sioux
Experience.. .1900-1930,"
The
American
West
(Toledo:
the
U n i v e r s i t y of T o l e d o , 1 9 8 0 ) , 5 3 - 7 2 .
2 6 . Solorn v .

Bar t l o t L .

2 7 . The c e n t r a l r o l e s of U. S. F a r m e r s in r e s e r v a t i o n d i s t r i c t
management
is evident
in
the a r t i c l e
"Arikara,
Sioux,
and
Government F a r m e r s : Three American Indi+an A g r i c u l t u r a l L e g a c i e s , "
South Dakota H i s t o r y , X I I I ( s p r i n g / S u m i a e r 1 9 8 3 ) , 2 2 - 4 8 .
2 8 . The i n i t i a l o v e r v i e w of t h e G e n e r a l A l l o t m e n t Act i n Appendix
B is helpful.
A d d i t i o n a l work must be a c c o m p l i s h e d in p r i m a r y
s o u r c e s for each a p p l i c a t i o n of S e c t i o n 5, h o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o
p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e s y n t h e s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o i t s
s p e c i f i c u s e . Federal documents w i l l be mo^t e s s e n t i a l , but materials
published in a r t i c l e s and books w i l l be important, too. For example, Father
Louis P f a l l o r ' s James McLaughlin; The Man With An Indian Heart (New York:
Vantage Press, 1978), which has been important to the development of t h i s
paper, supplies v i t a l information about the application of the Dawes Act.
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APPENDIX A: The Issue of Constitutional Guarantees

United

States

Senate

Bill

2564,

introduced

by

Barry

Goldwater during the Second Session of the Ninety-ninth Congress
on

June

16,

consequences

1986,

of

Whites, or over
provided

the

Pima-Maricopa
offenses*

precipitated

granting

tribal

Indians without

administration

discussion

governments
tribal

of

regarding

the

jurisdiction

over

membership.

justice

by

the

Salt

Indian Community Court over criminal

It went

to

support from officials

the

Committee

on

Indian

The bill
River

misdemeanor

Affairs

with

in Arizona state government and nearby

cities, and with assurance that this Indian court was up to the
task.1
Deputy Assistant U. S. Attorney General Victoria Toensing
wrote the opinion that while under current
Oliphant

v.

jurisidction

Suguamish
over

supported the change

Tribe

(1978)

non-Indians,

the

an

law established in

Indian

court

Department

in light of endorsements

from

of

had

no

Justice

non-Indian

officials in Arizona. She raised questions, nevertheless, about
the capacity of the Court to handle the caseload; the community
to

provide

jail

space;

and

the

tribal

[government

to

assert

jurisdiction without infringing on the constitutional rights of
non-members: right to appointed counsel, trial by jury, proper
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administration of the test for intoxicated [driving, application
2
of proper rules of evidence, and right of appeal
Concern about the constitutional rights' of persons tried by
the

tribal

Dakota

court

Attorney

gained
General

more
Mark

succinct
V.

expression

Meierhenry.

In

from

a

South

letter

to

i

Senator James Abdnor on September 4, he expressed firm opposition
to S. 2564 because "Congress cannot constitutionally deprive an
American citizen of his Bill of Rights guarahtees" by placing him
under a political force not bound by constitutional constraints.
At risk were the republican form of government guaranteed to each
state group, right to appoint counsel, right to a jury of persons
"from which members of a defendant's race are not automatically
excluded," and right to trial by a political system in which one
may participate.
non-Indians,

Any bill extending jurisdiction to a tribe over

Meierhenry

contended,

would

have

to

contain

safeguards to assure these rights.

1. 99 Cong., 2 Sess., S. 2564; Letters of support attached to the
bill when it went to Committee.
2. Statement of Victoria Toensing...before the Select Committee
on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, July 23, 1986.
3. South Dakota Attorney General
Abdnor, September 4, 1986.

Mark V. Meierhenry
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to James

APPENDIX B: The Purposes of the Daw^s (General
Allotment) Act of 1887

While congressmen debated the bill tha^: became the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (which reversed tlfie philosophy behind
the Dawes Act), the Office of Indian Affairs employed D. S. Otis
to write a history
transformed

of the act of

earlier

piecemeal

1887. He explained

efforts

to

place

how it

Indians

on

individual farms and ranches into a general plan for severalty in
most of the tribes, discussed arguments that led to its passing,
identified groups that had been for and against it, and described
When Francis Paul Prucha prepared Otis1

its early application.

report for reprint in book form, he wrote in the introduction
that

w

to

many

reformers"

who

shared

responsibility

passing of the bill authored by Henry Dawes
important

means

Otis

had

fitted
dominant views of that age of individualism."12

well

into

the

the

tribalism,"

"this was the most
that

"how

destroying

the

and

demonstrated

of

for

allotment

policy

Throughout his text, Otis quoted and paraphrased opinions to
demonstrate that most reformers and legislators supported the act
to prevent the further loss of Indian land, but "the supreme aim
of the friends of the Indian was to substitute white civilization
for...tribal culture....

Allotment was counted on to break up

- 1 -
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tribal life."

Other philosophies were influential.

Mention that

"Indians were o f course making no use of natural resources which
should be developed in the interests of civilization" expressed
4
the legacy of Vattel. But belief that "allotment was the legal
method by means of which...breaking down the reservations...was
to be accomplished" expressed the social anq economic purposes of
most non-Indians.

1 : In a summary remark, Otis expressed the

opinion that "allotment was first of all a method of destroying
the reservation and...secondly a method of bringing security and
civilization to the Indians."

And he demonstrated in many ways

that this was the popular solution to the "Indian problem" among
most

philanthropic

reformers,

legislators

and

members

of

the

voting public*
The major fault in Otis' analysis was excessive reliance on
published agency reports and congressional documents, and failure
to

use

original

Correspondence

sources

and

generated

inspection

at

reports

the

grass

roots.

far

greater

express

opposition to allotment and surplus land sa^es by Indians than he
perceived.
both

the

But primary sources corroborate the perception that
popular

congressmen

and

goal

of Whites

federal

and

the

administrators

accepted

was

to

policy

of

de-tribalize

Indians, and destroy their reservations.
This

conclusion

congressional

came

from

a

publications,

many

of

- 2 -
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substantial
which

number

contain

of

succinct

statements by members of Congress. Congressman Thomas Skinner of
North Carolina made a typical argument in 1$86 when he said that
"tribal relations must be broken up"; Indians should "shake off
the

shackles

of

tribal

authority."

With

more

land

on

reservations than they could "profitably use," they should sell
surplus so Whites "may get possession of them and come in contact
with Indians." Through the possession of individual allotments
and exposure to subsistence farmers would come "the most direct
route to citizenship for the Indian."

"No better element can be

found than the men who go out and settle upon the public lands,
and make for themselves honest homes," said Senator Henry Teller
from Colorado. "Give to our people...the right to go upon the
Indian lands and make, side by side of the Indian farm, a farm
tilled by the aggressive and enterprising Anglo-Saxon, and in a
little while contact alone will compel these people to accept the
civilization that surrounds them on every side." 8
There was dissent all along.

Back in 1880, a minority in

the House Committee on Indian Affairs expressed the opinion that
"it does not make a farmer out of an Indian to give him a quarter
section of land," and went on to charge that "the main purpose of
this bill is not to help the Indian...so much as it is to provide
a method for getting at the valuable Indian lands and opening
9
them up to white settlement." In 1883, stronger opposition came
from spokesmen for the Creeks in a memorial containing evidence
of numerous instances where allotment and citizenship had led to

- 3Add. 15*7

extreme hardship•
GenerallYi views expressed in congressional sources support
Otis's

conclusions, however.

Most

congressmen

and

reformers

favored the Dawes Act to destroy tribalism, to instill desire in
Indians
expose

for

self-sufficiency

allottees

to

the

through

example

of

personal

initiative,

to

agrarian

subsistence

by

opening surplus lands within reservation tjoundaries to bonafide
settlers, and to remove obstacles to citizenship in the United
States. One would have to torture phrases considerably to show
from majority opinions any inclination to preserve reservations
or tribal authority*
that

congressmen

One would search in v&in to discover a hint

who

legislation

felt

governance.

Surely

drafted

anything
they

and

voted

but

would

the

'1
opposed

antagc nism

have

Dawes

bill

toward
the

into
tribal

notion

that

Whites who settled within reservation borders to serve as models
for allottees might be subjected to tribal governance.

This is

not to say tribal authority would necessarily have offended all
non-Indians; by the late 1880s, many lived without inconvenience
on reservations
recognize

that

as husbands
the vast

of

tribal

majority

of

women.

It is only

congressmen

in

to

that era

believed that tribal governments and reservations were temporary
expedients soon to vanish as Indians received land in severalty
and citizenship.

The suggestion that White settlers might be

placed under tribal

jurisdiction, one suipects, would to them

have seemed preposterous.
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1. The DawesjAct and the Allotment of Indian Lands (Francis Paul
Prucha, editor; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973).
2. Ibid., x-xi.
3. Ibid., 8-9.
4. Ibid., 17.
5. Ibid., 21.
6. Ibid., 32.
7. 49 Cong., 2 Sess., Congressional Record
190.

(December 15, 1886),

8. 49 Cong., 1 Sess., Congressional Record
1763.

(February 25, 1886),

9. 46 Cong., 2 Sess., House Report No. 1576J.
10. 47 Cong., 2 Sess., House Miscellaneous Pocument No. 18.
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APPENDIX C: The Erosion of Government ^n Tribes of the
United States from the Age of Jacksoi* to the 1920s

Infringement on the "ancient customs and laws of the much
older tribal governments," to which Tim Tiago referred

in his

editorial, began when colonial

merchants ^nd administrators of

New

for

France

selected

middlemen

the

f^ir

trade.

Historian

Harold A. Innis wrote that "the best of hunters were rewarded
with favors and promotions," and "governors made titular officers
of those..•accounted the best huntsmen and warriors."

To' each

they gave "a coat, a pair of breeches and a hat, appointing him
captain of a river."
extended

advantage

To each, Innis might have added, they also
in the exercise

of

influence

among

tribal

members around them for their central rol§s as liasons between
suppliers of trade goods and Indian consumers.
purposes,
practice

early
known

Canadian
to

fur

officials

trade
of

operatives

the

United

For diplomatic
engaged
States

in

in

a

the

nineteenth century as "chief-making."
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, anc^ Pierre Choteau Jr.'s
leading

Upper Missouri River

trade operative, Honore Picotte,

were among leading explorers and merchants who engaged in this
practice during early national history.

In 1856, General William

Harney founded Fort Randall near the center of Sioux Country,

- 1 -

Add. I 60

wrote about chief-making and its significance, and described his
effort

to

alter' the

process- for

the

enhancement

of

federal

authority:
Certain chiefs were recognized by the nation,
others by the military, others again by the agents, and
the traders, for their own purposes, have most
unwarrantably given medals and appointed chiefs....
These conflicting interests necessarily weakened the
authority of all these chiefs....
I have caused the Sioux nation to select and
appoint a certain number of head chiefs and chiefs to
govern them, and to see that they carry out the
conditions to which they have assented in council; and
I have informed them that these would be the only
chiefs recognized by the President, myself, or their
Indian agent.
Harney

designated

affairs,

but

his

tribes.

Regardless

leaders

mainly

recognition
of

gave

previous

to carry

them

on

status

standings

they

diplomatic

within
now

their

were

in

position to influence Indian-White negotiations, the distribution
of

annuities,

distribution

the
of

choice

of

irregular

acquired positions

recipients

agency

in tribes by

who

demonstrated

steady

gratuities,

employment,

traditional

those who did not were eligible for such
those

for

Men

who

means as well as

"appointments." Only
ior

support

etc.

the

federal

policies

retained recognition for long.
Chief-making

became

common

practice

among

Field

Service

Agents as they founded reservations and searched for leaders to
take over

new

bands

formed

by

chiefs to replace traditional

agency

staff, and

leaders as ^hey
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cooperative

passed away.

On

the

Yankton

Redfield

Sioux

Reservation,

for

example,

recognized *Francis v Deloria

mixed-blood band*

Redfield1s

as

Agent

Alexander

"chief" ~of^ a

new

successors, acting with approval

from their superiors in Washington, DC, "made" Jumping Thunder
chief in place of Smutty Bear, Felix Brunot then Blue Cloud chief
in place of Pretty Boy, John Ree chief in place of Mad Bull,
etc.3
Within

approximately

a quarter

centulry, Greenwood

agents

reported the majority of chiefs to be compliant, and gained their
approval for the replacement of traditional by republican tribal
government under federal supervision.

J. F« Kinney declared that

chiefs were "not only useless," but also were
"progress" on the reservation.

impediments

to

In 1891, all who remained

in

office were induced to join a representative "Speaking Council."
Young men who aspired to leadership positions through traditional
means formed the "Sons of the Chiefs" and "Society of Orphans" in
protest,

but

made-chiefs

their

Jumping

letters

were

Thunder

and

ignored.
Medicine

In
Cow

1901,
passed

when
away,

Superintendent James D. Staley said he would no longer "recognize
chiefs" on his reserve.

After that, Superintendents

the elective

fall

council

to

into disusd.

Later

permitted

on, tribal

spokesman Clement Smith recalled the subsequent existence not of
effective

tribal

government,
4
groups...floundering."
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but

only

of

"factional

Similar

developments

occurred

around

other

agencies.

At

Sisseton, the constitutional "Renville Repujblic" collapsed in the
mid-1890s, following the death of its only President, Gabriel
Renville, leaving the tribe without effective central government
until

the

New

Deal

Era.

In

most

othejr

Sioux

tribes,

the

destruction of tribal authority was not as complete, but the
process of erosion was similar.
Among Tetons, it began as early as 1^78, when a commission
recommended the distribution of rations to Upper Brule and Oglala
family heads instead of to band

leaders, and wrote

that "the

domination of the chiefs should be broken up" and replaced with
authority by tribal officers elected for short terms.
exercised
opposed

power

with

support

to progress according

from

The chiefs

traditionalists,

to federal

who

were

standards, and their

removal had become "an agricultural necessity."

In 1880, Crow

Creek Agent William Dougherty said tribal government should be
destroyed in order to undermine "traditions and prejudices...of
which

the

head

chief

is the

head

repository."

In

1882, he

recommended "breaking up the organizations of bands and tribes,
and establishing the family as the basis ofisocial organization,"
for it would then be possible to "impart t|o them some semblance
of the manners, customs and laws of our civilization."

As long

as Indians lived on communal land "under tlje patriarchal system,
they

must

contme

to

be...trubulent,

maintain."
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id|le

and

expensive

to

In 1889i as General George Crook explained the terms of the
Great Sioux Agreement, he warned Teton leajders that the survival
of tribal government should no longer be assumed; "it does not
necessarily follow that because you are qhiefs today, that you
are going to remain
accept

so in the

"this new departure"

future."

Those who could not

(confinement

to reservation

would "have to give way to those who can."

life)

Like drift wood, one

who "keeps up with the current will be all right, and that which
o

cannot is left on the banks."
Many were "left on the banks" thereafter.
George Wright threatened

At Rosebud, Agent

to jail recalcitrants, and

said that

those who were "at one time recognized a^ chiefs, representing
the older men, who have outlived their usef |ulness," were going to
9
Rock, where the Agent
be thrust aside* This happened at Standing
authorized Phillip Bullhead to take over the band of Little Dog,
and directed mixed-blood District Farmer (Joseph Archambault to
bring into it not only Little Dog's people, but also those in the
bands of See-the-Bear and Moccasin, making thirty-nine families
in all.
Almost

without

exception,

agents

supplanted

traditional

leaders with tribal governments amendable t|o federal plans.
their

effort,

they

received

support

an<i

publicity

ecclesiastical spokesmen, who shared their 'philosophy.
one of them wrote

that

"tribal

organization

- 5 -

in

For
from

In 1909,

itself

always

opposed

civilization...for

civilization

means

its downfall....

Where any form of this organization exists..., there you have a
chilling shadow in the way of...progress."T
Military
thrived

leaders, agency

on

congressional
and

personnel

support
in

some

and

as

missionaries

all

endeavored

to

they

manipulate,

control,

government.

The results of their efforts 4 n Sioux Country varied

from reservation to reservation.

instances

destroy

tribal

On those situated east of the

Missouri River, tribal authority was either reduced to "factional
groups...floundering," or for all practical purposes destroyed.
On

reservations

west

of

the

Missouri, j where

larger

Indian

populations were shielded from White influences by distance and
the possession of terrain with marginal value for agriculture,
tribal leaders were more successful in tlfieir defense of their
prerogatives.

Even there, the procedures of attack on tribal

government were the same.

Only the timetab]le was different.

Most populous and remote of all Sioux reservations was that
of Oglalas around Pine Ridge. Truculent Valentine McGillycuddy
initiated a methodical attack on the prer pgatives of Red Cloud
and

other

traditional

establishment

of

an

leaders
"Agency

in

the

Council"

mid-1880s
d>f

100

with

the

"working

and

progressive" delegates from the Farm Districts. They spoke for
the tribe on matters of interest to the Agepc'^uand for some years
doubled as the Court of Indian Offenses.
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Soon, officials in

Washington,

DC,

withdrawing

recognition

made-chiefs

joined

the

attack

on

traditional

them

and

approving

from

(in one instance, replacing

leaders,
compliant

Red Cloud by American

Horse). 1 3
"Old

and

non-progressive

Indians

wh<^ call[ed]

themselves

'head Men and Chiefs1" organized an "Oglala Council" of 300 or
more to defend their prerogatives, to oppose federal policies,
and

to

assert

meetings.

treaty

rights.

At

first,

they

held

monthly

Later, they gathered only two or three times a year.

Never did they receive recognition as members of a legitimate
political body by Indian Office officials.]

In 1907, the Acting

Commissioner of Indian Affairs agreed to r^ise no objection when
they assembled to discuss general "questions of interest."

But

the

the

Indian Office

recognized

only

the

body

organized

by

Agency, which was by then the "Business Committee appointed by
the general council" of voting tribal adiilts^ to reach official
decisions

about all matters

except

thos^ which

justified

the

The Oglala Council asserted its influence, to be sure.

For

assembling of the general council.

example, from 1902 to 1906 it foiled the efforts of Agent John
Brennan and the Business Committee to arrange the lease of tribal
pastures to a livestock syndicate.
the

issue

for

fear

of

provoking

At length, Brennan dropped
unnecessary

tribe. 16
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friction

in the

This was an exception, however, becausfe even on remote Pine
Ridge

"progressive11

leaders

spoke

in ever

increasing

numbers

favoring cooperation with the Agent* Several wrote as early as
1894, urging federal officials to "do away with this Chieftain
business

which

councils...as

is
the

unprogressive"
white

progressive Indians."
grew

as

the

support.

In

tribe

men

and

have...to

to

rely

on

encourage

and

"regular
assist

The number of men with this disposition
became

1917, when

increasingly

compliant* A were

dependent
in the

on

federal

majority

and

traditionalists of the Oglala Council were feilent, Superintendent
H. M. Tidwell called for the election of a jiew business committee
of twenty delegates from farm districts, by ballot
council,

to

function

as

an

"executive

in general

committtee"

or

"deliberative body of practical size to consider and act on the
ordinary business of the tribe."18 This committee carried on
tribal affairs under supervision by the Superintendent until the
1930s, when the general
approval

council

for a constitutional

adopted

and the people voted

government to operate under the

terms of the Indian Reorganization Act. 19
On Pine Ridge Reservation, traditional Oglala leaders stood
more tenaciously

against the erosion

of

their

authority

over

central tribal affairs then did leaders anywhere in Sioux Country
excAg/t perhaps those at Standing Rjock, and obviously the Oglalas
were unsuccessful in the effort to preserve their central power.
On Pine Ridge, a similar process of erosion took place in the
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communities, where

traditional

bands

and

their

leaders were

replaced for^ official purposes by Farm Districts and officers
"made" by the Superintendents. After the Agency Council doubled
for a time as the Court of Indian Offenses, special judges were
appointed to the Indian Court as regular agency employees at the
salary of $7 a month.

Mainly, they worked in cooperation with

salaried tribal policemen toward social control under supervision
by the U. S. Assistant or Additional Farmers in the Districts.
Case loads were sparse, according to a 1915 report, but fairly
significant.
forty-seven

"Over
criminal

previous
cases

years"

the

"dealing

with

judges

had

assault,

tried

adultry,

forgery, cattle stealing, timber cutting, elopement, contempt of
court,

drunkenness, fighting, wife beating, seduction and
perjury." 20 Without question, the judges and policemen performed
vital services of governance.

They did s0 not as officials of

their tribe, however, but as regular agency employees on salaries
under direct supervision from Farmers, who in turn functioned as
sub-agents under Superintendents at Pine Ridge. And they behaved
like agency employees, especially when dealing with traditional
ceremonies regarded inconsistent with Indian Office orders, such
as the practice of Peyote religion. 21
At the community as well as the central level, on most
reservations tribal members participated in governance through
the era when the Dawes Act was in effect.
agency

operatives

more

than

tribal

- 9-
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But they did so as

leaders

under

close

supervision,

and

the

power

they

considerably.

In primary sources pertaining to their activities,

there is nonetheless evidence that they
some

patterns

land.

of

behavior

among

Indians

exercised

diminished

functioned
Who

to control

occupied

Indian

Nowhere in these records does evidende appear to state or

demonstrate their power of jurisdiction over non-Indians within
reservation boundaries, however, on

land qeded

as surplus for

occupancy by bondifide settlers.
Inasmuch

as congressmen

had access

tcj> correspondence

and

reports on reservation life, and allocated funds to support it,
one

must

assume

that

governance

which

existed

governance which congressmen meant to support.
regarding what congressional

approximated

One's inclination

intent should have been does not

alter the contents of a great body of original documents.
lead*

to

the

conclusion

that

congressmen

as

well

They
as

administrators meant to diminish, consCain and in places destroy
tribal governance as part of the plan for de-tribalization, and
intended

not

to

authorize

tribal

authority

over

Whites

who

occupied ceded land, or citizen Indian allottees who held patents
in

fee, within

the

original

boundaries

iof

trans-Mississippi

western reservations.

1. The Fur Trade in Canada. (New Haven: Y^le University Press,
1930) , 141.
2. 34 Cong., 1 Sess., Ex. Doc. 130, Harney to Secretary of War,
March 5, 1856.

- 10 -

Add. IC\

3. Herbert T. Hoover, "Yankton Sioux Experience in the Great
Indian Depression, 1900-1930," The American West
(Toledo:
University of Toledo Press, 1980), 57-68.
4. Ibid., 58-64.
5. Report by Col. D. S. S. Stanley and ReV. A. L. Riggs, August
28, 1878, M234, roll 266, NA.
6. Captain William Doughterty to Indian C6mmissioner, September
22, 1880, Crow Creek Files, Federal Archive and Records
Center-Kansas City.
7. Captain William Doughterty, "The Sioux,," December 10, 1882,
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, NA.
8. Proceedings of Council at Standing Rocpk Reservation on the
Agreement of 1889, July 26, 1889, Irregular Shaped Papers #440,
NA.
9. Agent J. George Wright to Indian Commissioner, June 16, 1890,
Letters Sent, Rosebud Agency, FA&RC-KC.
10. U. S. Agent, Standing Rock, to Joseph Archambault, July 31,
1901, Standing Rock Files, FA&RC-KC.
11. Augustus Field Beard, A Crusade of Brotherhood; A History of
the American Missionary Association (Boston: The Pilgrim Press,
1909), 83.
12. Agent V. T. McGillycuddy to Indian Commissioner Hiram Price,
May 4, 1884, Letters Received, NA; Pine Ridge Annual Report, ( },
Letters Sent, FA&RC-KC.
13. Secretary of the Interior to Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs R. V. Belt, July 1, 1889, Letters Received, NA.
14. Superintendent John R. Brennan to Indian Commissioner, June
24, 1909, Letters Received, NA.
15. Acting Commissioner C. R. Larabee to Pine Ridge Agent, April
26, 1907, Letters Received, NA.
16. John R. Brennan to Indian Commissioner, November 3, 1902,
April 14, 1905, November 17, 1906; Oglala Council to John R.
Brennan, November 11, 1906, Letters Received, NA.
17. George Standing Bear, Henry Twist and Fast Forse to Indian
Commissioner to D. H. Browning, October 13, 1894, Letters
Received, NA.

- 11 -

>Wl7d

18. Pine Ridge "Constitution, By-laws, and Resolutions," Indian
Central Classified^File, IRA Records, NA.
19. Acting Commissioner A. C. Monahan to Secretary
Interior, November 30, 1935, Pine Ridge IRA Files, NA.

of

the

20. Inspectors Fred S. Cook and H. S. Traylor, "Oglala Council"
Report, received July 12, 1915, Indian Central Classified File,
NA.
21. Pine Ridge Inspection Report, July 7, 1915, Indian Central
Classified File, NA.

- 12 -

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
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INTRODUCTION
In most areas of Anglo-American jurisprudence, a
coherent body of law develops when a series of appellate
cases are decided in such a way that one decision lends
precedent to the next decision.

Each new case places

the court at a fork in the judicial road.

In most cases,

courts will follow the familiar path of p$st legal precedents
Occasionally, however, courts detour from established
precedents.

If two cases cannot be reconciled, they are

distinguished, and the law thereafter develops along two
separate paths.

Other times, a well-worn road is aban-

doned, as precedents which no longer reflect current
legal, social or political values are overruled.

A

landmark decision often results when a past precedent is
overruled, and a new legal trail is blazed.
I
Indian law, however, often defies precedent.

Old

roads as well as new roads may be abandoned without
adequate legal or policy justifications. New trails
are often not clearly marked. Decisions which could have
been landmarks
courts.

are seemingly disregarded by subsequent

For lawyers litigating Indian l&w issues, it is

almost impossible to "map11 current developments in Indian
law.

The body of Indian law lacks coherence and consistency,

Indian law seems to be developing on a case-by-case basis,
without adhering to precedent and without establishing
landmark decisions from which a coherent body of law might
1
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begin to develop.
These disturbing developments in Indian law jurisprudence are especially apparent in the disestablishment
cases,

sometimes referred to as boundary cases or diminish-

ment cases.

Such cases typically arise out of disputes

between Indian tribes or tribal members and state or local
governments.

At issue is the respective authority of

tribes and other governmental units to ejxercise jurisdiction
over land areas once set aside as Indian lands and later
opened for settlement pursuant to §5 General Allotment
4
Act surplus lands acts. "Enacted over a span of almost
thirty years after the passage of the Da^es Act of 1887
[General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390 (18$7)], these statutes
provided for the allotment in severalty of tracts of land
on specific reservations to individual tribal members,
and then for the opening of the surplus JLands to settlement."5
Recent disestablishment decisions b^ the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

have "compounded the

confusion produced by the contradictions and conflicts
already existing among the previous decisions in this
area."

Important historical facts relating to legis-

lative intent and federal policies regarding Indian people,
Indian tribes and Indian lands, have beeti misapplied,
misinterpreted, or ignored.

Such cases violate available
2
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legal precedents while ignoring historical facts which
are essential to a well-reasoned resolution of issues
relating to Congressional intent.

In some cases, nbad

law11 results because attorneys have failed to provide
the courts with an adequate evidentiary record (e.g.,
testimony of qualified historians, historic documents,
and legislative histories) from which a court could make
factual findings to support legal conclusions regarding
intent.

In such cases, there is simply no historical

evidence, and courts are left to function in an historical
vacuum. 8 In other cases, where historical! evidence has
I
been presented, courts have ignored or improperly interpreted such evidence, rendering decisions which might
fairly be characterized as knowing attemptfs to rewrite
history to reflect contemporary notions of social justice
or political expedience rather than the intent of
legislative drafters.
The current state of the law raises several perplexing questions:

Why have the courts seemingly strayed

so far off any definable course in the disestablishment
cases?

Why has no clear standard of construction emerged

which might bring some order to the currently chaotic
disestablishment adjudications?

Will the United States

Supreme Court seize an opportunity to clatify current
confusion with a landmark decision?

3

MU^s:

In searching for possible answers to these questions,
let us begin by retracing the steps of the United States
Supreme Court in the five leading disestablishment cases
decided to date:
(1962);

Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351

Mattz v.* Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973);

v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975);

DeCoteau
Rosebud

Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 581 (1977); and Solem v.
Bartlett,

465 U.S. 463 (1984).

Tracing the evolution of

standards for determining Congressional intent in the
disestablishment cases, perhaps a "missed turn" will be
discovered, or a new path uncovered.

After looking to

past cases for guidance, one can look ahead to the
I
critical juncture in the development of disestablishment
case law which is looming on a not too dilstant horizon.
q
The pending case of Utah v. Ute Indian Tribe, currently
on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, will be analyzed as a
potential landmark decision.

The United States Supreme

Court has the opportunity, in Ute, to clearly articulate
a standard of statutory construction which encourages
historical inquiry in the adjudication or Congressional
intent issues.

If such a standard is defined and fol-

lowed, historians will play an essential role in assisting
courts to understand and interpret historical facts
relevant to the determination of issues of legislative intent.
With adequate development and application of historical
4
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facts in disestablishment cases, perhaps legal conclusions
based on those historical facts will begin to evolve into
a series of consistent, coherent precedents.
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN THE
FIVE MAJOR DISESTABLISHMENT CASES
'
The Broad Context:
Supreme Court

Statutory Interpretation in the

"The legitimate scope of a court's authority to make
law where a legislature has spoken... is a recurring issue
in American legal thought."

The Supreme Court has

wrestled with two competing versions of the "proper"
judicial role in statutory construction cases.

"One

version grants primacy to the legislature as the author
of the statute and therefore emphasizes the statutory
text or legislative intention....

The second version

grants primacy to the judicial reader or (interpreter of
the statute and therefore emphasizes the creative role
of common law courts."

Each version has enjoyed

dominance during at least one regime of academic thought.
These regimes which influenced judicial behavior were
catalogued by Professor Paul N. Cox of Valparaiso
University as follows:
The first regime, which shared some of its
values with legal positivism, prevailed in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Under it, courts ... were to emphasize the plain
meaning of statutory text....[T]ext had
primacy under such a view.

Adim

The second regime, which may be identified
with legal realism, ... denied the authority
of text by demonstrating the indeterminacy
of the meaning of language and denied the
authority of legislative intent by pronouncing
it a fiction. Judges on these premises are
largely free from legislative wjll.

The third regime, perhaps best represented by
the Legal Process School... recognized the freedom
of judges to choose between alternative
interpretations of a statute....The language
of statutory text, while not controlling,
limited possible choices.... [T]jie third
regime substituted legislative purpose as
the fundamental basis.... [T]he third
regime...treat[s] author and interpreter
as rough equals.

[W]e may have entered an era of the fourth
regime, the regime of chaos..;.

If there is therefore no currently dominant
interpretive regime...it has nevertheless been
recently claimed that a particular interpretive
strategy has come to prevail iiji . . . the Burger
Court: the strategy of literalism. If so, the
Court has returned full circle to a version
of the first regime and to the,contradictions
of that regime: the text has primacy, but its
force is to be strictly limited to the
^o
language employed by the national legislature.
Because Indian law develops within a larger body
of law, problems of statutory interpretation which
currently plague Indian lawyers

may also be plaguing

our colleagues in other legal specialties.

Attempts to

change the Court's approach to statutory construction
issues in the Indian law context may be more difficult
where the Court as a whole is operating in another regime.

6

The Narrower Focus: Congressional Intent Determinations
in Five Major Disestablishment Cases
During the past quarter century, the United States
Supreme Court has on five occasions addressed questions
of disestablishment or diminishment of Indian reservations.
In each case, the Court interpreted acts of Congress
which opened surplus lands (lands remaining after allotments to individual Indian tribal members) to non-Indian
settlement.

None of the cases has yet emerged as a con-

trolling precedent.

None of the cases has as yet been

overruled by a subsequent disestablishment case.

In each

case, the Court has at least given lip service to the
need to determine Congressional intent, but rules of construction have shown little consistency ift application.
Confusion abounds, as commentators both favoring and
opposing disestablishment results freely (admit.
During the October 1986 Term, the United States Supreme
Court will again have an opportunity to clarify the
confusion in yet another disestablishment! case,

Ute v.

Utah Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. 1072, affl'd in part and
rev'd in part, 716 F. 2d 1298 (2-1 decision) (10th Cir.
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, qn rehearing en
banc, 773 F. 2d 1087 (5-2 decision) (10th Cir. 1985),
petition for cert, filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. May 5,
1986) (No. 85-1821).

7
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Seymour v. Superintendent
In Seymour a member of the Colville Indian Tribe
was convicted of burglary in a Washington state court.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, Seymour alleged that the
state court which had convicted and sentenced him was
without jurisdiction, since the crime he had allegedly
committed took place in the southern half of the Colville
Indian Reservation, within "Indian country.11

The Washington

Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the southern
half of the Colville Indian Reservation had been disestablished and was therefore no longer "Indian country."

On writ

of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
It found that neither the surplus" lands act nor a 1916
presidential proclamation diminished the original boundaries
of the reservation.
vacuum.

The case was decided in an historical

No reference was even made to the General Allotment

Act or to the legislative history of the surplus lands act
in question, and no one addressed the fact that the 1906
act was based on a formal cession agreement.
1424, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).

S. Rep. No.

In construing the

statute, without aid of historical facts, the court relied
primarily on the language of the act and a comparative
statutory analysis (comparing one act with an earlier act
or resolution).

Perhpas Seymour is most remembered for its

dicta, in which the Court distinguished A|ct of 1892, 27
Stat. 62,63,

the express terms of which "vacated and re-

stored to the public domain" the northern, disestablished
8
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At the district court level, the coutft was presented
with a voluminous record which included 217 legislative
documents and 485 historic documents, 1864-1978.

In the

trial court's lengthy opinion, a detailed historical
analysis was undertaken in the search for Congressional
intent.

Subsequent decisions by the Tentfy Circuit,

particularly the en banc

court, have largely ignored

the vast wealth of historical data available in the
trial record, relying on language rather than legislative
history, and a strained interpretation of Solem, in
arriving at its anti-disestablishment decision.
Had the court applied the standards set forth in
DeCoteau and Rosebud, the court, given the historical
record at its disposal, should clearly have concluded
that the reservation had been disestablished, at least
in part.

1)

The face of the legislative act included
32

heretofore powerful reference to "public domain.11
2)

Surrounding circumstances evidenced aft intent to

disestablish, as did "subsequent events11 and demographic
information deemed so persuasive in Solem.

The population
3
and land use of the disputed area is over 907o non-Indian.
The federal government had not treated the area as an
Indian reservation since 1897.

The tribe itself had

obtained a monetary award in its claims afction [Ut-e Indian
Tribe v. U.S., 4 Ind. CI. Comm. 707 (1965)] based on the
35
tribe's allegation that it had "lost the reservation."
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3)

Documented legislative history also indicated an
36
intent to disestablish.
However, the Tenth Circuit en banc,in an expansive
reading of Solem concluded (5-2 decision) that despite
the unequivocal language of disestablishment, the
reservations had survived.

The en banc

majority

refused to analyze the ''surrounding circumstances"

and

"legislative history" factors which the Rosebud court
set forth in its standard for interpreting surplus lands
enactments. 37
The en banc

decision has further confused an

already complicated body of case law.

Petitioners

make a convincing plea for clarification

of disestab-

lishment standards in the aftermath of Solftn:
Only this Court can correct the ^n banc
majority's misreading of Solem, a misreading that not only would result in
transforming a vast region of the State
of Utah into an Indian reservation, but
also would threaten to have a similar
effect throughout the Western States in
other areas that are not now considered
to be Indian reservations. Alrejady the
Navajo Tribe of Indians, armed v^ith the
decision below, claims that 1.9 million
acres in New Mexico, which were "restored
to the public domain" in the early 1900fs,
are nevertheless part of an Indiian reservation because the en banc majority's
decision here renders "unsound" the view
^g
that such language ends reservation status.
The case has potential ramifications that extend far
beyond the immediate controversy in Utah.

39

Ute is a

critical juncture in the development of disestablishment
case law.

The Supreme Court, by granting certiorari,

could seize the opportunity to provide needed clarification.

CONCLUSION
If congressional intent determinations in disestablishment cases are to develop into a coherent body of
law, two preconditions must be met.

First, the Court must

adopt and consistently apply a standard for statutory
construction.

The standard set forth in DeCoteau and

Rosebud provides a ready model.

Second, the Court must

have access to necessary historical data if the standard
adopted includes ''legislative history1' or "surrounding
circumstances" elements.
The second precondition can only be met if
historians work with lawyers to compile, analyze, and
explain the significance of historical data.

The need

is great for general research relating to the General
Allotment Act, particularly the §5 surplus lands
provisions.

In other determinations, as well,

historians can aid the courts in providihg a proper
historical perspective for a fair adjudication of issues
relating to Congressional intent.
With proper historical guidance, Courts may be
less tempted to adopt a literalist approach to statutory
construction that can only deepen the state of confusion
that typifies disestablishment adjudications of the recent
past.
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The social, economic, and political tensions

created when land is "re-established" as [reservation land
after extended periods of non-Indian settlement were alluded
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[I]t ought not be the task of the Court to remake
history by revising the effect of acts of Congress
in order to conform them to modern policy, no matter
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that is just what the Court has undertaken
in this case. The result has been the perpetuation of a cruel historieal hoax on
thousands of innocent homesteaders and their
descendants in the Cheyenne River area.
These rangers and fanners now find themselves
after the passage of many decadejs, suddenly
thrust, into the unenviable statiis of residents
of an Indian reservation, where their elected
officials have only limited jurisdiction and
where they have no effective voice in the governance of their affairs and property by tribal
governments.
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SOVEREIGN-^
NATION
A remote Utah community struggles with the confusing
legacy of America's Indian reservation system.

O

utside the lumber store
across the street from the
small county courthouse
in Duchesne, Utah, a sign
gives the days prices on
"Lay Mash, Hog Grow, Hen Scratch,
Chick Starter and Turkey Feed." Nearby,
a group of men discuss how they feel
about living under "foreign" sovereignty.
One insists that he is not really concerned but adds, "If they push too hard,
just let me put it this way, there is going
to be a whole lot less of them soon."
"Why are you worried?" asks another.
"At least you got a paper from the Indians
saying you paid them for the land. All I
got is a paper from the Farm Bureau giving me my land. I may lose mine."
"Those darn Indians got paid two or
three times for that land," says a third
angrily. "They got paid for it when Congress took it and got paid again later.
Now they got the land too."
What happens when a sovereign country is reborn within the borders of the
United States? For more than a hundred
years, Congress, Presidents and the
courts have left a legacy of doubt, a legacy that has come home to Indian and
non-Indian residents of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation in northeastern Utah.
The reservation is located within tour
sparsely populated counties—mostly
Duchesne and Uintah Counties—in a
large, bowl-shaped area in northeastern
Utah. The bowl's rim is defined by jagged
mountains that tower 13,000 feet high
around an arid basin floor that is about
4,200 feet above sea level. It takes about

by Judy Jones
three hours to drive to Duchesne from
Salt Lake City, the state capital. The only
road into the area passes by long stretches of brown, wandering hills that harbor
no visible life.
The land in the basin is typical of the
desert West. It is covered with faded gray
sagebrush, tall pinyon pine, scrubby juniper trees and long, brown galleta grass.
But, however desolute it may appear to
the outsider, the area was used as hunting grounds by several bands of the I te
Indian tribe before the white man arrived in 1776. The area has been fought
over ever since.
Three million acres of reservation land
were originally set aside for the Utes un
der an executive order signed by Abra-j
ham Lincoln on October 3. I Ho 1 On July
14, 1905, however, Theodore Roosevelt
declared that the land should be opened
to entry, settlement and disposition under the general provisions of the home
stead and townsite laws of the United
States"—an order that muddied reservation boundaries. When, in the 19 40s,
over ^OO.OOO acres were legally re
turned to tribal jurisdiction, the Utes at
last held title to one million undisputed
acres of reservation territory' That situation lasted for 30 years, through several
court disputes that often resulted in opposing decisions and failed to set a coherent legal precedent for settling Indian
land cases.
Then, in the mid-I9"()'s, the Indians

went to court, again, this time to reclaim
all 3 million acres originally granted
them by the Federal Government. After a
decade of litigation, the 10th Circuit
Court sided with the Utes l<a.st year, the
Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal
of the lower courts decision.
Both Indians and non-Indians have re
acted slowly to the court's decision The
tribe has been excused from paying state
sales and income taxes, and it has liberal
ized tribal hunting rights to allow Indians
to hunt the entire area, including Federal
forest lands, throughout the year Aside
from those steps, no major actions have
been taken.
But much more is possible As a mat
ter of fact, a fact little known to most
white Americans, the I S Constitution
does stop at the border of most Indian
reservations, but not because they arc
islands of injustice.'" wrote the Indian
newspaper. The I^ikota Times, lax year
"It stops because the Indian nations are
sovereign Just as the I S Const mi don
hxs no validity in Canada. Mexico IVru
or in Europe, it is not the law of the land
on the sovereign Indian nations
Non-Indians in the affected area> seem
uncertain about what that means NX an
of outsiders who ask questions most \ o |
unteer only that nothing ha> happened
yet and won't concern them until it does
Secretaries and clerks in the Dmhcsne
County Courthouse glare at reporters
and mumble that the recent ruling
doesn't affect them at all "do a>k the
Indians what they think the\ ,uot Dun
ask them what they intend to do with it
they repeat several times, finalU asking
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to be left alone.
But Ron Johnson, a salesman in Duchesne, expresses outrage. "How would
you feel if the Russians came into New
York City and took over?" he asks. "I am
not going to leave. I am going to stay and
fight, and they will not drive me out. If
the whole town got up and left, I guess
I'd go too. But before I left, I'd burn the
town to the ground."
Dave Bauman, a retired city worker
who likes to hunt and fish and who is
known locally as Santa Claus because of
his long white beard, views the situation
differently. "We can buy a permit to hunt
and fish on their [Indian) land, which has
the best hunting hereabouts." Bauman,
whose wife, Lela, is part Indian, dismisses
local talk about the Indians moving in
and taking over. "They are not dumb and
stupid like people think they are," he says
of the Indians. "They have intelligent
leaders running things. We don't expect
any drastic changes."
But reliable
expectations—things
you'd bet the farm on—are hard to come
by here. Uncertainty is a kind of quicksand that the whole region has sunk into.
No one really knows what to expect. For
example, no one will lose their land, at
least not outright. According to the court
ruling, non-Indians who owned their
land before the ruling still own it; the
Indians cannot take land from any owner.
It is possible, however, that through land
use planning, environmental controls
and control of water rights, the Indians
could make the land literally unusable.

I

ndian government is quite different
from American constitutional government. Only about 450 of the
2,500 tribal members on this reservation
can register to vote. A voter must be 21
years of age and meet residency and tribal blood requirements. The governing
body for the Ute tribe, elected by tribal
members, is a six-member Business
Committee composed of two representatives from each Ute band: the Uncompahgres, the Uintahs and the White Rivers. The six members then elect one
committee member to serve as chairman.
The present chairman, Lester Chapoose, a fatherly man with a political science degree from the University of I tan,
says the major benefit of the court decision, which made the Ute Reservation
the second largest reservation in the nation, was an increase of Indian authority
over Indians. Before the Ute Law and Order Code was passed in 1975, he says,
"we had a tremendous amount of trespassing going on on this reservation that
went unchecked." When the tribes enforcement officers took people to Justice
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cenr?

Ihe non-Indians
don't fault the Indians
as much as the U . S .
Government. They
feel they should have
the same civil rights
as any other U . S .
citizen. And yet
they find themselvts
a nation within a
nation and a
jurisdiction within
jurisdiction."
of the Peace courts, he adds, "in almost
every instance the J.P court wouldj just
throw it out. We didn't have any authority at that time and we wanted to protect
our own people Tribal members ir} the
area of the reservation were subjected to
incarceration in Duchesne or Koose|veIt,
the non-Indian communities, and tpere
was a lot of discrimination going on to
get the tribe."
But Tom Tobin, an attorney who represents the local governments and Who
has specialized in Indian law for many
years, believes that jurisdictional uncertainties have made law enforcement
more complicated. While county officers
continue to have complete jurisdiction
over the non-Indians and mixed bjood
Indians, tribal members are now arretted
and tried by tribal authorities TobiJi xsserts that even major crimes like murjder.
which should be dealt with by Federal
courts, could be handled in tribal courts
where serious offenders could be lejt go
without punishment.
j
Ron Crittendon, an aide to Utah Republican Rep. Howard Nielson. is from
the area now considered reservation He
agrees that the present jurisdictional situation is complicated. "If it is Indian to
Indian, the Indians handle it If it is ilonUte tonon-Utc. then it clearly goes to the
white man's court. If it is Indian dtul rionIndian, then we just don't know
!>ontribal Indian gets to be a problem l"hc
sheriffs have asked. How do 1 know f he
is a Ute or not? Thev told them. Iff he
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looks like an Indian, he is an Indian and
you gotta treat him that way." The problem with that logic is that mixed bloods
are not members of the tribe nor are they
considered Utes unless they have more
than 50 percent Indian blood and at least
1 percent Ute blood.
There are other difficulties. The Business Committee rules over the tribal judicial system. There is no separation of
powers since tribal councils appoint tribal judges. If the Business Committee
doesn't agree with a judge's decision,
they simply remove the judge. A l i e
judge was fired recently by the Ute Business Committee when the judge declared that a number of mixed blood Indians were in fact members of the tribe.
At hearings for the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights held in Rapid City, S I ) , last
year, many Indians complained about
tribal justices lack of separation of powers. Agnes Bullickson, a formal tribal
treasurer of the Yankton Sioux tribe, testified that she tried to keep records of
tribal actions but got caught between
two tribal factions, who burned, stole or
otherwise misused her minutes She also
claimed that when she protested against
other tribal members trespassing on her
land and removing truckloads of wood,
tribal leaders tried to have her banished.
An attorney who testified about several
cases he had handled described one
criminal case in which tribal leaders denied a man bond simply because he was a
resident of another reservation, and not
because of the seriousness of his crime.
Judge Bertha C. Two Bulls, an xvsociate judge with the Pine Ridge Tribal
Court, told the commission that the Indian system doesn't work very well When
asked to explain why, she said. Because
of the same people being on the review
boards and the grievance board And
they are also commissioners
ITie pe< >
pie, you know, just give up after the first
hearing because it takes so long, and thev
have to just continually face the same
people. They are all the same — the\ are
the grievance committee and then thev
are the commissioners.' I think that the
Indian Civil Rights Act should be applied,
and that it should be enforced, but m a
lot of cases it applies to some and then it
doesn't apply to anybody at all she said
The hearing report is loaded with h«>r
ror stories of abuses of Indians b\ other
Indians—including police brutaht\ m b
al groups fighting among themselves and
verbal search warrants While tew MK h
cases have been reported among the I te
tribe, it is understandable that non huh
ans, and especially part Indians art w«>r
ried about the potential for mishandling
of legal situations.
The tribe's attornev, Ste\e l^»\iUn

maintains that the Indians are willing to
negotiate with non- Indians to clear up
confusion over the future of the affected
areas. But Chapoose is less certain. "The
question for the tribe," he says, "is going
to come down to, Do you legislate away
all the rights that you have gained? The
point here is if we go out there and negotiate with the state and come out losing
more than what we should, then it is no
good. We will have to look at the settlement real closely to see that we do not
give away this right that we have so long
and hard fought to get in the first place."
Dennis fckes, the first Deputy Director
of the Office of Indian Rights in the Justice Department, believes that Congress
should intervene. Ickes served as Deputy
Undersecretary of the Interior and, although he now represents Duchesne and
Uintah counties as an attorney, he describes himself as a longtime friend of the
Indians who does not want to deprive
Indians their rights of self-governance.
But, he says, Congress needs "to make
adjustments in existing law so as to, on
the one hand, protect and enhance tribal
sovereignty and, on the other hand, better protect the rights of individuals who
are subject to that sovereignty."

I

ckes points to another cause of apprehension in the region—uncertainty over the tribes ability to tax.
"Jurisdiction gives the power to tax," he
says. "It is a little bit ironic that here you
have taxation without representation—
the tribe governing without any ability
of the governed to participate in the
levying of the taxes. It is latent power
here. It is like the guy who has a gun
pointed at you, got the hammer cocked
and it is loaded with bullets. He says he is
not going to pull the trigger. Yet the ability to do that is present."
City and county officials worry aloud
that if at some point the Indians decide to
impose their own taxes, as they have on
other reservations, the already depressed area will be in dire straits. And
non-Indians will have no right to vote on
taxes, any more than they do on tribal
leaders.
The tax issue poses another problem—lost revenue. The court ruling
brought 90 percent of Duchesne County
and 60 percent of Uintah County within
reservation boundaries. County officials
express worry that their diminished tax
base might hurt their ability to fund law
enforcement as well as other vital government operations.
The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs has been holding hearings on
the problems of taxation on reservations.
The hearings have been held preliminary
to consideration of a Senate bill that

Melcher (D-Mont.) is using these hearings to make political points back home.
"To my way of thinking," he says, "it
would have been better to hold a bill on
taxation in the first place and decide
whether Congress had historically ever
intended that anything like that would
result. He holds the hearings as though
maybe they have the rights, but we want
to see the ramifications. They vote $400
million for the tribes for interim relief
since they are going to be deprived of
this important right."
Attornies in the case do not agree on
what the best solution to the problem is.
Ickes would like to see Congress leave
the reservation boundaries alone, let the
Indians have full jurisdiction over their
own and let the non-Indians have jurisdiction over their people and properties.
Tobin says the best answer is to have
Congress pass a law recognizing the original Congressional intent of leaving tribal
members on tribal property—which he
defines as the original one million acres
Indian attorney Boyden would like to see
both sides work out a solution together
and then have Congress set that agreement in stone.

11 is a little bit
ironic that here you
have taxation without
representation—the
tribe governing
without any ability of
the governed to
participate in the
levying of the taxes."
would impose a two-year moratorium on
the implementation of any tribal taxes
pending a study by a Presidential commission— in exchange for an aid package
to the Indians of over 1400 million to
alleviate economic and social hardships
caused by the moratorium.
Attorney Tobin charges that Sen. John
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The courts have been unable to resolve the issue in any consistent fashion
because they cannot agree on what Congress originally intended to be the fate of
the Indian reservations. Crittenden, his
folksy, country speech turning suddenly
to fire, maintains that the 10th Circuit
court decision completely ignored Congress's intentions, i t was the Congress
during that period of time [early 20th
century] that was trying to terminate the
reservations and turn Indians into regular folks," he says. "To try and say that
they didn't mean to is ludicrious. The
courts have decided it wasn't right to do
this to the Indians, so they are saying that
Congress didn't mean to do that [terminate the reservations]. That's legislating
in my mind. I think the 10th Circuit
Court did that."
id the Federal Government, and
Congress in particular, intend
originally to do away with reservations? Probably. Is that what Congress
wants today? Probably not. But some
clarification of the laws intent is clearly
necessary to prevent communities like
this one in Utah from sinking further into
a quagmire of uncertainty. Still, no decisive action appears forthcoming.
Sen. Jake Gam (R-Utah) has promised
to at least hold Senate hearings, if that is
what local officials want. But Gam's staff
say they have not heard from the counties in months. County government attornies say that the local people are not
able to finance lobbying efforts, while
the Indians have a well-financed and
well-organized Washington lobbying
group. "The problem here is that Congress does not work well without hearing both sides of a question," declares
Tobin.
Nielson, who represents the area, said
he believes that "the time is right for
cooperation between the Indians and the
non-Indians." But Nielson has not been
willing to press for any type of Congressional action because he does not think
Washington leaders would be interested
in dealing with Indian problems buried
in a Western desert.
Crittenden says that another reason
Nielson isn't trying to get Congress to do
anything at present is fear that it would
stop the parties involved from talking to
each other. "If we just say, Hey, were
going to go to Congress and were going
to go to court and were going to beat
you red-blooded pot lickers, we're not
going to. The non-Indians don't fault the
Indians as much as the U.S. Government.
The land was opened up, and they went
out there in g(x>d faith. They feel they

should have the same civil rights as any
other U.S. citizen. And yet tpey find
themselves a nation within a nation and a
jurisdiction within a jurisdiction.''
"If it keeps going like this," added former Duchesne County Commission
chairman Ted Kappen, "we could ail end
up back on Plymouth Rock with the rest
of the country owned by the Indians.
Let's face it, the Indians owned everything before we got here and this decision implies we should give it all back.
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Judy Jones is an investigative
for a Utah magazine.
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but other Westerners doubt that
happen. They are more inclined to a
with Nielson that Congress just isn'
terested in the problems of a remote
sert community. Nobody cares al
18,000 people living in the middle
Utah desert," says one non-Indian i
dent. "You can bet that if it were Man
tan the courts had given over to the I
ans, something would be done fast."
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